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Preface 
Is it possible to create "designer babies"? Is it ethical? Are current legal 
responses to these possibilities adequate? Th~s book is a response to these 
questions. It seeks to explore the legal and ethical issues raised by attempts 
to influence traits before birth. In essence, this book presents a moral 
critique of legal positions with regard to what is often referred to as 
"creating designer babiesy'-what I term "prenatal influence of traits." 
The details of the law and science can, however, be no more than a 
snapshot of the position as it stood at the time of writing. I have made every 
effort to state the legal and scientific position as of November 2001. 
Nonetheless, ignorance and misunderstanding are acute dangers for a 
project as ambitious as this. Despite these dangers I have attempted to 
provide detailed appendices on the relevant laws of no less than 17 
countries, viz. the 15 EU countries, Canada and the US. I have also 
attempted to keep abreast of the current science, which has been no easy 
task for a non-scientist in such a rapidly developing area. 
The legal and scientific background is, however, merely the subject 
matter of the book's argumentative framework. To some this m e w o r k  
will be unattractive simply because it stands as a development of a 
particularly ambitious moral theory-Man Gewirth7s Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC). I hope, however, that this book's relevance extends 
beyond the implications of any one moral position. This was c e d y  the 
intention and many aspects of the developed moral framework are equally 
required by other moral theories. 
Given the size of the book's subject matter some selectivity is 
unavoidable. I have chosen to focus on certain techniques of prenatal 
influence and their use as triggers for regulatory oversight. Thus, attention 
is directed towards abortion and prenatal diagnosis, preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis, embryo research, cloning, and prenatal gene therapy. 
This work displays debts to many people. 
First, I would like to thank Deryck Beyleveld, who supervised the 
doctoral thesis on which this book is loosely based. Anyone who has been 
supervised by him will understand much of my gratitude. Mine is, however, 
even greater because, as acknowledged in the text, some of the ideas in this 
book stem from our CO-authored work. 
Second, I would like to thank those who provided information on the 
laws of other jurisdictions over the last few years. I would particularly like 
to thank (in alphabetical order) Tim Caulfield (Canada), Tina Garanis- 
Papadatos (Greece), Hille Haker (Germany), Pierre Langeron (France), 
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Salla Lotjonen (Finland), Jo5o Carlos Loureiro (Portugal), Deirdre 
Madden (Ireland), Roberto Mordacci (Italy), Andr6 Gongalo Dias Pereira 
(Portugal), Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia (Greece), Nina Schultz-Lorentzen 
(Denmark), and Elisabeth Rynning (Sweden). Many others directed me 
towards sources of information and, as indicated in the text, provided 
information on individual laws. Any errors are, of course, mine. 
Third, I would like to thank those who were kind enough to proof-read 
early parts of the text, especially Fergus Malone. Special thanks must go 
to Julie Prescott who took care of the creation of the camera-ready copy 
and the final proof-reading. 
Fourth, I am grateful to those who commented on my earlier work and 
drafts of this book. These include Darren Shickle, Stuart Toddington, and, 
most crucially of all, the publisher's reviewer. The advice of Jennifer 
Gunning has been invaluable. I, of course, bear sole responsibility for 
what remains. 
Most important of all has been the love and support of my family. I 
would like to dedicate this book to Liz and our daughter, Abigail. 
Shaun Pattinson 
Postscript 
By the time you read this book it is inevitable that the law and science will 
have moved on. Even in the short time between finalising the text and 
preparing the camera-ready copy, Crane J's decision in R (on application 
of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWHC Admin 918 
has been overruled by the Court of Appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 29). By the 
time this book is published, an appeal might well have been heard by the 
House of Lords. Developments such as these, however, are no more than a 
minor inconvenience and formal legal changes have hitherto been 
painfully slow in the majority of the countries studied. Moreover, although 
legal and scientific developments can affect the application of the critical 
framework developed in this book, the framework itself is not affected by 
such contingencies. 
January 2002 
As many readers will be aware, during the last few months a number of 
countries have enacted legislation or are close to doing so (including 
Canada, France, the Netherlands and Sweden). With the exception of 
embryo research (which is slowly gaining great legislative acceptance), 
these developments do not reflect any great movement in the debate. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Few can avoid feeling sympathy for a child with Lesch-Nyhan syndrome. . 
Boys with this genetic condition are often mentally disabled and suffer 
extreme pain similar to that associated with gout. What is more disturbing is 
that its victims compulsively self-mutila-ften chewing off their lips, 
biting off their finger tips, or gouging out their eyes.' This condition surely 
invites our sympathy. It also raises difficult ethical (and regulatory) 
questions. Would it be wrong to use genetic technology to remove this 
condition from an unborn child? Would it be wrong to discard unimplanted 
embryos carrying the genetic mutation associated with this condition? Would 
it be wrong to abort a fetus if it carried this gene? Indeed, would it be wrong 
to test for it? If all a potential mother's eggs camed this genetic mutation, 
would it be wrong for her to use a cloning technique to avoid it? If the 
mother could avoid the effects of this genetic mutation by taking certain 
drugs when pregnant, would she be doing wrong if she did? 
At present, many of these questions are purely hyp~thetical,~ but science 
does not stand still. It is now possible to test for numerous genetic conditions 
before birth or, where fertilisation takes place outside of the body, before 
implantation into the womb. It is, in theory, possible to create a genetically 
identical copy of a living human being. It might one day be possible to 
genetically modifL an embryo either before it is implanted or as it develops 
in the womb. It might even become possible to influence the gestating child 
by changing the environment in the womb3 or by creating an artificial womb. 
The techniques that I am alluding to are those offering prospective 
parents opportunities to design their babies or, more accurately, to influence 
their traits before they are born. This book is concerned with the regulation 
of these techniques, which for convenience I will call the "techniques of 
prenatal infl~ence."~ My task is to probe the moral legitimacy of parental 
I Information on Lesch-Nyhan syndrome extracted from Kitcher 1996, especially 82; 
and Holm 1998,184. See also Lesch and Nyhan 1964. 
It is, however, possible to test for the genetic mutation causing this condition during 
gestation (see Connor and Ferguson-Smith 1997, 142; and Graham et al., 1996). 
As the thalidomide incident demonstrates, it is already possible to influence some 
characteristics by altering the environment in which the embryo or fetus develops E 4 I am using the word "prenatal" to refer to the period before birth, not just the i developmental period in the womb. This cut-off point is not being upheld as 
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desires in the context of attempts to regulate the techniques offering the 
potential to fulfil them-the techniques of prenatal influence. 
1.1 Moral Questions 
Before we can begin a moral critique of any sort we need a definition of 
morality. More precisely, we need to distinguish the moral from the non- 
moral. 
The definition used in this book is multifaceted. I use the word 
"morality" (and related terms) to refer to prescriptive imperatives 
(requirements purporting to be action guiding and addressed at others) that 
are categorical (unconditionally binding irrespective of one's inclinations or 
desires and taking precedence over all other imperatives), and other- 
regarding (requiring one to take account of the interests of persons other 
than oneself). 
The purpose of this stipulation is not to legislate on linguistic usage or to 
establish any substantive conclusion, but to aid expression and 
communication. Nothing but brevity would be lost if the word "moral" was 
replaced by a phrase such as "categorical other-regarding imperative" or an 
elaborate list of its defining components. 
Possessing a definition of moralit$ we can now address what one 
theorist terms the three central questions of moral philosophy, 
First, the authoritative question: Why should one be moral . . . ? . . . Second, 
the distributive question: Whose interests other than his own should the agent 
favorably consider in action? . . . Third, . . . the substantive question: Of 
which interests should favorable account be taken? (Gewirth 1978,3) 
The "authoritative" question requests a rationally adequate justification for 
the claim that there are moral (as opposed to non-moral) requirements on 
action. The "distributive" question asks what the objects of moral concern 
are. It asks to whom or what we owe moral duties. The "substantive" 
question asks which interests (of those we have duties to) we are required to 
take account of. 
These questions are interrelated, so that answering one goes a long way 
towards answering the other two. The next section will start with the 
authoritative question. The chapter will then go on to address less stringent 
ways of justifylng one particular criterion of moral permissibility (in 1.3 
below). 
significant per se, it is merely a stipulation on the subject matter of this book. See 
Chapter Three for analysis of the specific techniques in question. 
This definition is essentially the same as that adopted by Gewirth 1978, 1. 
Thus, this chapter briefly presents a number of ways of justifylng a 
particular criterion of moral permissibility. This criterion purports to be 
moral in the sense defined above (i.e., it is a categorical other-regardmg 
imperative). It is a criterion of moral rights where the holders of the rights 
and the bearers of the correlative duties are agents, i.e., beings who have the 
ability to reflect on their chosen purposes. These rights are rights to the 
necessary conditions of pursuing purposes at all or with general chances of 
success. 
1.2 The Dialectically Necessary Argument for Morality 
The authoritative question is one of the most controversial in philosophy. 
Justifying morality is certainly made no easier by the definition of morality 
adopted above. 
The moral theory on which I wish to rest my argument runs against the 
current trend of modem philosophy by claiming to establish a supreme 
principle of morality without reliance on any form of moral intuition, 
consensus, or contingency. Such talk of a "supreme principle of morality" 
certainly fits uneasily with widely accepted beliefs and the main body of 
moral philosophy. Nonetheless, this particular moral theory seeks to 
establish an imperative that is uniformly obligatory for all those capable of 
understanding its prescriptions. This is the moral theory of Alan Gewirth. 
In his seminal book, Reason and Moraliiy (1978), Gewirth argues that 
the supreme principle of morality is the Principle of Generic Consistency 
(hereafter the PGC). Gewirth's theory draws out the self-reflective 
implications of being an agent, where an agent is a being that has the ability 
to pursue chosen purposes. Of course, contingencies such as lack of resolve 
or resources might hinder an agent's ability to successfblly achieve its 
purposes, but to be an agent it must have the capacity to pursue its 
purposes. Thls capacity need not be readily perceptible to others; a purely 
mental action (such as pondering a mathematical problem) can be just as 
much a purpose as a physical action (such as walking to the post office). 
This latter point is relevant to the determination of who, other than oneself, 
is an agent, which will be discussed in the next ~hapter .~ 
The most insightful aspect of Gewirth's argument is its methodology. It 
adopts what Gewirth terms the "dialectically necessary method." It is 
"dialectical" because it is conducted in the form of an internal dialogue, 
beginning with claims that are made within this first-person perspective. It is 
"necessary" because all the steps of the argument follow logically (hence 
I refer to the agent as an "it" to avoid suggesting that agents are necessarily male or 
female or, indeed, necessarily have a sex. 
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necessarily) from premises that cannot be coherently rejected within this 
per~pective.~ 
Thus, Gewirth argues from the claim of an agent to be an agent within 
the first-person perspective of that agent. The argument is easier to absorb if 
divided into three stages. The first stage, seeks to establish that an agent 
must attach necessary instrumental value to its having those conditions that 
are necessary for it to act at all or with general chances of success (i.e., the 
generic features of agency). The second stage, seeks to show that this 
commits the agent to claiming rights to the generic features (i.e., the generic 
rights). The third stage of the argument, seeks to establish that an agent must 
accept that all agents have the generic rights (i.e., Gewirth's supreme 
principle of morality). I will present this argument first in skeletal form, 
before explaining in more detail how each step is derived. 
It should be kept in mind that this book is primarily concerned with the 
application of the PGC (or any equivalent moral principle), rather than its 
defence. 
1.2.1 Skeletal Outline of the Argument to the PGCs 
Stage I 
In claiming to be an agent I must (by definition) accept that 
(1) "I act (or intend to act) for a purpose that I have freely chosen," 
which entails 
(2) "My purpose is good." 
Since 
(3) "There are generic features of agency," 
I must accept 
' A dialectically necessary argument is to be contrasted with dialectically contingent 
and assertoric arguments. A "dialectically contmgent" argument is one where 
contingency is introduced by either the premises (i.e., they can be coherently denied), 
or the method of inference (i.e., the connection between the premises and the 
conclusion is not necessary). An "assertoric argument" is one where the conclusion 
follows fiom premises that are not dialectical, i.e., not tied to the claims of an 
interlocutor. 
This re-statement follows the structure of Beyleveld 1991, and Beyleveld and 
Pattinson 1998. I have, however, endeavoured to avoid the formalistic style of these 
works. 
(4) "My having the generic features is good for my achieving my 
purpose whatever that purpose is." That is, "My having the generic 
features is (categorically instrumentally) good." 
stage II 
This entails, 
(5 )  "I (categorically instrumentally) ought to pursue my having the 
generic features," 
which entails 
(6) "Other agents categorically ought not to interfere with my having 
the generic h tures  against my will, and ought to aid me to secure 
them when I cannot do so by my own unaided efforts f I  so wish," 
which is to say, 
(7) "I have both negative and positive rights to have the generic 
features. " In short, "I have the generic rights. " 
stage III 
This entails (as can be shown by reductio ad absurdum), 
(8) "I have the generic rights because I am an agent" 
which, by the logical principle of universalisability, entails 
(9) "Every agent has the generic rights because it is an agent." In short, 
"All other agents have the generic rights." 
Thus, 
(10) "All agents have the generic rights." 
Thus, by the logical principle of universalisability, 
(1 1) It is dialectically necessary for every agent to accept that all agents 
have the generic rights. This statement is referred to as the Principle 
of Generic Consistency (PGC). 
1.2.2 The Argument to the PGC Explained 
Since an agent is, by definition, a being that has the capacity to act for 
freely' chosen purposes, it must perceive any purpose that it pursues (or 
9 The word ''freely" here serves two purposes. First, it refers to what may be called 
external freedom, freedom from coercion or action forced by others. That is to say, if I 
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intends to pursue) as "good," in the sense of worth pursuing. This is simply 
because it is analytically true that a being who acts (or intends to act) for a 
freely chosen purpose must attach sufficient value to its purpose to motivate 
it to pursue that purpose, i.e., it must proactively value its purpose. 
Since an agent must proactively value its purpose, it must attach at least 
instrumental value to anythmg that is necessary for it to achieve that 
purpose. This follows from the agent reasoning according to principles 
that it must accept in order to be an agent. These include the principle that 
those freely pursuing an end must be prepared to pursue the means 
necessary for achieving that end. Thus, an agent must (if it is to avoid self- 
contradiction) attach at least instrumental value to those conditions that are 
necessary for it to act at all or with general chances of success. These 
conditions for sake of brevity are collectively referred to as the "generic 
features of agency." 
If the agent is to avoid denying what has just been established-that it 
must attach (categorical instrumental proactive) value to its having the 
generic features-it must claim that it (categorically instrumentally) ought to 
pursue and defend its possession of the generic features. 
Since an agent needs to have the generic'features in order to pursue and 
defend its possession of the generic features, an agent must be against 
interference with its possession of the generic features against its will. For 
the same reason, an agent must also be in favour of others helping it to 
secure possession of the generic features, when it wishes to have such help 
and is unable to secure them without help. Thus, the agent must claim that 
other agents categorically ought not to interfere with its having the generic 
features against its will, and ought to aid it to secure them when it cannot do 
so by its own unaided efforts, if it so wishes. 
This claim can be rephrased in terms of claim-rights as interpreted by 
the wilVchoice theory of rights.'' Thus, it is dialectically necessary for an 
am coerced into acting, I am not acting for a freely chosen purpose in the sense 
required to move from step (1) to (2). Second, it is used to refer to what may be called 
internal freedom. The move from step (1) to (2) does not require the agent to be free 
from deterministic causality, all that is necessary is that the agent feel free, in the 
minimal sense required for it to necessarily value its purposes. Perhaps, this sense is 
that of being capable of operating on the belief that it has some capacity for 
choice/control over its actions. If so, this psychological freedom (which will be purely 
illusionary freedom if the agent is not actually free) seems to be presupposed by its 
denial, because if I believe that I'm not free I must accept that this belief is itself 
caused, but this would mean that its truth value is irrelevant. By irrelevant, I mean 
that it would be no more a self-descriptive claim than the numbers displayed on a 
calculator's screen are for the calculator. Thus, any self-reflective being would appear 
to be required to believe itself to be free in this rmnimal sense. 
'O Claim-rights are justified claims imposing correlative duties on others. There are two 
orinci~al theories or conrntions of claim-rights: the benefit (or interest) theory and 
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agent to claim that it has negative and positive rights to have the generic 
features. Collectively these rights can be referred to as the "generic rights." 
The specific content of which will be analysed in the next chapter. 
So h, it has been shown that it is dialectically necessary for an agent to 
claim the generic rights for itself. At this point the argument is not other- 
regarding, i.e. it does not require the agent to take into account the interests 
of other agents. The next step then is to move from this self-regardmg (albeit 
other-referring) claim to an other-regardmg claim. 
To do this Gewirth looks towards the "logical principle of 
universalisability," which he states as 
if some predicate P belongs to some subject S because S has the property Q 
(where the 'because' is that of sufficient reason or condition), then P must 
also belong to all other subjects S1, S2 . . . , Sn that have Q. If one denies this 
implication in the case of some subject, such as S1, that has Q, then one 
contradicts oneself. For in saying that P belongs to S because S has Q, one is 
saying that having Q is a sufficient condition of having P; but in denying this 
in the case of S1, one is saying that having Q is not a sufficient condition of 
having P. (Gewirth 1978, 105) 
This principle is purely logical. Properly regarded it is no more than an 
explanation of what the word "because" means when it is used to import the 
concept of sufficient reason. All it claims is that if having Q is a sufficient 
reason for the claim that the subject S has P, then any subject (Sn) that has 
property Q will also have P. 
However, before Gewirth can apply the principle of universalisability he 
must first establish that an agent must regard the fact that it is an agent as 
the sufficient reason for its claim that it has the generic rights. In other 
words, he needs to show that the agent's clatm that it has the generic rights 
(which has just been established) entails the claim that it has the generic 
rights because it is an agent." 
To do this Gewirth invokes what he terms the "Argument from the 
Sufficiency of Agency" (the ASA) (see Gewirth 1978, 110). This argument 
takes the form of a reductio ad absurdurn in that it seeks to show that by 
the will (or choice) theory. The difference between the benefit and will theory is that 
the latter requires the right-holder to have the capacity to waive the benefit of the 
right (i.e., be an agent). 
Above it has been shown that it is dialectically necessary (and hence justitid) 
for an agent to direct claims of non-interfaendaid at other agents, and since an agent 
can choose not to pursueJdefend its generic features-it will only contradict itself if it 
does not attach at least imtrumental value to its generic features-the agent can waive 
the benefit of the correlative rights. Thus, the argument requires the adoption of the 
will theory of rights. 
I I I use the word "because" to refer to a mtlicient reason. 
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denying the claim that it has the generic rights because it is an agent, the 
agent denies that it has the generic rights. This is because denying that it has 
the generic rights for the sufficient reason that it is an agent, requires the 
agent to assert that it has the generic right because it has a property that is 
not necessarily possessed by all agents. However, this implies that if the 
agent lacked this property it would not have the generic rights, which 
contmd~cts the previously established statement, made on the basis of its 
claim to be an agent, that it has the generic rights. Thus, it is dialectically 
necessary for an agent to claim that it has the generic rights because it is an 
agent. 
All that thc ASA does is make explicit what has already been shown to 
be dialectically necessary. 
The principle of universalisability now operates on this claim to 
show "every agent has the generic rights because it is an agent." This 
dialectically necessary claim, when combined with the agent's 
previous dialectically necessary claim that it has the generic rights, entails 
the dialectically necessary claim that all agents have the generic rights. 
Applying the principle of universalisability to this, since an agent denies 
that it is an agent if it does not accept that all agents have the generic rights, 
it follows that every agent denies that it is an agent if it does not accept that 
all agents have the generic rights. Thus, it is dialectically necessary for every 
agent to accept that all agents have the generic rights. This is the Principle of 
Generic Consistency-the PGC for short. 
If successful, this argument provides answers to the authoritative, 
substantive, and distributive questions (1.1, above). The authoritative 
question asks what justification can be given for accepting that there are 
moral requirements on action. The answer, according to the argument above, 
is that I (any agent) would deny that I am an agent if I did not adopt a moral 
point of view (as defined above). The distributive question asks who the 
objects of moral concern are. The PGC answers that agents are the objects 
of moral concern (see Chapter Two). The substantive question asks which 
interests (of those I owe duties to) must I take account of. Accordmg to the 
PGC, I must take account of the generic rights, which are the rights of 
agents to the generic features, therefore the generic features are the interests 
that I must take account of. 
1.2.3 Evaluating the Argument to the PGC 
Given its conclusion, it is no surprise to find a great deal of academic 
resistance to this argument. Every stage of the argument has been critically 
probed by some of the world's most respected philosophers. The consensus 
is that there is a flaw in the argument, although there is no consensus as to 
where this flaw is.'' I base my argument on it because, as fhr as I can tell, no 
one has yet raised a successful objection. For those who are still not 
convinced two further points should be noted. First, Gewuth has addressed 
many of his critics, and Deryck Beyleveld has addressed just about all 
criticisms made up until 1990.13 Although objections are st i l l  bemg made, 
few take account of the responses already made and, in my opinion, all are 
variations of previously answered  criticism^.'^ Second, even if the argument 
to the PGC is on final analysis unsuccessful, my argument can be read as an 
argument from stated presuppositions. In short, I am not in this book. 
seeking to defend the PGC, but to apply it. 
The claims made for this argument are easy to misunderstand. The 
argument is dialectically necessary so it does not establish morality to be 
true tout court. It does not, as Gewirth puts it, establish the PGC as 
assertorically true. However, the lack of force independent of its dialectical 
foundations is more a theoretical point than a practical one. For all practical 
purposes the PGC must be treated as if it is true, because all those capable 
of following moral prescriptions are by definition agents (see Beyleveld 
199 1, 1 1 1- 1 13). l5 Nevertheless, it must be remembered that on a purely 
theoretical level what is necessarily true is not the PGC, but the claim 
lZ The argument to the PGC does, however, have its supportem, includmg Bauhn (1989, 
1995), Beyleveld (1 991), Beyleveld and Brownsword (1994), Birsch (19%), Heslep 
(1989), Hill (1984), Hoffma~~ (1991; 1996), Howie (1990); Kahn (1984), Lloyd and 
Freeman (1994, 386-387), Phillips (1996), Pluhar (1995), Reamer (1979; 1990), 
Steigleder (1 998), and Toddmgton (l  993a; 1993b). 
l3 Since it is nearly impossible to find every criticism of Gewirth's argument to the 
PGC, there a few criticisms, written in 1990 or before, that are not directly mentioned 
in Beyleveld 1991. These include Nozick 1981, 722; Singer 1985; Louden 1986; 
Putman 1987; and Freeden 1990. 
l4 Criticisms of the argument to the PGC, published after 1990, include Davis 1991; 
Hittinger 1992; Fotion 1993; Clayton and Knapp 1993, 160; Dyck 1994; Kramer and 
Simmonds 1996 and 1998; Kramer 1999; and O'Neill 1995. Gewirth has responded to 
some of these criticisms in Gewirth 1992; 1997a; 1997b; and 1998. Beyleveld 2002 
responds to Singer 2000, which presents one of the few criticisms claiming the ASA is 
invalid. Also, there is a book collating new papers criticising and &fen- the PGC, 
including a response by Gewirth: Boylan 1999. 
l5 Kant makes similar claims for the concept of fire will in GmnmvOnk for the 
Metaphysic of Moruls, after arguing that a rational with a will (i.e., an agent) 
would deny that it was such a being if it did not consider its will to be free. 
Now I assert that every being who cannot except under the Idea offreedom is by 
this alone-from a practical point of view-really h e ;  that is to say, for him all 
the laws inseparably bound up with freedom are valid just as much as if his will 
could be pronounced h e  in itself on grounds valid for hmetical  philosophy. 
(Kant 1785 as translated in Paton 1948,108) 
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Beyleveld 1999, 102-103. 
- -- -. -- IF- 
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that an agent will deny that it is an agent if it does not accept the PGC as the 
supreme principle of morality. 
Another thing that the argument does not do is reduce morality to reason 
(cf., e.g., Bond 1980; Reiman 1990). Showing that reason commits agents to 
a supreme moral principle does not reduce moral culpability to intellectual 
error. The moral culpability lies in violating the rights of other agents, not in 
violating reason. Logic-based reasoning is merely the means of establishing 
that we must accept that we have moral obligations, it is not itself the 
content of our obligations nor will it necessary motivate us to comply with 
these obligations. 
As shown above, a crucial step in the argument to the PGC 
demonstrates that the sufficient justifjmg reason for the agent's claim to 
have the generic rights is its possession of the capacity to value its purposes. 
Gewirth calls this step the "Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency" (the 
ASA). (The ASA links claims 6 and 7 in the skeletal summary of the 
argument above.) This step appears to make the application of the logical 
principle of universalisability straightforward. Since agents are (by 
definition) beings who value their purposes, this property is one possessed 
by all agents. Thus, the agent from whose viewpoint the argument is 
conducted must recognise that other agents have the generic rights. 
The ASA is, therefore, necessary to prove that it is dialectically 
necessary for an agent to recognise that other agents have the generic rights. 
This ASA works by demonstrating that an agent cannot restrict its claim to 
the generic rights to its possession of a property that only it possesses if it 
would still have to claim the generic rights were it to lack that property. 
What if, however, the sufficient reason for the agent's claim was that 
agent's specific valuing on its specific purposes? The agent from whose 
viewpoint the argument is conducted could not coherently lack this property. 
This involves a very subtle distinction. It is a distinction between (a) 
possession of the property defining agents as a class, and (b) possession of 
one specific (indexical) instance of that property. While (a) will be possessed 
by all agents, (b) will only belong to the subject of the argument, i.e. the 
agent from whose viewpoint the argument is conducted. Another agent 
cannot have (b). You cannot have (a) in the sense that I have (a), because 
you do not have the same relation to my purposes that I have. 
Beyleveld (199 1, 288-300) attributes to Scheuennann (1987) the claim 
that the ASA only demonstrates that agents must take (b) to be the sufficient 
reason for their claim to have the generic rights. Beyleveld argues, rather 
more fully than I will below, that even lf this claim is accurate, it does not 
defeat the argument to the PGC. 
This objection claims that the argument to the PGC assumes, without 
justification, that any agent can be substituted in my dialectical reasoning. 
However, no such assumption or substitution is necessary. The simple fact 
of the matter is that (b) implies (a). If I reason from my pro-active valuation 
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of my purpose, then I must reason from my membership of the class of 
agents, because if I were not a member of this class, then I would not be able 
to value my purposes. 
To be clear, the relationship between (a) and (b) is not merely one of a 
general category and one of its sub-categories. (a) implies (b) in a more 
restrictive sense than "being a bachelor" implies "being utmmied." From 
my dialectically necessary viewpoint (a) operates as (b). (a) cannot even be 
included in my dialectically necessary viewpoint without being portrayed as 
(b) (see Beyleveld 1991,295), 
Once this is appreciated, it becomes apparent that, in reasoning from my 
proactive valuation of my purposes, I am reasoning from my possession of the 
property of rpvp [i.e., my possession of (a)] (which necessarily belongs to all 
PPAs [i.e., agents]). (Ibid., 296) 
In my view, this is the most vulnerable step in the argument to the PGC. 
Thus, if the above argument is sound, the dialectical necessity of the 
PGC appears to be rationally inescapable. This has implications beyond the 
scope of this book, not least on the relationship between morality and a 
justifiable concept of law (see Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994). However, 
since my purpose is to evaluate existing positive legislation and regulations, 
it is simpler if I treat morality as if it were external to the law as, for present 
purposes, nothing of significance turns on this issue. 
1.3 Dialectically Contingent Arguments for the ff iC 
If a categorical other-regarding principle is to be justified to the rational 
amoralist, nothmg less than logical necessity operating on rationally 
necessary premises will do. Nonetheless, the idea of deriving a supreme 
moral principle purely logically from premises that are rationally undeniable 
by all relevant subjects is not surprisingly an unpopular one. 
One theorist went as far as declaring that, 
This is "philosophy as a coercive activity," and Gewirth comes quite close to 
the extreme of propounding "arguments so powerful that they set up , reverberations in the brain: if the person r e h  to accept the conclusion, he 
dies." (Regis 1984, 2)16 
16 Regis is quoting Nozick 1981 who was addressing philosophical strategies generally, 
rather than Gewirth's argument as such. 
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Others have rejected the methodology as "hke trying to squeeze blood out of 
a turnip7' (Nielsen 1984, 79), and so obviously flawed that the reader can be 
trusted to find its flaws unaided (see Nozick 1981, 722).17 
One supporter of M r t h ' s  project has adopted an approach that might 
be more appealing to such critics and presented dialectically contingent 
justifications for the PGC, i.e., dialectical arguments starting from premises 
that can be meamq@lly denied. Beyleveld 1996 presents arguments to show 
that the PGC follows logically from the claim that there are 
(a) human rights; 
(b) categorically other-regarding requirements on action (i.e., moral 
requirements as defined in 1.1); or 
(C) categorically bin- requirements on action. 
The point of presenting such arguments is more political than philosophical; 
it relies on the fact that these premises attract widespread support and are 
unlikely to be rejected. The relevancy of this approach should be evident. 
Premise (a), the idea that there are human rights, is one that is entrenched in 
all the legal systems under study. In all the EU countries, the US, and 
Canada the idea that humans have rights. by virtue of being human is 
foundational. This is reflected not only in the written constitutions of 
countries such as the US and France, and the Bill of Rights in countries such 
as Canada, but also in the common law of countries, such as England. 
Moreover, all these countries are signatories of various international human 
rights conventions. The UK has recently made an explicit commitment to 
securing human rights by giving circumscribed domestic effect to the main 
provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Where human rights are taken to be will (or choice) claim-rights 
commitment to the PGC is logically implied.'* Beyleveld (1996, 23-25) 
argues that to recognise (Will-choice) rights to anythmg requires one to 
recognise the necessary means of exercising that right, if one is to avoid 
contradicting oneself. This requires one to grant rights to the generic features 
of agency as the necessary conditions for exercising any rights irrespective 
of their specific content. Also, since only agents can m ~ l l y  exercise a 
right, agents must be the relevant subjects and objects of these rights. Thus, 
'' To quote, 
I leave it to the reader to decide where th~s attempt to have morality drop out of 
the category of purposeful action fails. (Nozick 1981,722) 
Beyleveld 1996 does not make the fact that the relevant conception of rights must be 
the will-choice conception explicit. If human rights are accepted only if defined by the 
interestkenefit conception, then the argument to the PGC will be an argument fiom 
duties (i.e., h categorical other-regarding requirements on action). 
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granting human rights (understood as will-choice rights possessed by virtue 
of being human) requires one to recognise generic rights of agents. 
The soundness of this argument turns on the fact that the capacities 
necessary to exercise rights (to waive the benefits or burdens of rights) and 
to be a meanhgfbl subject or object of practical precepts are the attributes 
of agency. 
Of course, the argument from acceptance of human rights will have no 
persuasive force for those who do not accept the supposition that there are 
human rights. However, a parallel argument can be presented from 
acceptance of moral duties; from the supposition that there are categorically 
bindmg and other-regardmg requirements on one's action (see Beyleveld 
1996,32-35). According to this argument, if I accept that I owe categorical 
duties to others, then I must claim that I ought to have the necessary 
conditions of my fblfilling those duties. That is, I must claim rights to my 
possession of the generic features. Since I owe these duties by virtue of 
being an agent (which follows fiom the supposition that these duties are 
categorical), by the logical principle of universalisability all other agents 
owe these duties. Thus, all other agents must also claim rights to the generic 
features. Since these duties are other-regarding, 1 must accept duties to 
maintain and advance the generic features of other agents. Universalisation 
of this leads to the PGC. 
A slightly weaker conclusion is sought by a similar argument presented 
by Doyal and Gough (1991, Chapter Five). They invoke the principle 
"ought" implies "can" to demonstrate that if B holds A to have any 
obligations to others, then B must accept an obligation to forebear from 
preventing A from doing her duty (i.e., an obligation not to interfere with A S 
minimal needs) and an obligation "at least to conMbute towards A's 
minimal needs-satisfaction" (ibid., 95). In other words, in Gewirth 
terminology, they apparently argue that to accept that others owe duties 
implies acceptance of duties to maintain and advance that other's generic 
features. 
If the dialectically contingent arguments are successful, even if the 
dialectically necessary argument were not, opponents of the PGC are faced 
with a choice between giving up their opposition to the PGC or giving up 
claims that they are likely to hold dear-such as the claim that there are 
human rights. Thus, in this sense at least, this book is an attempt to draw out 
, the logical implications of belief in human rights. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The abstract moral principle discussed above might seem f%.r removed from 
the ethical and regulatory questions asked at the of this chapter. 
Indeed it is. This starting point needs considerable expansion and 
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supplementation before it can be applied to the subject matter of this book. 
The mere supposition of a moral principle gran- rights to the generic 
features of agency to all agents does not, by itself, tell us much about the 
morality of the techniques of prenatal influence or how to regulate their use. 
This criterion of moral permissibility needs to be developed if it is to be 
applied to practical problems. The next step is to ask what or whom this 
principle protects. In Chapter Two, I will argue that this question must be 
asked with reference to the limitations of possible knowledge. We must hce 
head on what is known as the problem of other minds, i.e., the problem that 
however much the empirical evidence leads us to believe that other beings 
have minds, interpreting the evidence in this way requires metaphysical 
assumptions that we cannot know for certain. It is only against this 
backcloth that our answers can have practical significance for determining 
our obligations to objects and beings in the empirical world. 
After this moral frsunework is developed, Chapter Three will outline the 
ethical and regulatory issues raised by the subject matter of this book. The 
rest of the book will analyse this subject matter, the techniques of prenatal 
influence, with reference to the current regulatory position in the 15 member 
states of the EU, Canada, and the US. 
Chapter 2 
Moral Status: 
The Objects of Moral Concern 
Before evaluating the morality of existing attempts to regulate the techniques 
of prenatal mfluence, it needs to be asked what or who matters morally. We 
need to ask to what we owe moral concern, where being an object of moral 
concern involves being owed duties, or to put it another way, involves having 
moral status. 
There are two ways in which a being or object can attract moral status. 
The first way is for it1 to attract moral status directly, solely on the basis of 
its characteristics. I will refer to this as intrinsic moral status. The second 
way is for it to attract moral status indirectly, as a means of protectq the 
moral status of those (others) with intrinsic moral status. I will refer to thts 
type as indivect moral status. 
In this chapter, I concentrate on the determination of what or who has 
intrinsic (or direct) moral status. Nevertheless, the existence of indirect 
moral status indicates that even if a being has no intrinsic moral status, it 
does not follow that we can treat it as we like with impunity. 
Towards the end of this chapter it will be argued that determining moral 
status is only the first step towards understanding our moral obligations. The 
other steps or factors will be analysed. 
2.1 Grounds for Possession of Intrinsic Moral Status 
Possession of intrinsic moral status can be grounded on possession of a 
number of characteristics or properties. There are many possible criteria for 
possession of moral status. Some wish to grant moral status to those who are 
(a) living creatures; 
(b) sentient, i.e., capable of experiencing pain; 
(c) human, i.e., member of Homo sapiens; 
(d) agents, i.e., able to act for purposes constituting their reasons for action; 
1 I use the word "it" throughout to avoid implying that those with moral status are 
necessarily human or gendered. 
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(e) partial agents, i.e., non-agents who possess some of the characteristics 
of agents; or 
(f) potential agents, i.e., non-agents who have the potential to become 
agents. 
These are just examples. Each criterion has its supporters and critics. For 
example, some theological positions wish to ground possession of intrinsic 
moral status on membership of the species Homo sapiens (see, e.g., Noonan 
1970); yet others denounce this criterion as a morally repugnant prejudice 
comparable to racism and sexism (see, e.g., Singer 1995). 
Another heavily criticised criterion is that of potential agency or, as it is 
sometimes phrased, potential personhoodhumanity. The major objection to 
the claim that intrinsic moral status is grounded on potential agency depends 
on it being formulated as a means of deriving moral protection fiom the 
claim that agents have moral status. When formulated in this way, it can be 
objected that potential qualification for possession of intrinsic moral status 
cannot serve as a sufficient ground for actual qualification for possession of 
intrinsic moral status. To use the words of John Hams, "[wle are all 
potentially dead, but no one supposes that this hct  constitutes a reason for 
treating us as if we were already dead @Ianis 1998a, 50). This claim, 
sometimes referred to as the "logical point about potentiality" (see Feinberg 
and Levenbrook 1993, 206), is indubitably correct. This logical point, 
however, demonstrates only that the sufficiency of potential agency (for 
possession of intrinsic moral status) cannot be derived fiom the sufficiency 
of actual agency. It does not show that potential agency cannot, with the 
support of further premises or independently of its relationship to actual 
agency, be a sufficient ground for possession of intrinsic moral status. 
Nonetheless, there are many other criticisms of the concept of 
potentiality. For example, according to Hanis, 
if the potentiality argument suggests that we have to regard as morally 
s imcant  anythtng which has the potential to become a fully fledged human 
being, and hence have some moral duty to protect and actualize all 
human potential, then we are in for a very exhausting time of it indeed. 
(1998a, 50) 
This argument is weaker than it first appears, as it leaves two lines of 
response. First, we could take advantage of the "if' and develop a 
potentiality argument that does not impose a duty to protect and actualise all 
potential. Potentiality can be held to be sufficient for granting full moral 
status, a fixed degree of moral status below this level, or moral status that is 
proportionate to the degree of potential possessed. It does not follow fiom 
the fact that a being has some intrinsic moral status that we must protect it 
no matter what consequences this has for those with greater moral status. To 
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take just one example, if the potentiality aqgment operates on the basis of a 
threshold, counting only those with a certain degree of potential, then we will 
only have a duty to protect those above that threshold, and then only insofar 
as this is consistent with our other (potentially hierarchically more 
important) moral obligations .2 
Second, a proponent of the potentiality criterion can always bite the 
bullet and accept that we are obliged to protect and actuahse such potential 
insofar as we can.3 Hanis has given no argument why this is wrong in 
principle, as opposed to being merely counter-intuitive. 
Moreover, with regard to this and the other possible grounds for 
possession of intrinsic moral status, where one is dealing with a categorical 
moral principle, precautionary reasoning will operate to protect those who 
might possess the relevant properties. This type of argument will be 
presented below (2.4) in connection with the moral theory on which the 
thesis of this book is premised. For now, it is sufficient to note that since the 
violation of a categorical moral principle is (by definition) absolutely 
impermissible, and we can never be certain that another being lacks 
whatever property is held to be necessary for possession of intrinsic moral 
statusY4 we must treat all other beings as possessing the relevant property 
unless doing so itself threatens to violate that categorical moral principle. 
2.2 Grounds for Possession of Intrinsic Moral Status Underpinning 
Current Regulation and Debate 
Rhetoric capable of simultaneously appealing to more than one criterion for 
, possession of intrinsic moral status is pervasive. 
At the international level, rhetoric with widespread appeal peppers 
international instruments, such as the European Convention on Human 
fights and Biomedicine. Article 1 of this Convention demands that parties to 
, it "protect the dignity and identity of all human beings." The World Health 
Organisation's 1997 resolution adopts similar language, 
1 
The use of cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically 
t unacceptable and contrary to human integrity and morality. (Quoted in UNESCO 1998, my emphasis) 
2 For an example of a threshold argument, whereby only a specific type of potentiality 
(labelled "strong potentiality") is said to count, see Stone 1987. 
3 There is no reason why a proponent of potentiality is committed to denying that 
"ought" implies "can." 
4 Simply because of the limitations of empirical knowledge and the logical possibility of 
innumerable alternative metaphysical explanations for any given set of empirical 
facts. 
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Such rhetoric could appeal to those adopting any of the positions outlined 
above (2.1). All the positions outlined grant full intrinsic moral status to 
normal adult human beings and the rhetoric used can suggest that what is 
being protected or referred to is the moral status of adult human beings or 
the status of human agents as duty bearers. Also, the term "human" 
ambiguously suggests advocacy of two different views: the view that moral 
status rests on membership of the human race (i.e., human in the biological 
sense) and the view that moral status belongs to agents or persons (i.e., 
human in a moral sense). Although, it must be admitted, the former 
interpretation is the most persuasive. 
The language of national bodies is similarly vague, seeking widespread 
appeal rather than clarity of position or argument. For example, the 
published opinions of the Portuguese National Council of Ethics for the Life 
Sciences are loaded with assertions that science must serve "human life and 
dignity" (1995, 3), and protect "the dignity of the human person, the 
equilibrium of the human species and life in society" (1997, 2). Similarly, in 
the UK, two bodies have vaguely asserted that cloning "raises serious ethical 
issues, concerned with human responsibility and instrumentalisation of 
human beings" (HGAC and HFEA 1998a, 16). 
Even where the language appears to be committed to a particular stance, 
further analysis often reveals an underlying vagueness. For example, the 
Warnock Report, which formed the basis of the UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, asserts that "the embryo of the human species ought 
to have a special status" albeit less than that of a living child or adult 
(Warnock 1985, para. 11.7). This reference to "the human species" suggests 
advocacy of the view that intrinsic moral status is grounded in membership 
of the human race, but special status for the human embryo could plausibly 
be derived from potential agency or even indirect considerations. This latter 
point highlights the danger of looking at the national and international debate 
for insight into the criterion for possession of intrinsic moral status in play.5 
This danger is even more evident when analysing different regulatory 
structures. There are of course exceptions-Ireland appears to have adopted 
the Roman Catholic Church's position groundmg moral status on being 
human in the biological sense (see 4.3.2). However, in the main, analysing 
different regulatory approaches is unlikely to reveal the level of intrinsic 
moral status granted, or to what it is granted, because beings might be 
protected as a means of protecting the intrinsic moral status of others. 
Legislation might protect the embryo because it is thought to possess a high 
degree of intrinsic moral status or because the embryo is thought to have a 
Many other examples could be cited. E.g., the now customary nod in the direction of 
"human dignity," is another rhetorical device used to reach agreement by hiding the 
true nature of dissensus and disagreement (see 6.3). 
high degree of indirect moral status (e.g., it might be protected as a means of 
protecting the moral interests of adult humans). 
Moreover, any political consensus or regulatory approach is more likely 
to be the result of political compromise than the adoption of a theoretically 
pure perspective. Indeed, a regulatory approach is more likely to tell us 
about the compromises made or evaded than about the underpinning ground 
for possession of intrinsic moral status (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b, 
255-258). 
This does not, however, mean that there is no way to determine the level 
of intrinsic moral status a being possesses. The absence of political 
consensus has no relevance to the determination of who has moral status at 
the level of prin~iple.~ Morality, as defined in Chapter One, comprises a set 
of categorical other-regarding obligations the existence of which is not 
dependent on their recognition as such. Since my argument is premised on 
the claim that it is necessarily true that an agent denies that it is an agent if it 
fails to accept and act in accordance with the PGC, reliance on consensus, 
intuition, or alternative moral perspectives is to be rejected7 If the 
acceptance of this conclusion strikes the reader as being unduly dictatorial, 
or lacking moral appeal, this can only be because a prior moral framework is 
being implicitly appealed to. 
2.3 To What Does the ff iC Grant Intrinsic Moral Status in the 
Abstract, as Part of Its .Ontology?8 
As just restated, Alan Gewirth demonstrates that agents and prospective 
agents (hereafter "agents") are committed to accepting the PGC on pain of 
denying that they are themselves agents. There is no contingency in starting 
with the concept of an agent. Agents are, quite simply, the only beings for 
which questions as to what one ought to do can have meaningful import. The 
abilities necessary to be the meaningful object or subject of a moral 
imperative (or any practical precept) are the abilities of agency. Unless one 
is able to reflect on one's ability to act for purposes constituting one's 
6 Cf. the following statement of the (Canadian) Discussion Group on Embryo Research. 
The pluralistic nature of Canadian society does not allow for a settled definition 
of the moral status of the embryo . . . . The human embryo by virtue of their [sic] 
humanness has a certain moral status and, therefore, should be treated with 
respect. (1995, 1) 
The only alternative is to reject the premise of this book, the PGC, which requires 
refutation of the arguments that have been presented elsewhere to defend this premise 
(see 1.2.2). 
B The following argument is derived from Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998 and 2000a. 
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reasons for acting, one is not able to be the object or subject of practical 
precepts in any meaningful sense. 
Since the PGC requires agents to act in accordance with the "generic 
rights" of other agents, it should be quite clear that the PGC grants 
intrinsic moral status to agents. It is, however, debatable whether this moral 
principle grants intrinsic moral status, as part of its ontology, to any other 
beings (see, e.g., Hill 1984; Gewirth 1984; Pluhar 1995, ch. 5). 
Gewirth himself maintains that the PGC grants moral status to various 
beings that he classifies as non-agents, such as young children, the 
mentally deficient, fetuses, and non-human animals (see Gewirth 1978, 
121-124; 140-145). He argues that the "Principle of Proportionality" 
operates to extend the population to which the PGC applies in the abstract 
to encompass those who have only some of the characteristics necessary 
for agency-partial agents. 
The principle Gewirth claims is able to effect this derivation, the 
Principle of Proportionality, states, 
When some quality Q justifies having certain rights R, and the possession of Q 
varies in degree in the respect that is relevant to Q's justifying the having of R, 
the degree to which R is had is proportional to or varies with the degree to 
which Q is had). . . . Thus, if x units of Q justify that one have x units of R, 
then y units of Q justify that one have y units of R. (Gewirth 1978, 121) 
As stated in Chapter One, in the process of deriving the PGC it is 
demonstrated that agents must (on the pain of denying that they are agents) 
consider being an agent as the sufficient condition for possession of all the 
generic rights. Thus, the claim that partial agents have the generic rights in 
part requires the substitution of "being an agent" for Q, and "the generic 
rights" for R in the Principle of Proportionality. In short, what Gewirth 
wishes to do is use the Principle of Proportionality, together with the PGC, 
to infer that as a being approaches agency it is accorded proportionally 
greater generic rights. Thus, he argues, agents have the generic rights in 
full-all the generic rights at full strength-whereas partial agents have the 
generic rights in part-limited generic rights of comparatively weaker 
~trength.~ 
However, even if the Principle of Proportionality is reformulated so that 
it becomes a necessarily true principle (maintaining the rational necessity of 
its import for agents)," there are a number of reasons why the ontology of 
See, e.g., Gewirth 1978, 121-124 and 140-145; analysed in more detail in Beyleveld 
and Pattinson 1998 and 2000a. 
'O The Principle of Proportionality, as stated by Gewirth, is not a necessarily true 
principle (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998 and 2000% 46). However, it is necessarily 
true that, if having Q justifies having R, and the possession of Q varies in degree in 
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the PGC cannot be changed solely by its application. Three such reasons 
demonstrate that having the capacities necessary and sufficient to be an 
agent is necessary (and sufficient) for having any generic rights at all. First, 
the generic rights, by virtue of their derivation, are wiWchoice claim-rights, 
which (as they presuppose the ability to waive the benefits of the rights) can 
only meaningfully be possessed by agents. Second, since the subjects of the 
generic rights are also the objects of correlative duties, the imposition of 
proportional generic rights implies the imposition of proportional duties, and 
partial agents cannot meaningfully be the subjects of duties to any degree. 
B r d ,  the force of these objections cannot be evaded by claiming that the 
Principle of Proportionality can be used to derive intrinsic moral status for 
partial agents in the form of "quasi-generic rights," i.e., benefivinterest 
claim-rights, the benefits of which are not waivable. This is simply because 
the Principle of Proportionality is a quantitative manipulator so that it can 
only (acting on its own) alter the quantity of a variable, rather than the 
quality of a variable. In other words, the Principle of Proportionality cannot 
(without the assistance of another principle) derive quasi-generic rights from 
a claim about generic rights. 
I have argued that the PGC, in the abstract, grants intrinsic moral status 
to agents, but not (at least by application of the Principle of Proportionality 
alone) to partial agents. But what about potential agents, i.e., those non- 
agents who have the potential to become agents? 
Gewirth and Steigleder wish to derive moral status for potential agents 
by modifjrlng the ontology of the PGC. Gewirth (1978, 142) sees this as an 
application of the Principle of Proportionality, whilst Steigleder (1998, 241- 
242) appears to derive intrinsic moral status for potential agents 
conceptually from the concept of potentiality itself. 
There is, however, a fatal objection to attempts to derive intrinsic moral 
status for potential agents under the PGC (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 
2000a, 46-49). For any being (X) to be granted direct protection under the 
PGC it must be demonstrable that agents must (on the pain of denying that 
they are agents) grant X at least some moral worth by virtue of X's 
degree in the respect that is relevant to having Q's justifying the having of R, then 
the degree to which R is had is a function of the degree to which Q is had. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be inferred kom this (without M e r  provisos) that having R is 
such a function of having Q that, if having X units of Q j- that one have X units of 
R, then having y units of Q justify that one has y units ofR for all values of X and y. 
Also, since R can be any property at all, the Principle of Proportionality can be 
stated more explicitly as, 
When having some quality Q justifies having some property R, and the extent of 
having Q sufficient to justify having R in full is not necessary to justify having R 
to any extent at all, the degree to which R is had is a function of the degree to 
which Q is had. (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000% 46) 
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characteristics. In other words, an agent must deny that it is an agent by 
denying that potential agency is a sufficient reason for possession of intrinsic 
moral status. 
But an agent cannot deny that it is an agent by refusing to accept that 
possession of a property it cannot possibly possess is sufficient for some 
intrinsic moral status. Additionally, an agent cannot (by definition) be a 
potential agent where a potential agent is understood to be a non-agent 
possessing the potential to become an agent. Thus, being a mere potential 
agent cannot possibly be a sufficient reason for the conferment of any direct 
moral protection under the PGC. 
It also follows fiom this line of reasoning that an agent cannot deny that 
it is an agent by refusing to accept that possession of a property not 
necessarily possessed by agents (as opposed to not possibly being possessed 
by agents) is sufficient for some intrinsic moral status. Thus, we can say that 
those beings that are not at least partial agents cannot possibly be granted 
intrinsic moral status under the PGC. 
In summary, the PGC definitely grants intrinsic moral status to agents, 
does not appear to grant any intrinsic moral status to partial agents (it 
certainly cannot grant such protection to partial agents by the mere 
application of the Principle of Proportionality), and cannot grant intrinsic 
moral status to potential agents or beings that are not at least partial agents. 
2.4 To What Does the PGC Grant Intrinsic Moral Status in Ractice, 
as Part of Its Application to the Objects in the Empirical World?" 
It appears that the PGC grants intrinsic moral status, in the abstract, only to 
agents. Thus, if we are going to apply the PGC to objects in the empirical 
world we need to be able to determine who, or what, are agents. 
As defined, being an agent involves having a specific kind of mental 
attitudeit involves having the reflective, purposive capacity of proactively 
valuing one's purposes. Thus, since I (any agent) have direct access to my 
mental state, I can know with certainty that I am an agent. I cannot even 
doubt my own possession of the requisite self-reflective purposivity without 
thereby demonstrating that very thing, because the very act of denying that I 
have self-reflective purposivity involves acting for the reflective purpose of 
denying that I have this capacity. 
I cannot, however, know that any other being is an agent in this way. I 
do not have direct access to the mental state of another being. I cannot, 
therefore, necessarily presuppose the agency of others by denying it. At 
most, I (any agent) can try to determine whether some other being " X  is an 
l1 The following argument is in part derived tkom Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998 and 
2000a. 
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agent by constructing a model of the characteristics and behaviour to be 
expected of an agent, and testing X's characteristics and behaviour against 
it. However, even if X &splays all the characteristics and behaviour 
expected of an agent (as most adult human beings do), we can only say that 
it is ostensibly an agent (hereafter an ostensible agent). It remains logically 
possible that X is merely a cleverly programmed automaton without a mind. 
In another context Feinberg and Levenbrook claim, 
What makes me certain that my parents, siblings, and friends are people [in 
the above terminology, agents] is that they give evidence of being conscious 
of the world and of themselves; they have inner emotional lives, just like me; 
they can understand things and reason about them, make plans, and act; they 
can communicate with me, argue, negotiate, express themselves, make 
agreements, honor commitments, and stand in relationships of mutual trust; 
they have tastes and values of their own; they can be frustrated or fulfilled, 
pleased or hurt. (1995, 201, my emphasis) 
Despite Feinberg and Levenbrook's reassurances, we can never be certain 
that Descartes' evil demon is not deceiving us by projectmg appropriate 
behavioural patterns into our minds or by programming the objects that we 
perceive. The relevance of empirical evidence for determining whether 
another being is an agent depends on metaphysical assumptions. 
Thus, a sceptic might claim that although the PGC is categorically 
binding on agents, it cannot be demonstrated (to any agent) with the required 
degree of rational stringency that there are any other agents. Without such 
rational demonstrability, the PGC is rationally necessary for agents only in 
an abstract way, divorced fiom our actions in the empirical world. 
There are a number of contingent ways of responding to the sceptic (see 
Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000a, 41-42). However, what we need is a reason 
that is rationally compelling for agents for acceptmg that (or acting as if) 
other agents exist. This reason is provided by the application of 
precautionary reasoning to the categorically binding nature of the PGC. 
It can be conceded that where X is an ostensible agent (i.e., displays all 
the characteristics and behaviour expected of a being with the capacity for 
reflective purposivity) the propositions "X is an agent" and "X is not an 
agent" have the same epistemiclcognitive status. That is to say, it can be 
conceded that it is logically possible for either proposition to be true (though 
not in the same sense at the same time). However, the PGC imposes a 
framework for interpreting these propositions, because these propositions 
have significantly divergent moral import. If I mistakenly presume X to be 
an agent, then, although this will lead me (mistakenly) to have to restrict my 
exercise of my rights to some extent, I do not deny my (or any other agent's) 
status as a rights-holder. In contrast, if I mistakenly presume X not to be an 
agent, then I deny X (an agent) is a rights-holder. In short, the consequences 
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of being wrong in one case involve restricting the exercise of my rights, and 
the denial of all the rights of a right-holder in the other. 
Therefore, all things being equal, presuming that X is an agent runs far 
less risk of violating the PGC than presuming that X is not an agent. Since 
the PGC is categorically binding, it can never be justifiable to run the risk of 
violating it where this can be avoided. Therefore, it is categorically 
necessary to do whatever one can to avoid denying the agency of others, 
provided only that the actions taken do not conflict with the hierarchically 
more important requirements of the PGC. 
Where X is an ostensible agent it is, by definition, possible to treat X as 
an agent possessing the generic rights. It follows that I can avoid the risk of 
mistakenly denying the intrinsic moral status that X might have altogether by 
presuming X to be an agent and acting accordingly. 
Thus, except where I am faced with an unavoidable conflict between the 
hierarchically most important generic needs of myself and an ostensible 
agent," I must totally ignore the metaphysical possibility that X might not be 
an agent. X's ostensible agency is to be taken as sufficient evidence that X 
has the capacities needed to be an agent. 
As stated elsewhere, this reasoning invokes a Precautionary Principle, 
If there is no way of knowing whether or not X has property P, then, insofar 
as it is possible to do so, X must be assumed to have property P if the 
consequences (as measured by the Principle of Generic Consistency) of erring 
in presuming that X does not have P are worse than those of erring in 
presuming that X has P (and X must be assumed to not have P if the 
consequences of erring in presuming that X has P are worse than those of 
assuming that X does not have P) .  (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000a, 43) 
What about those beings and entities-such as gametes, embryos, fetuses, or 
newborn children-who do not display all the characteristics and behaviour 
expected of an agent? Although they display some related characteristics and 
behaviour,13 the evidence persuasively suggests that they are not agents. 
l' This exception will only apply in extreme circumstances (such as where two men are 
both trying to hang on to a piece of wood that will not support both their weights after 
a shipwreck). It is important to note that the conflict must be (a) unavoidable, so that 
the proviso does not apply where I am responsible for the occurrence of the conflict in 
the first-place; and (b) a conflict over the most basic generic needs, i.e., the 
consequences of my not treating the other as an agent must involve irreparable 
damage to my ability to act at all. See 4.2. for M e r  discussion of this reasoning. 
l 3  Spermatozoa, e.g., are alive and, during the fertilisation process at least, behave in 
ways that are vaguely goal-orientated; albeit more suggestive of biochemical 
hardwiring than a rational will. An even greater degree of partial agency is displayed 
by newborn babies who also display some ability to interact with, and learn from, 
their surroundings. 
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They cannot even be treated as agents with the generic rights in the same 
way that ostensible agents can, as they do not display the ability to exercise 
the generic rights (the benefits of which are waivable), or to act in 
accordance with the generic rights of others. 
Nonetheless, I cannot be certain that these are not in fact agents. It 
remains possible-though admittedly counter-intuitive and not at all likely- 
that a being or entity who does not &splay ostensible agency is in fact an 
agent. A failure to display ostensible agency does not conclusively prove that 
a being is not an agent. So, if I suppose it is not an agent and act 
accordingly, I could thereby be depriving it of the protection of the PGC to 
which it is entitled. 
We cannot avoid denying the possible intrinsic moral status of such a 
being altogether, because we cannot meaningfully treat it as an agent with 
the generic rights. We can, however, grant (necessarily paternalistic) "duties 
of protection" to those who appear to be only partial agents. Such duties 
require agents to assist and refrain fiom harming such beings in ways that 
protect the benefits that they would receive if they had the generic rights and 
chose to exercise them. In short, we must grant what appear to be only 
partial agents duties of protection, as this is the only way of avoiding 
violating their moral rights, should they in Eact be agents. 
Where does this leave us if we are Eaced with a conflict between two 
such beings? Well, precautionary reasoning explicitly declares that I must 
treat all possible agents as agents except where this threatens to violate the 
more important requirements of the PGC. Thus, all things being equal, such 
conflicts are to be handled by a criterion of avoidance of more probable 
harm, which states, 
"If my doing y to Z is more likely to cause harm h to Z than my doing y to X 
(and I cannot avoid doing y to one of Z or X) then I ought to do y to X rather 
than to Z." 
Where y = failing to observe a particular duty of protection, and h = 
mistakenly denying a being the status of an agent, we can infer by this 
criterion that, "If my failing to observe a particular duty of protection to Z is 
more likely to mistakenly deny Z the status of an agent than is my failing to 
observe this duty of protection to X (and I cannot avoid failing to observe this 
duty to one of Z or X) then I ought to fail to observe my duty to X rather than 
to Z." (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000% 44) 
Thus, my duties of protection to those who are more probably agents take 
precedence over my duties of protection to those who are less probably 
agents. In other words, the moral protection granted to those who are 
apparently partial agents is proportional to the probability that they are 
agents. 
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In summary, all things being equal, all possible agents are to be treated 
as agents insofar as it is possible to do so. However, where there is a conflict 
between the protections offered to two possible agents, ostensible agents are 
to be granted full intrinsic moral status and what are apparently only partial 
agents must be granted intrinsic moral status that is proportional to the 
probability that they are agents. 
2.5 Relevant Empirical Evidence 
We have seen that the level of a being's intrinsic moral status is dependent 
upon the probability of it being an agent (up to the point of ostensible agency 
where we must grant full moral status). Therefore, applying the PGC to the 
objects in the empirical world requires an understanding of what is to count 
as relevant evidence affecting the likelihood that a being is an agent. Viewed 
through the interpretative gauze of precautionary reasoning, there are at least 
three categories of evidence relevant to the probability of any being (Y) 
being an agent. 
First, there is behavioural evidence. This is evidence related to the way Y 
behaves, and the relationship between this behaviour and the behaviour that 
an agent would be expected to display. The behaviour that living beings are 
capable of exhibiting can be classified in a number of ways. Elsewhere four 
categories of evidence are suggested: 
I Patterned organismic behaviour (displayed by all living organisms). 
I1 Behaviour that evidences itself as purposive (as being motivated by 
feeling or desire). 
I11 Behaviour that evidences itself as intelligent (as being susceptible to 
learning by experience). 
IV Behaviour that evidences itself as rational (value-guided, and 
characteristic of an agent). (Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998, 18-1 9) 
Category IV behaviour constitutes ostensible agency, which is sufficient to 
attribute possession of full intrinsic moral status. Those whose behaviour is 
restricted to Category I are to be accorded less moral status, because this 
behaviour is not sufficient for ostensible agency. As beings acquire Category 
I1 and III behaviour, however, they are to be accorded progressively greater 
moral status, because such a progression provides increasingly better 
evidence of their status as agents. 
These categories are neither watertight nor invariable, so that there is in 
fact a proportional range of evidence within each category. Since this book 
deals primarily with the moral claims of normal adult humans (who are, 
pdgmatically, ostensible agents) in relation to the moral claims of those 
displaying behaviour falling within Category I (and, perhaps, sometimes 
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Category 11) there is no need to analyse this type of evidence to any greater 
degree here. 
Second, a being's characteristics count as evidence affecting the 
probability that it is an agent. For example, if a specific degree of 
development of the brain and nervous system is empirically associated with 
the ability to express pain behaviour, malung it likely that any being with 
such characteristics is able to feel pain, this counts as agency-related 
evidence in the same way that pain-behaviour would do.14 In a way, evidence 
concerning a being's characteristics is indirect behavioural evidence. It is the 
type of evidence that we habitually use when encountering an unknown 
member of a familiar species. For example, we assume on the basis of the 
characteristics possessed by an unknown human that it has the degree of 
abilities that we associate with humans of the same age and condition, unless 
and until we acquire conflicting evidence. Under precautionary reasoning 
this is precisely what we ought to do. 
Thus, the intrinsic moral status of a developing fetus will be 
proportional not only to its behavioural display of the abilities related to 
ostensible agency (which, given its environment will be limited), but also its 
characteristics, such as the degree of development its organs and nervous 
system display. 
Third, evidence of future potential agency-related behaviour and 
characteristics (particularly evidence of potential ostensible agency) is 
relevant evidence. On the one hand, evidence that Y is a potential ostensible 
agent, by itself, increases the .likelihood that Y is in fact an agent, in 
proportion to the strength of this evidence. On the other hand, evidence that 
Y is a potential ostensible agent adds to the degree of moral status secured 
by the degree to which it displays the characteristics and behaviour expected 
of an agent. Thus, where there is a conflict between what appear to be two 
partial agents (A and B), both displaying the same degree of characteristics 
and behaviour expected of an agent, the one displaying the greater degree of 
potential ostensible agency will have greater intrinsic moral status. 
The weakest evidence that a being is a potential ostensible agent will 
exist where it is a member of a species whose members typically develop 
into ostensible agents under specifiable conditions. Thus, ex hypothesi, a 
human embryo exhibits evidence of potential ostensible agency (in 
proportion to its developmental stage), thereby increasing the moral status it 
possesses over that of, say, a sheep embryo at the same stage of 
development. 
In summary, where a being displays characteristics and behaviour less 
than that expected of an ostensible agent its moral status will be 
14 All things being equal, a being displaying pain-behaviour (i.e., reaction to pain) is 
more likely to be an agent than a being unable to react in this way to such external 
stimulus. 
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proportionate to the probability that it is a locked-in agent, i.e., an agent that 
is for some reason unable to display its agency to others. The probability 
that a being is a locked-in agent is to be measured by evidence relating to the 
degree of behaviour and characteristics (related to those displayed by 
ostensible agents) it displays, and any evidence suggesting that it will 
potentially increase its agency-related behaviour and characteristics in the 
future. 
2.6 The Effect of Indirect Moral Status 
As indicated at the outset, a being might be protected not only because its 
own characteristics are sufficient to grant it moral worth, but also because of 
its connection to others who have such intrinsic moral worth. Indirect 
(derivative or vicarious) moral status can be acquired in two ways. 
First, there is a form of self-connected indirect protection,15 which is not 
a pure form of indirect moral status at all. As I will explain below, for a 
being to be granted moral status in this way, it must be a potential 
(ostensible)16 agent treated in a way manifesting an intention on the part of 
the actor that it will become an agent-in-the-hre. If these conditions are 
satisfied, then the possible agent must be treated in a way consistent with the 
generic rights that it will have when it becomes an agent in the future. Thus, 
the possible agent now has a conditional form of moral status. It has a form 
of self-connected indirect moral status. 
Second, a being might be granted wholly indirect moral status, i.e., 
moral status as a means of protecting the intrinsic moral status of a totally 
independent being. To limit overlap with other chapters, I will do no more 
than outline the various ways in which a being might attract such protection. 
l 2.6.1 Indirect Self-Connected Protection: Protection of a Being as a 
Means of Protecting It as a Future Ostensible Agent 
Protection of a being as a future possessor of intrinsic moral status is often 
cofised with the protection granted to a being as a potential possessor of 
intrinsic moral status. These concepts-the concepts of fUturality and 
potentiality-must be kept distinct. 
IS This label is taken kom Beyleveld 2000a, 64. For fiuther analysis of this concept, the 
concept of fbturality, see below, Beyleveld, Quarrell, and Toddington 1997; and 
Pluhar 1995, 1 1 1 .  Futurality is also mentioned, elliptically, in various other works, 
including Hanis 1998a, 63-64; and Feinberg 1978,180-1 82. 
l6 For ease of expression I will drop the prefix "ostensible," unless it requires particular 
emphasis. 
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One theorist who does distinguish the two is Pluhar, who argues that the 
protection offered by the futurality argument 
is based upon the hypothetical existence of future rights holders into which 
these infants [or other potential agents]'' have turned. But i f  we decide to 
exploit any of these infants [or other potential agents] in ways that would 
prevent them j b m  ever achieving the status of rights holders, no wrong 
would be done! If we si@cantly impair them mentally, or kill them, no 
future rights holders can have any claim on us. (Pluhar 1995, 111, original 
emphasis) 
On the assumption that a potential agent has no intrinsic moral status, 
Pluhar argues that it will only attract protection as a future agent if it is 
treated in a way that allows it to actually develop into a future agent. This is 
undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, where my actions display an intention that a 
potential agent will become an agent-in-the-Wre, then when evaluating my 
actions, this potential agent must be treated as an agent-in-the-kre. 
Consequently, the h r a l i t y  argument still has force in determining my 
moral obligations. This is so even on Pluhar's assumption that (what 
appears to be) a potential agent has no intrinsic moral status. For example, if 
a pregnant women intends to nurture her child until it reaches the stage of 
being a possessor of intrinsic moral status (e.g., she does not intend to have 
an abortion or commit infanticide), she might well be infringing the rights 
that the embryo-fetus1* will have as a h r e  agent if she harms it during its 
gestation (e.g., by excessive alcbhol consumption during her pregnancy). 
The b r a l i t y  argument is, however, even stronger than this, because 
(what appears to be) a potential agent has intrinsic moral status by virtue of 
the characteristics it currently possesses. Indeed, the PGC will (with certain 
provisos) impose the intention to nurture a potential agent into an agent.lg 
Precautionary reasoning requires agents to accept duties to allow and assist 
a being to develop its potential to display itself as an agent (should it be an 
agent)," unless there is a danger of conflict with the protection owed to those 
of equal or higher moral status. Thus, unless outweighed by other PGC- 
based considerations, we are required to take account of the generic rights 
that a potential agent will possess in the future. 
17 For convenience I refer to beings that appear to be potential agents as potential agents. 
l8 As in the rest of this book, I use the term "embryo-fetus" to encompass all stages of 
development kom fertilisationlcreation to birth. 
l9 Remember, I am using "agent" as shorthand for "ostensible agent." 
20 This is quite simply because all beings are possible agents, and agents have additive 
rights to increase their current level of purpose-fulfilment. 
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2.6.2 Wholly Indirect Moral Status: Protection of a Being as a Means 
of Protecting Wholly Separate Agents 
There are numerous ways in which protecting the interests of a being with 
intrinsic moral status might require duties to be imposed on others having 
the effect of protecting those lac- this degree of intrinsic moral status. I 
will briefly overview five possible arguments grantmg wholly indirect moral 
status to a being (X). 
It should be noted that where X is an ostensible agent it has full intrinsic 
moral status. This means that it has the full amount of moral protection 
possible, so it cannot gain additional moral protection indirectly. Therefire, 
X needs be taken to be a being displaying irisufficient evidence of agency to 
be classified as an ostensible agent. 
Possibility One: The Physical Proximity Argument 
Where X is in such close physical proximity to an agent that any attempt to 
harm X will Inadvertently or unavoidably harm (or put at risk from harm) 
that agent, X must be granted at least a degree of indirect protection. This 
type of argument provides another reason why a future father's attempt to 
manipulate the characteristics of his offspring developing in his partner's 
womb, would be immoral without his partner's consent. The physical 
proximity between the gestational embryo-fetus and its mother is such that 
the mother's permission will usually be required before any procedures 
a f f i  the embryo-fetus can be undertaken. 
Since, however, the embryo-fetus also has some intrinsic moral status, 
the mother will (in some circumstances) be required to permit or perform 
certain actions in the embryo-fetus' interests. For example, if she can prevent 
it developing a seriously debilitating congenital defect by talung certain 
vitamin supplements that will not harm her health in any way, she will have 
a duty to (at least) attempt to take these vitamins.2' 
Possibility Two: Argument from Development of Virtues (e.g., Against 
Brutalisation) 
All things being equal, the PGC requires agents to develop virtues, 
understood as those character traits disposing agents towards compliance 
with the PGC (see Gewirth 1978, 332-333). Thus, insofbr as disregard for 
the well-being of X is evidence of a cruel character (e.g., one likely to inflict 
pain or suffering on agents or discriminate between subgroups of agents) it 
violates the PGC. 
2 1 This example is not entirely hypothetical, see 3.4.3 for evidence suggesting that t a h g  
folic acid can reduce the chances of a child being born with, inter alia, spina bifida. 
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This type of indirect protection has its origins in the work of Kant who, 
with regard to the moral status of animals, wrote, 
If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practise kindness towards 
animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings 
with human beings. (Kant 1798 as translated by Infield 1963,239) 
This type of argument is not refitted by examples of persons who can be 
cruel to one group of possible agents (humans) while simultaneously 
showing great kindness towards another (non-human d s )  (cf. Pluhar 
1995, 91). Possibility Two is meant to be generally true rather than true for 
all individuals, so isolated counter examples do not refbte it (nor is anecdotal 
evidence enough to confirm it). l When reviewing the strength of this argument is must also be 
remembered that any discriminatory capacity must accord with the 
requirements of the PGC operating under precautionary reasoning, which 1 will not permit any wanton cruelty to any category of possible agent. 
It is arguable that at a certain stage of development the embryo-fetus has 
so many of the visual features of a human adult or child that it is likely 
(though this requires empirical proofl that those who are able to treat them 
as worthless objects are more likely to treat adult human beings in this way. 
Given the precautionary thesis, agents ought to inculcate themselves 
with those character dispositions encouraging protection of all possible 
agents. Such dispositions might even give greater protection to the subjects 
of prenatal influence than they are currently entitled to by reducing the 
c i r c m c e s  where there is conflict between these subjects and the 
potential parents. 
Possibility Three: Argument from Protection of the Sensitivities of Others 
Where an agent has protective feelings towards X, harm to X is capable of 
causing harm to that agent. This is particularly relevant as many human 
agents have protective feelings towards unborn children. Moreover, as 
Beyleveld argues, 
There is an evolutionaty explanation for this, as it is quite plausible that 
protective feelings for the young, including the unborn, confer an 
evolutionary advantage. Consequently, to show disregard for the well-being of 
the embryo-fetus is to cause great distress, even psychological damage to 
those who have natural, and indeed generally beneficial emotional responses. 
(2000a, 64) 
It has been suggested that the force of this type of argument is removed 
where the sensitivities of agents are protected by secrecy, so that others 
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never discover that harm is being inflicted on X (see, e.g., Pluhar 1995, 
102). However, secrecy in such circumstances stands in need of justification, 
as protective feelings for (apparently) partial agents are to be encouraged as 
a means of inculcating PGC-directed dispositions (see Possibility Two, 
above). Also, it is implausible to suggest that secrecy can always be 
maintained in such circumstances. 
It should, however, be noted that protecting an agent's sensitivities is 
required by the PGC only as a means of protecting its generic feat~res,2~ and 
only when these sensitivities are themselves consistent with the requirements 
of the PGC, including the requirement to treat all agent subgroups as agents. 
Possibility Four: Contractual Argument @m the Collective Waiver of the 
Freedom to Mistreat Certain Beings 
Since the generic rights are wilVchoice claim-rights, agents may waive their 
benefits. This suggests that a collective waiver of the benefit of any right to 
harm X (should any such right exist) could grant X indirect moral status. 
There are a number of problems with this form of protection. Evidently 
those who would wish to harm X are likely to be those who would not agree 
to waive the benefit of their right (should they have such a right) to do so. 
Thus, the force of this argument is coterrninous with the legitimacy of using 
democratic mechanisms to override the rights of minorities. Therefore, any 
limitations on the legitimacy of democracy constrain this form of indirect 
moral protection. 
Possibility Five: Property Argument 
Once a proprietary relationship with a particular being or object has been 
established,= harm inflicted on it by others will be an idkhgement of the 
owner's rights. Thus, it might appear that X will be granted indirect moral 
protection if X is the property of an agent. If this were the case, the practical 
limitations of this indirect protection would be stark; by itself it only protects 
property and it does not prevent mistreatment by the owner. 
22 The generic features are the categorical needs of agency, i.e., those capacities required 
to act or act successfully, whatever one 'S purpose might be. 
23 There are numerous ways to establish property in an object. Generally, I (any agent) 
must claim property in whatever is necessary (given the societal and environmental 
context in which I act) to pursue and defend my having the generic features of agency. 
One specific method of property acquisition is presented in Gewirth (1 996, 166-2 13). 
Gewirth justifies private property using "antedentialist" and "consequenti&st" 
justifications, to show that I have property in whatever income or produce I have 
legitimately produced for the purpose of having such rights, subject to the rights 
(particularly positive rights) of others. 
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With regard to the subjects of prenatal influence the property argument 
appears weak, since these subjects are, ex hypothesi, to be treated as 
possible agents possessing intrinsic moral status. No agent can legitimately 
claim ownership rights over another (without that other's consent), as this is 
tantamount to slavery. At most an agent can claim guardianship rights, but 
such rights will neither imply a right to harm X,24 nor grant X any additional 
indirect moral protection from anyone other than, perhaps, the guardian.2s 
2.7 The Content of Our Moral Obligations 
1 have argued that under the PGC agents are required to grant full intrinsic 
moral status only to agents, which in practice, requires agents to grant equal 
generic rights to all those whose characteristics and behaviour are indicative 
of self-reflective purposivity. Since just about all adult human beings display 
this degree of agency-related behaviour, the vast majority of potential users 
of the techniques of prenatal influence will have full intrinsic moral status. 
Where the characteristics and behaviour of a being are less than 
sufficient for ostensible agency, it has moral status though less than that of 
an ostensible agent (i.e., moral status that is proportional to the likelihood 
that it is in fact an agent). A being with a low level of moral status might be 
granted additional protection by more indirect means. For example, a 
gamete-which displays less agency-related behaviour and characteristics 
than a bacterium, and an expemely low degree of potential ostensible 
agency-might be owed additional protection where harm to it is likely to 
cause psychological harm to the ostensible agent whose body produced it. 
However, determining our moral obligations requires more than just an 
understanding of the level of moral status possessed by those (actually or 
potentially) affected by our actions. The specific content of our moral 
obligations will depend on 
24 Except where the infliction of a degree of harm to those under one's guardianship is 
justified under the PGC. Where, e.g., the harm is justified as a necessary means of 
inculcating those under one's guardianship with dispositions and understanding 
conducive to compliance with the PGC. 
Guardians might, by virtue of assuming responsibilities of guardianship, have special 
obligations to those in their charge. 
It is, however, possible to envisage circumstances where making a property claim 
over a possible agent might represent the only means, in the circumstances, of 
protecting its generic features. E.g., in a legal system (such as that of the UK), where 
an unimplanted embryo has very little (if any) legal status, granting its biological 
parents limited property rights might be an appropriate means of offering embryos 
some protection. 
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(a) the purposes that we are able to perform; 
(b) the magnitude of morally relevant harm threatened (taking account of all 
morally relevant needs) by our pursuit or non-pursuit of these purposes; 
(c) the risk of morally relevant harm (taking account of all morally relevant 
needs) resulbng from pursuing or not pursuing these purposes; and 
(d) the level of moral status owed to those that we put at risk from this level 
of harm. 
These variables will interact so that for every action there is a need to weigh 
the risk of PGC-relevant harm, talung account of the PGC-relevant needs of 
all potentially affected beings .26 
The level of moral status owed to those potentially affected by our 
conduct (requirement (d)) has already been addressed. Requirement (a) 
states no more than our moral obligations depend on the alternatives 
available to us. Obviously, if one potential action will involve harm to 
myself and morally relevant others, and the only alternative action will 
involve harm to no one, then I ought to pursue the latter. Our moral 
obligations are also limited by the principle "ought implies can." That is to 
say, we cannot be morally required to do an- that is impossible for us 
to do. This is relative to the degree to which we are able to control our 
actions in the circumstances (our specific task ~ompetence),2~ our physical 
and psychological constitution, and the aid and resources available to us. 
The risk of morally relevant harm resulting from our conduct 
(requirement (c)) requires a measure of the probability that any given action 
or inaction will cause harm to the morally relevant needs or interests of 
myself a d o r  others. This will be conbngent on factors such as the 
particular task being pursued or left unpursued, the specific task competence 
of those involved, and the resources available. Usually the greater the risk, 
the more pressing the need to take precautions against its manifestation and 
vice versa. The permissibility of running a risk will be closely tied to other 
factors, such as the level of morally relevant harm threatened. 
The level of harm threatened by our conduct (requirement (b)) is 
measured by a number of sub-factors. This is determined by the degree to 
which the morally relevant interests and needs of all those possessing moral 
status are affected by the specific act/ornission in question. 
Under the PGC the relevant interests are an agent's possession of the 
generic features of agency, i.e., those capacities necessary for present and 
future purpose-fulfilment, whatever that purpose might be. Actual or 
threatened damage to an agent's generic features-generic harm-being a 
prerequisite for PGC prescriptions. Gewirth himself separates the generic 
26 HOW these are to be weighed is considered in later chapters, parhcularly Chapter Five. 
27 For a detailed discussion of the concept of "specific task competence," see Beyleveld 
and Pattinson 1998. See also 6.4.2, below. 
Moral Status: The Objects of Moral Concern 35 
features into freedom and well-being, representing their procedural and 
substantive components respectively. I do not adopt this distinction because 
it can cause confbsion of the aspectual with the perspectival. That is to say, 
this subdivision increases the likelihood of confusion between freedom and 
well-being as different aspects (or parts) of the generic features, rather than 
different perspectives on the same generic features. The point is that freedom 
and well-being must be interpreted perspectivally, because these are not two 
different generic features that can come into conflict with each other, but two 
perspectives on the same corpus of generic features2' 
The generic features can be subdivided into those capacities necessary 
to act at all, and those necessary to act successfully. Gewirth refers to 
the capacities necessary to act at all as "basic" capacities. The 
capacities necessary for successful action can be further divided into 
the capacities necessary to maintain one's current level of purpose-fulfilment 
("nonsubtractive" capacities), and those necessary to increase one's current 
level of purpose-fblfilment ("additive" capacities). This creates a hierarchy 
of potential generic harm according to the degree that the relevant generic 
capacity is needed for purpose-fulfilment. This leads Gewirth to the 
conclusion that the degree of generic handneed is measured by the "criterion 
of degrees of needfulness for action" (see Gewirth 1996, 45-46). Thus, 
when ranking the rights of agents to the generic features-the "generic 
rights7'-the rights pertaining to generic capacities that are more needed for 
action take precedence over rights pertaining to less needed generic 
capacities. In a situation of conflict the generic capacities are to be ranked 
hierarchically in descending order: basic, nonsubtractive, then additive 
generic capacities. 
Although actual or potential damage to an agent's generic features is a 
prerequisite for harm under the PGC, not all such damage violates the PGC. 
Agents do not have unconditional duties of non-interference or assistance 
with regard to the generic features of other agents. For example, the duty to 
aid another agent to secure its generic features is limited by two other 
provisos (see 1.2 above; Gewirth 1978,217-230). According to the first, the 
"own unaided effort" proviso, I (any agent) have a duty to aid another agent 
to secure its generic features only where it is unable to do so by its own 
unaided effort. The second, the "comparable cost" proviso, states that I only 
have a duty to aid another agent to secure its generic features when my doing 
so does not deprive me of the same or more important generic capacities, as 
measured by the degree of needfulness for action. 
28 Thus, the hierarchical structure of the generic features (presented below) permeates 
both its procedural (freedom) and substantive (well-being) components. 
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2.8 Deriving Moral Obligations from the Generic Rights of Others 
The generic rights are not rights to pursue particular purposes; they are 
rights to the necessary conditions for pursuing purposes in general or with 
general chances of success. It follows that the frustration of an agent's 
purpose does not necessary violate its generic rights. 
The generic rights do, however, provide a framework from which more 
specific rights can be derived. Such derived rights will be non-absolute for at 
least two reasons. First, an agent cannot have a right to put others at risk of 
generic harm that is hierarchically greater than that which the agent (or 
another agent) would suffer if prevented from acting for that particular 
purpose. This follows from the impermissibility of causing avoidable, 
hierarchically greater, generic harm to another agent, and the absence of any 
duty to allow another to unwittingly cause such harm. 
Second, an agent does not have a right to endanger its own generic 
features unless it has freely chosen to inflict or risk such hann, and it does 
not thereby harm others. This is not to suggest that an agent has a duty to 
itself not to inflict freely chosen self-harm. 
In summary, an agent cannot have a right to perform a task where the 
agent lacks the capacity to perform that task without endangering the generic 
features of itself or (morally relevant) others-unless either (in the case of 
self-harm) it has freely chosen to create such dange19 or (in the case of harm 
to morally relevant others) such danger is necessary to protect hierarchically 
equal or more important generic features. 
The application of the PGC is better explained using an example. One 
right derivable (with certain provisos) from the generic rights is the right not 
to be deceived or lied to. 
Lying and other forms of deceit appear to represent a paradigmatic 
example of the intentional infliction of harm to another's ability to pursue 
their purposes with general chances of success. However, it might be 
objected that if the deceived person never discovers this, then no generic 
harm will be suffered. What generic harm, for example, is suffered by a 
devoted husband who never finds out that his wife is deceiving him by 
holding herself out as faiffil when she is routinely unhiffil? What harm 
' to his ability to act at all or with general chances of success has he suffered? 
More than is at first apparent! The deceiving wife can never be certain that 
her husband will not find out; she is riskmg the infliction of generic harm for 
her own benefit. She has no right to run this (realistic) risk, as it is not 
(~sual ly)~  necessary to protect hierarchically more important generic needs 
29 Provided the infliction of this self-harm does not impermissibly harm others. 
30 It is, of course, always possible to modify the example so that this deceit is in fact 
necessary to protect hierarchically more important generic needs. E.g., it might be 
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of her own. Operating on precautionary reasoning, if one's action has a 
number of possible outcomes, one of which involves the infliction of 
avoidable generic harm on an innocent person, and the action itself is not 
necessary to protect hierarchically more important generic needs, then one 
must assume that this risk will manifest itself. This is simply because not to 
do so puts one at risk of violating the PGC. 
This is not to say that deceiving is always wrong. Causing generic harm 
where it is necessary to protect hierarchically more important 
generic needs of oneself or others is justified. This follows from the criterion 
of needfulness for action outlined earlier.31 With this in mind, some of the 
arguments presented above (2.6.2) for indirect moral status can provide 
hrther reasons why deceit infringes the PGC. 
Invoking the earlier argument from the development of virtues, a person 
who deceives in circumstances where chances of discovery are small, 
displays a capacity for deceit that is psychologically difficult to confine. 
One's capacity for avoiding deceit, it appears, is proportionate to one's 
observance of the inclination to be truthful. In short, the ability to convince 
oneself that it's not really wrong has the potential to rot or undermine one's 
moral inclinations. 
Also, invoking the proximity argument, even if the deceived person will 
never find out, the deceiver will usually have involved at least one other 
person in the deceit. In the example, the unfaithful wife's lover, or other 
close friend, is likely to know. This means that others will be subject to 
pressure to participate in deceit. Moreover, exposure to examples of deceit 
characteristically undermines a person's confidence in their own freedom 
from being deceived by those around them. This undermines one's ability to 
pursue one's purposes with confidence. 
Other rights and obligations derivable from the generic rights will be 
explored in later chapters. 
This book seeks to apply the moral framework developed in this chapter 
to the existing regulatory responses to the techniques of prenatal duence.  
The next chapter will, therefore, begin by outlining what these techniques 
are, before exploring the ethical and regulatory issues that they raise. 
necessary for a woman to lie to her husband where she has been forced to marry him 
against her will and needs the help of her lover to escape from his control. 
31 The example often given would be where someone lies to a Nazi, in Germany during 
the Second World War, about the whereabouts of a Jew to protect that Jew. 
Chapter 3 
Prenatal Influence of Traits: 
Questioning the Present, Possible, and 
Probable 
This chapter seeks to explore the specific scientific, legal, and ethical issues 
raised by attempts to influence traits before birth. After exploring the 
concept of heredity as propounded by the current scientific orthodoxy, it 
examines the limitations of some scientific concepts typically used to 
describe the manipulability of various traits. This is followed by an 
exposition of the techniques capable of enabling prenatal influence, before 
concluding with an overview of the ethical and legal issues raised by these 
techniques. 
3.1 Understanding Heredity 
3.1.1 Genes, Chromosomes, and the Phenotype 
A brief exposition of the concept of heredity is required before we can 
examine the amenability of traits to prenatal influence. The units of 
heredity-genes-are the most obvious place to start. 
Genes are found scattered along tiny structures within the cell nucleus 
called chvornos~rnes.~ Our chromosomes come in pairs. One chromosome 
from each pair is a copy of the sperm's 23 chromosomes and the other is a 
copy of the oocyte's (egg's) 23 chromosomes. As a result, humans typically 
have 23 pairs of chromosomes (46 in total) within each cell; each cell 
carrying identical copies of these chromosomes. I say "typically," because 
occasionally there are more or fewer than this, due to abnormalities in the 
' l In humans, genes are also canied on circular strands of DNA inside sack-like bodies 
i within cells, called mitochondria. There are a minimum of 30,000 human genes (see i' The Gene Sequencing Consortium 2001), yet only 37 genes are canied in the 
mitochondria (see Hopkins Tanne 1999, 593). Thus, for convenience, I shall ignore 
these mitochondrial genes unless otherwise indicated. 
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sperm or the ~ocy te .~  This usually results in non-viability, but there are 
exceptions. One well known exception is Down's syndrome, which is caused 
by an extra copy of chromosome 21 or occasionally an extra copy of part of 
chromosome 2 1 .3 
One pair of our chromosomes, the sex chromosomes, determines our 
sex; the other 22 pairs are called the autosomes. Sex chromosomes come in 
two forms: the X- and the Y-chromosomes. The Y-chromosomes carry the 
genes coding for maleness, so that normal males have one X and one Y, 
whereas normal females have two Xs. 
The genes themselves are found at distinct locations (called loci) along 
the chromosomes. At each locus there are a number of different forms that 
the gene can take, each called an ~ l l e l e . ~  Since the particular order of genes 
on a chromosome will be the same for both of the paired chromosomes,5 it is 
possible to make associations between the genes held at particular loci and 
the traits an individual has. 
At this point, I should mention that an individual's manifest traits or 
characteristics are collectively referred to as the phenotype. When we 
interact with people, we evidently do not see their genes, only the physical 
manifestation of their genes, and this is the result of interaction between the 
individual's genome (the complete set of alleles carried at all the individual's 
loci and non-coding DNA) and other factors, which will be examined in 
greater detail below. 
3.1.2 Dominant and Recessive Alleles 
Some phenotypic traits are influenced by variations at one particular locus 
on the paired chromosomes. However, the allele held at a particular locus on 
one chromosome might not be the same as the allele held at that locus on its 
paired chromosome. If the code of an allele is expressed irrespective of what 
allele is held at that locus on the paired chromosome, it is said to be 
Also, sometimes the chromosomes are not identical within all cells. This is called 
mosaicism. 
3 So, instead of having two copies of chromosome 2 1, such offspring have three copies. 
Down's syndrome, or trisomy 21 as it is otherwise known, has an overall birth 
incidence of 1 in 700 live-births, and the 
incidence at conception i s . .  .much greater, but more than 60% are 
spontaneously aboxted, and at least 20% are stillborn. (Connor and Ferguson- 
Smith 1997, 1 18) 
At the molecular level, with the gene being represented by a DNA sequence, an allele 
is the term given to any one particular sequence. 
5 Except for the male's paired sex chromosomes, since the alleles on the X-chromosome 
will not be the same as those on the Y-chromosome. 
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dominant. If the code of an allele will not be expressed where the paired 
chromosome carries a different allele, it is said to be recessive. 
Thus, where an allele lies on an autosome (a non-sex chromosome), and 
two copies of it are required for a particular trait to manifest, the trait is said 
to be autosomal recessive. Examples of traits associated with such alleles- 
autosomal recessive traits-include cystic fibrosis and sickle cell disea~e.~ 
Where only one copy of a particular gene is needed on either of the paired 
chromosomes, the trait is said to be autosomal dominant. Examples of 
autosomal dominant traits include Huntington's disease (see 3.4.1, below) 
and neurofibrornatosis. 
The sex-chromosomes are different. In males, since the Y-chromosome 
does not carry the same alleles as the Xshromosome, the alleles on the one 
X-chromosome will not be paired. Thus, all the alleles on a male's X- 
chromosome will usually be expressed, whether dominant or recessive, 
because there will be no other allele to counteract it. In females, who possess 
two Xshromosomes, all the alleles on the X-chromosome are paired. 
However, in a female's cells only one of her X-chromosomes will usually be 
switched on at any one time, which one will vary from cell to cell. Thus, 
even where a female has a copy of a dominant gene, she is not likely to 
express it to the same degree as a male. 
Most traits, including most genetic disorders, are not associated with 
only one gene (monogenic); they are associated with many genes (polygenic). 
Often the precise mix of genetic and non-genetic factors on the phenotype is 
nearly impossible to d e t e w e .  Separating these factors is somewhat like 
trying to unbake bread or slice it into its ingredients. Different or modified 
ingredients can affect the bread, but not always in predictable ways. As we 
shall see, talking about genes for certain phenotypic traits is somewhat like 
talking about ingredients for a thick crust or light texture. Nevertheless, 
scientists often talk of genes for phenotypic traits-genes for eye colour, 
genes for achondroplasia (dwarfism), genes for cystic fibrosis, etc. Clearly, 
talk of genes for particular traits is being used as shorthand for associations 
between genetic variation at particular loci and a particular trait. Scientists 
using this shorthand are usually not claiming that possession of a particular 
allele or group of alleles will always have a particular phenotypic effect. 
3.1.3 Penetrance and Expressivity 
Even single gene defects do not necessarily affect all those with the relevant 
alleles. Many alleles have different levels of penetrance, i.e., different 
To avoid confusion I should point out that a person who is a d e r  of sickle cell 
disease-i.e., has only one of the two alleles required to express it-is said to have 
the sickle cell trait. 
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frequencies with which the phenotype associated with a certain allele 
manifests itself in those with that allele. 
Also, many alleles have different levels of expressivity, i.e., different 
levels of effect on the phenotype. Such differences might include variations 
in the timing and severity of onset. For example, Neurofibrornatosis type 1 is 
known to have a highly variable level of expressivity so that one person with 
the relevant genotype can manifest a strikingly disfiguring skin condition, 
whereas another person with the same genotype might appear unaffected (see 
Connor and Ferguson-Smith 1997, 174). 
A frequently cited example of another genetic defect whose level of 
expressivity is uncontroversially amenable to non-genetic manipulation is 
phenylketonuria (PKU)-an autosomal recessive disorder.' Two copies of 
the recessive allele associated with PKU will render cells unable to produce 
an enzyme needed to metabolise the protein phenylalanine. Without this 
enzyme the normal cellular process that converts phenylalanine into another 
amino acid, tyrosine, does not occur. Those individuals whose cells are 
unable to perform this conversion process will, if reared on a normal diet, 
accumulate abnormally high levels of phenylahhe and correspondingly low 
levels of tyrosine. The resultrng chemical imbalance severely disrupts 
cognitive development and can cause retarded growth, epilepsy, and 
hyperactivity. Fortunately, for those unable to convert phenylalanine to 
tyrosine, this chemical imbalance and its consequences, can be avoided if 
they are given a special diet (low in phenylalanine, high in tyrosine) from 
birth through to adolescence. Some care does, however, have to be taken, 
because this special diet will actually cause mental retardation if given to 
those who do not have two copies of the relevant recessive allele. 
PKU is, therefore, a particularly good example of a method of 
intluencing the characteristics of a child aper its birth. Although this book 
is not concerned with postnatal manipulation of phenotypic characteristics- 
i.e., manipulation occurring after birth-in theory, there could be traits 
similar to PKU whose consequences might be treatable or preventable during 
gestational development. 
7 The information on PKU is derived from Thapar et al. 1994, 749-751; and Kitcher 
19%, especially 66. It is a condition affecting "on average 1 in 10 000 Caucasian 
neonates" (Thapar et al. 1994,749). 
Apparently, the level of penetrance of PKU is not affected by diet, because all 
those with the relevant alleles will manifest some degree of the trait even on a low 
phenylalanine diet. (Information provided by Darren Shickle.) 
Since PKU is such a disabling condition, neonates are screened at birth (the Guthrie 
test) (see Connor and Ferguson-Smith 1997,207). 
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3.2 Some Scientific Issues 
There are numerous scientific concepts used to describe the manipulability 
of traits by attributing various properties to those traits. For example, traits 
can be described as 
(a) heritable (to a specific percentage or degree); 
(b) genetic; 
(C) inherited; andlor 
(d) biological. 
Since usage of these concepts o h  leads to misunderstandmg and 
overstatement, I will explore the limitations of each in turn. 
3.2.1 Heritability 
Heritability represents an attempt to measure the genetic influences of a trait 
without reference to the structure of the genotype on a molecular level. That 
is to say, without reference to the particular alleles inherited by those 
displaying the relevant trait. As a concept it has been applied to many traits, 
the most controversial being IQ and homosexuality (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, 
below). 
On a general level, heritability estimates the proportion of phenotypic 
variability explained by genetic variability (as opposed to environmental 
variability) within a specific population (see Daniels et al. 1997, especially 
5 1-54; Sarkar 1998, ch. 4). It represents the genotypic variability divided by 
the total variability of a trait in the population and is usually expressed as a 
percentage or a decimal ranging from 0 to 1. It follows that if all instances of 
variation (of a trait) in the population were associated with genotypic 
variability, then heritability would be 100% or 1. In contrast, if genetic 
variation were to contribute nothing to the phenotypic traits of a population 
(because all the population were genetically identical), the heritability of any 
phenotypic trait in that population would be 0% or 0.9 (In both cases, 
however, the traits of individuals in such populations would still depend on 
the interaction between their genes and their en~ironment.)'~ 
This figure would still be an estimate, because there is always a possibility of somatic 
mutation, rendering two monozygotic twins genetically different. 
l0 The literature often distinguishes broad and narrow heritability. This distinction is 
based on the idea that genotypic variability has two distinct components: additive and 
non-additive (see, e.g., Daniels et al. 1997, 52). Additive genetic variation describes 
the situation where every allele associated with a trait acts completely independently 
from its paired allele (i.e., there is no dominance), and Erom all other alleles. Non- 
additive genetic variation describes the situation where the alleles involved interact. 
Based on this distinction, narrow heritability describes additive genetic variability 
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Measurements of heritability are estimated using studies of twins and 
siblings reared in different environments. Genotypic variability is estimated 
without reference to the alleles held by individuals on the basis of the degree 
of genetic relatedness. For example, genetically identical twins will share all 
their genes, whereas other siblings (including non-identical twins) are likely 
to share only half their genes with each other. These genetic relationships are 
then compared to the phenotypic traits of particular populations of related 
individuals who are reared in different environments. 
Thus, heritability is a property of a trait in a population in a given range 
of environments, rather than a property of a trait itself. At least three thmgs 
follow from this. First, heritability is population and environment specific, in 
that its descriptive significance is tied to the specific population and range of 
environments studied. Second, heritability can reveal nothing about the 
genetic component of a trait on an individual level. It is all about genetic 
variability in relation to phenotypic variability within a population, and not 
an individual's genotype in relation to its phenotype. As emphasised above, a 
heritability figure of 0 or 0% would not indicate that the genotype of an 
individual within that population did not contribute to that individual's 
phenotypic traits; it would only indicate that within the population studied, 
genotypic differences are not of relevance to any phenotypic differences. 
Third, it follows that a heritability figure, by itself, is not sufficient to predict 
the likely impact of genetic or environmental manipulation. 
Limitations are also inherent in the nature of the related and 
interconnected concepts, such as the concept of genetic. 
3.2.2 Genetic 
All non-genetic factors (whether or not they are inherited or biological) are 
collectively referred to as environmental. Also, viewed in terms of the impact 
of a specific gene or group of genes, the rest of the genome is environmental. 
Thus, as stated above, the phenotype is the result of interaction between the 
genes and environment. 
over total variation (of a trait) in the population, and broad heritability describes both 
additive and non-additive genetic variation over total variation (of a trait) in the 
population. In other words, broad heritability is the measure of all genotypic 
influences, and narrow heritability is the measure of the influence of the alleles (at all 
loci) when they are presumed to be acting additively (i.e., completely independently of 
each other). 
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When defined as a sequence of DNA," the genes themselves are not 
sufficient conditions for the development of any phenotypic traits. Genes can 
either be expressed-by coding for RNA and thereby directing the 
production of a protein (or part of a protein)-or they can regulate the 
expression of other genes. Genes cannot perform either function without an 
appropriate cellular environment, and the consequences of producing a 
protein will depend on the protein in question, the organism in which the 
protein is produced (often the part of the organism in which the protein is 
produced), and the organism's external environment. 
An analogy might make this clearer.12 If the phenotype is thought of as 
the area of a rectangle, then the genes are analogous to the width and the 
environment to the length of the rectangle. Just as the area of the rectangle is 
a product of both its width and length, the phenotype is the product of both 
the genes and environment. Also, just as it makes no sense to ask what 
percentage of the rectangle's area is attributable to the width, it is as 
meaningless to ask what percentage of a specific phenotypic trait is genetic 
or environmental. Variations in width might produce variations in the 
rectangle's area, but the width cannot be described as being 50% responsible 
for the area. 
Since, however, a large proportion of any individual's genomic and 
cellular inheritance will be shared by all humans,'3 the empirical evidence 
can suggest that specific alleles are (within this species) necessary andlor 
sufficient conditions for the manifestation of certain traits. If an allele 
appears to be a suficient condition for a trait, then the empirical evidence 
suggests that any human with that allele will manifest (express) that trait if 
slhe survives until or beyond the time of onset. If an allele appears to be a 
necessary condition for the existence of a trait, then the evidence suggests 
that the trait cannot manifest in an individual who does not have this allele. 
Specific alleles can also be contributory conditions for the manifestation of a 
trait. That is to say that an allele can contribute to the manifestation of a 
trait without being either a necessary or sufficient condition for that trait. 
For example, the empirical evidence suggests that the BRCAl mutation 
increases the chances of a woman developing breast cancer but a woman 
without this mutation can still develop breast cancer, and possessing this 
l '  DNA is an acronym for deoxyribonucleic acid, which forms the genetic material of 
most organisms, includmg all humans. DNA molecules consist of two sugar-phosphate 
backbones that wind round each other to form a double helix, fkom which bases jut 
inwards like the steps of a ladder (see Watson and Crick 1953). There are four bases, 
different orderings of which produce different proteins. '' I am grateful to Deryck Beyleveld for suggesting this analogy to me. 
l3 That is, certain genes and cellular environmental products are necessary for an entity 
to be, or become, Homo sapiens. 
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mutation does not automatically indicate that the woman will develop breast 
cancer (see 3.4.1). 
3.2.3 Inherited 
A trait is inherited if it is passed from one generation to its offspring. 
However, genes are not the only inherited factors capable of affecting the 
phenotypic traits of a child. There are at least two ways in which non-genetic 
material capable of influencing traits can be inherited. First, material is 
inherited along with the genes during fertilisation, as there is more to 
gametes (eggs and sperm) than genes.14 Second, material can pass from the 
mother to her offspring in the womb. PKU provides an illustrative example 
of the latter, as a child can have the PKU phenotype without carrying the 
associated gene, because the PKU phenotype can be caused by one of the 
mother's gene products-phenylalanine--crossing the placenta in excessive 
amounts.'5 
It follows that there is a conceptual distinction between the genetic and 
the inherited. For example, PKU can be inherited without being genetic (in 
the sense of having a causal imput from the specific genes held by the 
affected person). Thus, it is possible to attempt prenatal influence by 
manipulating inherited factors other than genes.I6 
3.2.4 Biological 
The genetic and inherited are also distinguishable from the biological. The 
biological is distinguishable from the genetic because some biological effects 
and events have no relation to the specific genes held by an individual (i.e., 
that individual's genotype).17 For example, mental retardation is a biological 
l4 A somewhat esoteric example is found in a particular species of snail, Limnaea 
pewgm (see Freeman and Lundelius 1982, and Sarkar 1998, 178-179). This species 
of snail usually has a shell coiled to the right, but it can coil to the left where the snail 
carries two copies of a certain recessive allele or where the snail does not have these 
recessive alleles but its mother does, as her gene products, carried in the egg's 
cytoplasm, are sacient to cause coiling to the left. Thus, in some snails the direction 
of the coiled shell is inherited, but not genetic. 
IS Information provided by Dmen Shickle. 
16 Many social factors are arguably postna&lly inherited, in the sense used here. E.g., in 
some societies or social groups, jobs can be subject to primogeniture. 
l 7  The genotype is used to describe the specific alleles held either at a specific locus or 
by a specific individual. As indicated, this sentence utilises the terms in the latter 
sense. 
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event that can be caused by malnutrition irrespective of one's genotype. It 
also follows that not all biological events result from inherited fhctors. 
3.3 Genetic Influence on Behaviour 
A trait can be "genetic," or have a genetic component, in both a narrow and 
a wide sense. In the narrow sense, it is simply another way of saying that the 
trait is associated with a particular gene; in the broad sense, to declare that a 
trait is genetic is to say that it is not attributable solely to (often postnatal) 
environmental factors. 
To claim that certain behavioural traits have a genetic component in the 
wide sense is hardly controversial, indeed it is almost tautolog~us.'~ As we 
shall see, what is more controversial is whether any specific genes can be 
identified and the level of influence that these genetic factors have. 
As I indicated above, even if the term is used in its narrow sense, 
referring to an association between a gene and a trait, this does not mean 
that it is claimed that the gene is a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
manifestation of that trait. Nonetheless, if an association between a gene and 
a particular trait is well-founded, then it will be possible to modifjr at least 
some instances of the trait by manipulating the gene or its products. 
Finding associations between genes and traits is much more &cult for 
(what are presumed to be) multifactorial and polygenic traits, than with the 
single gene traits discussed above. Such traits require a much larger study 
sample, making it difficult to conduct statistically adequate research and 
even more difficult for any results to be replicated in later studies. Often it is 
difficult to distinguish a correlation or association from a cause. The 
extremes are rarely problematic-a strong association between having, say, 
cystic fibrosis and watching football would be unlikely to suggest that 
watchmg football causes cystic fibrosis. It becomes more problematic when 
a new association is found within a small sample in circumstances 
suggesting that it might be a causal hctor-such as an association between 
the appearance of a particular region of the X-chromosome and male- 
homosexuality (see 3.3.2). As we shall see, this is a major problem f$ced by 
research into the genetics of complex behavioural traits, such as intelligence, 
homosexuality, and crrrmnality. Another major problem is the lack of 
adequate specification of the relevant trait. IQ, sexuality, and criminality, it 
will be argued, are largely social constructs that do not seem to be capable of 
being defined in a non-arbitrary and nonantmgent way. 
18 See, e.g., Mann 1994. Also, "[elvidence for genetic iduence has been found for 
nearly all behavioral [sic.] disorders that have been investigated" (Plomin et al. 1994, 
1733). 
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3.3.1 Intelligence 
Perhaps the most controversial use of the concept of heritability (3.2.1) is 
found in Herrnstein and Murray's book The Bell C u ~ e . ' ~  In this work 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994, 105), argue that "IQ is substantially 
heritable" estimating "the genetic component of I Q  to be about 60%. They 
then claim that there are associations between IQ and socioeconomic 
success,20 and between low IQ and socioeconomic dy~function.~' In their 
words, "high cognitive ability [measured by IQ] is generally associated with 
socially desirable behaviors, low cognitive ability with socially undesirable 
ones" (ibid., 117). Thus, they argue socioeconomic successes and failures 
are largely the result of genetic fixtors. 
The Bell Cuwe concludes by suggesting the implementation of various 
sociopolitical policies. They argue that since IQ has a large genetic 
component, it is largely resistant to environmental manipulation, by, for 
example, educational me~hanisms.'~ Thus, they argue, money spent t y n g  to 
remove the burdens of the cognitively disadvantaged is largely wasted. Also, 
most controversially of all, they claim that the cognitively disadvantaged 
include a large proportion of the Afiican-American p~pulation.~' The 
implications of this last claim have evoked the most vociferous criticisms. 
If Hermstein and Murray are to be believed, it would appear that IQ is 
amenable to prenatal influence and is a good indicator of high-level socio- 
economic potential. This latter point is of interest because parents are more 
likely to wish to ensure their children have a high IQ if attaining this is of 
social utility. (Parents might also value a high IQ in itself or because it is 
likely to ensure other valued goals, such as membership of MENSA.) 
l9  The Bell Cuwe has been heavily criticised (see, e.g., Kincheloe et al. 1996, Devlin et 
al. 1997, and Fraser 1995). 
20 Measured by, e.g., the attainment of places at elite educational institutions (in 
Chapter 1 of The Bell Curve), and high income occupations (in Chapter 2). 
21 Measured by, e.g., low academic attainment (Chapter 6), high divorce and "out-of- 
wedlock births" (Chapter 8), and increased likelihood of criminality (Chapter 11). 
22 See Chapters 17-20. Earlier, in Chapter 13, they state, 
Changmg cognitive ability through environmental interventions has proved to be 
extraordinarily dficult. At best, the examples of special programs that have 
permanently raised cognitive ability are rare. (Hennstein and Murray 1994,3 14) 
23 E.g., 
In discussing IQ tests, for example, the black mean is commonly given as 85, the 
white mean as 100, and the standard deviation as 15 . . . . A total of 156 studies 
are represented . . . [in their statistical graph], and the mean B/W [blackhvhite] 
difference is 1.08 standard deviations, or about 16 IQ points. (Herrnstein and 
Mumy 1994,276) 
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However, if the concept of heredity is defined as above (3.2. l), then it 
follows that Herrnstein and Murray cannot rely upon it to ground many of 
their claims. This follows from the limitations of the concept drawn out in 
3.2.1. 
First, the descriptive significance of heritability is tied to the specific 
environment and population studied; therefore, it is not meatllngfU1 to 
extrapolate in the way that Herrnstein and Murray wish to. Even within 
there limits they estimated heritability of IQ at only 60% (which appears to 
be a vast overestimate: see Devlin et al. 1997), which means that, within the 
populations studied, variation in IQ is at least 40% attributable to 
environmental variation. Since their research used sibhgs (especially 
twins) who were either brought up by their genetic parents or separated from 
their genetic parents after birth (and sometimes a long time after birth), this 
must be postnatal environment. Thus, Herrnstein and Murray's figures are 
Ear from conclusive. 
Second, heritability can reveal nothing about the genetic component of a 
trait on an individual level, so Herrnstein and Murray's conclusions for 
individuals are not supported. A heritability figure by itself is not enough to 
empower those who wish to ensure their child is born with a high IQ. The 
genes (or environmental factors) responsible for variation of that trait (in 
individuals) need to be identified and, at present, no such genetic component 
has been identified.24 
Third, heritability does not predict the likely impact of genetic and 
environmental manipulation, and so Herrnstein and Murray cannot use the 
concept to ground the idea that certain social policies are a waste of time. 
Indeed, their claim that state-initiated attempts to aid the cognitively less 
able have failed (see Hermstein and Murray 1994, chs. 17-20), might just 
as well be an indication that such attempts failed to go fkr enough, rather 
than (as the authors imply) indicating that IQ lacks environmental 
manipulability. 
Another major problem is the characterisation of the trait supposedly 
being investigated in such studies. Herrnstein and Murray believe that IQ 
tests measure intelligence or, using their preferred phrase, cognitive ability, 
as described by Spearman's (1904; 1927) general factor, g (see Herrnstein 
and Murray 1994, ch. 1). This has been questioned, not least because it 
reduces intelligence to a unidimensional concept and appears to be biased 
towards white Western cultural skills (see, e.g., H. Gardner 1995; Carroll 
1996; Hunt 1997). 
Hermstein and Murray's main argument for the adequacy of IQ tests 
begs the question. They argue that "if the tests had been fatally flawed or 
merely uninformative, they would have vanished" (Herrnstein and Murray 
24 Certain features that are indirectly relevant to IQ (such as memory) have, however, 
been associated with certain alleles. 
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tests than it has when applied to other once accepted beliefs, such as flat 
l 1  Earthism. 
l IQ tests are, indeed, severely flawed as a measure of intelligence. IQ scores describe performance at a particular set of tasks that have been 
1 designed to measure a particular set of skills. Thus, IQ is defined relative I, to these tests and the set of skills that they are designed to measure. It follows that IQ does not describe a physical or behavioural trait that can 
Id' meaningfully be the result of gene-environment interaction. It is nothing '1 more than a social construct. And it makes no sense to investigate the causal input of one's genes to the possession of skills defined according to 
contingent social values. 
11, 3.3.2 Homosexuality 
Same-sex sexual preference-a homosexual phenotype-appears to have a 
significant (postnatal) environmental component, perhaps affected by 
variables such as history, culture, personal experience, and personal choice. 
Male homosexual behaviour certainly appears to have been more prevalent 
in those cultures that were very tolerant towards it, notably the Assyrian 
and Graco-Roman (see Baron 1993). Nonetheless, a number of scientists 
have attempted to identify biological, inherited, andor genetic components 
associated with homosexuality. 
I will first review the major studies on the assumption that 
homosexuality (or, indeed, any form of sexuality) can be non-arbitrarily 
defined. I will then question this assumption and deny that sexuality is 
capable of being non-arbitrarily defined and scientifically controlled for. 
Simon LeVay (1991) claims to have found that a specific region of the 
hypothalamus was smaller in homosexual men, than in heterosexual men, 
but slightly larger than in heterosexual women. As LeVay concedes, 26 of 
the 41 subjects died of AIDS, including all 19 of the homosexual men in 
the study,25 which might itself be a cause of these differences. However, 
LeVay argues that the size difference was apparent even when comparing 
the homosexual and heterosexual male AIDS victims, AIDS did not affect 
the other parts of the brain that were studied, and there was no association 
between the size of this region of the brain and the length of survival from 
the time of diagnosis (see LeVay 199 1, 1036). 
Nevertheless, LeVay's findings have yet to be replicated (see Byne 1994, 
29; Mann 1994). Also, since finding a correlation or association is not 
There were 19 homosexual men, including 1 bisexual man, all of whom died of AIDS. 
Also, 6 of the 16 heterosexual men, and 1 of the 6 presumed heterosexual women, died 
of AIDS (see LeVav 1991,1035). 
the same thing as3nding a causal component, it is possible that homosexuality 
itself causes the shrinkage of the hypothalamus, rather than the converse. 
In another study, Hamer et al. 1993a claim to have identified a 
particular region of the Xchromosome-region 28 of the long or "qv 
arm-that is associated with some forms of male homosexuality. More 
specifically, Hamer et al. showed that this marker on the X-chromosome 
was shared by 22 of 40 pairs of homosexual brothers. Again, this result has 
not been replicated (see LeVay and Hamer 1994, 25; Mann 1994; 
D'Alessio 1996, 33).26 One problem seems to be getting an adequate 
sample group. 
In yet another study, Bailey and Pichard 1991 measured concordance 
rates-the percentage of those who share a particular traitn-for relatives 
of male homosexuals. They found concordance rates of 52% for identical 
(monozygotic) twins, 22% for non-identical (dizygotic) twins, 11% for 
adopted brothers, and 9.2% for the non-twin biological. All of the siblings 
in the study were reared together, which means that they shared a great 
deal of their (postnatal) environment. Since genetically identical twins 
share all their genes and other biological siblings share only half their 
genes, the difference between the concordance rates of identical and non- 
identical twins might be thought to support the view that there is a genetic 
contribution to homosexuality. However, the finding that the non-twin 
biological brothers were far less prone to homosexuality than non-identical 
twins, suggests that homosexuality is largely environmental, as they share 
the same proportion of genes." Also, the result for adopted brothers is 
inconclusive. Indeed, since one would expect a genetic contribution to 
homosexuality to result in concordance that is proportional to the 
percentage of shared genes, all the results of this study are inconclusive. As 
King and McDonald put it 
the discordance for sexual orientation is striking and confirms that genetic 
factors are [an] insufficient explanation of  the development of  sexual 
orientation. ( 1992,409) 
A very similar line of research has been performed measuring concordance 
rates for relatives of female homosexuals (see Bailey et al. 1993). They 
found concordance rates of 48% for identical twins, 16% for non-identical 
twins, 6% for adopted sisters, and 14% for non-twin biological sisters. This 
Harner et al. 1993a has also be criticised by Fausto-Sterling and Balaba 1993, to which 
they have responded in Hamer et al. 1993b. For further criticisms, see Baron 1993, and 
Byrne 1994,3 1 .  " Thus, if all individuals in a study share a trait, the concordance rate is said to be 100%. 
28 The fact that twins are more likely to have similar life experiences than non-twins 
[ might be the explanation for this statistical difference. 
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might be interpreted as indicatmg that there is a genetic component to female 
homosexuality. However, the sample was very small, totalling 15 3 siblings. 
Even on the assumption that the trait under study is adequately defined, 
all of these studies raise more questions than they answer. Once the 
assumption itself is questioned, the foundations of this research rot away. 
The problem is c o n s t m ~  a non-arbitrary definition of a homosexual 
phenotype so that persons can be non-arbitrarily classified accordmg to their 
sexuality. 
Is one's sexuality to be defined according to the gender of those whom 
one has had sex with or accordmg to the fkll range of one's sexual desires or 
fantasies? Can we determine sexuality accorchg to self-proclaimed 
behaviour or desires, even though people are known to lie to others and to 
themselves? Is it possible to control for persons whose only preference is to 
rebel against the societal norm? Is sexuality any different from other 
preferences, such as preferences for or against peanut butter or horror 
movies? 
The studies reviewed fail to address these issues. In LeVay's study, for 
example, those who died of AIDS having participated in sex practices with 
members of their own sex were assumed to be homosexual, and the sexual 
orientation of those who had died of non-AIDS causes was presumed by 
reference to an estimated population incidence of homosexuality (see LeVay 
1991, 1035; LeVay and Hamer 1994, 21). Bailey and Pichard rely on an 
estimated 2% population incidence of homosexuality. How is it possible to 
estimate a population incidence of homosexuality as opposed to estimating 
the number of people in a particular familial, social, historical, and 
cultural setting who actually have sexual relations with persons of the same 
sex as themselves? 
Criminal behaviour per se cannot be described as a genetic trait, because 
crirninality is defined relative to institutionally posited rules, rather than a set 
of behavioural traits. That is to say, c m t y  does not describe a set of 
behavioural characteristics; it describes the social characterisation of certain 
conduct. For example, whether one infiinges the laws relating to sexual 
conduct might depend on fhctors such as the relevant age of consent and the 
legality of certain sexual acts, which vary from country to country. Thus, 
talk of c'criminality genes" can only be m ~ l ,  if used as shorthand for 
genes associated with identifiable traits, rather than biologically unrelated 
groups of traits. 
It might be thought that the term can legitimately describe genes 
associated with violent behaviour. Various studies claim to identifL genes 
creating a predisposition for violent behaviour. One study has shown a 
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deficiency of a gene product, monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), to be 
associated with aggressive behaviour in the men of a Dutch fhily. This led 
a team of researchers to create a line of transgenic mice in which the gene 
encmdmg MAOA was modified to provide a model of MAOA deficiency (see 
Cases et al. 1995). This study found that the mice, when adult, manifested 
"a distinct behavioral syndrome, including enhanced aggression in males" 
(ibid., 1763). Thus, talk of violence genes-genes associated with a 
predisposition for aggressive behaviour-has a degree of plausibility; 
although more studies would be needed to establish this. The empirical 
evidence would be likely to suggest such a gene as a contributory condition, 
rather than a necessary or sufficient condition (see 3.2.2). However, any 
discovered predisposition for aggressive behaviour will manifest itself 
differently in different environments. In some environments it might 
contribute towards violent behaviour, but in others it might contribute 
towards sporting prowess or entrepreneurial success. 
Talk of "crime genes" must also take account of the fact that crime itself 
can only be measured indirectly, through its detection. Thus, any associations attributable to crime, are actually associations with detected or 
self-attributed crime, and there may be factors relevant to detected and self- 
attributed crime that are not relevant to crime per se. For example, it is 
possible that those with lower intelligence are more likely to be caught when 
committing criminal acts. This is one way of explaining Hermstein and 
Murray's claim, if it is in fact true, that "criminal offenders have average 
IQs of about 92, eight points below the mean" (1994, 235). One reservation 
I have with Hermstein and Murray7s claim is that it is plausible that 
cognitive ability could affect the type of crime committed, so that while 
those committing the more primitive crimes--e.g., violent crimes such as 
rape and assault-might, on average, have low cognitive abilities, and those 
committing the more complex crimes-such as some forms of fiaud-might, 
on average, have high cognitive abilities. Thus, even if Hermstein and 
Murray have correctly identified associations, these must be restricted to the 
specific crimes that they have studied. Indeed, it is possible that genes 
associated with one specific type of crime could also be associated with 
more socially desirable traits. 
Although it might be possible to manipulate the likelihood that a future 
child might be detected engaging in some criminalised conduct indirectly- 
by manipulating genetic factors t .  in some environments, predispose 
towards pursuing, or being detected pursuing, certain purposes-it is 
misleading to talk of "crime genes." Also, we must be careful to avoid 
confusing correlationslassociations with causal factors. For example, it is 
known that males commit the vast majority of crime,29 but this does not 
l 29 E.g., there are currently 61,740 male compared to 3,349 female prisoners (see Ford 2000). 
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imply that c M t y  is the result of a Y- or X-linked gene or an autosomal 
gene expressed only in males. It is more likely that the social upbringing of 
males increases the likelihood of such conduct. Having said that, certain 
male hormones are widely known to increase aggressive behaviour, so there 
might be a genetic predisposition for some aggressive behaviour, which in 
some contexts might contribute towards violent behaviour. 
/ ' 3.4 Techniques of Prenatal Influence: Practice and Possibilities 
A number of things can be done to influence the traits of offspring before 
their birth. Any technique enabling discovery of existing traits or the 
prediction of fiture traits, if applied before birth, could reduce the chances 
of having a child with undesired traits. Often this will involve having a 
different child to the one that would have been born with the undesired trait. 
The techniques enabling prenatal influence range from those that are 
relatively direct-such as aborting a fetus before its birth on the basis of 
ultrasound pictures revealing the presence of an undesired physical trait-to 
those that are relatively indirect-such as -g to modifL a gene that 
increases the likelihood that an undesired trait will manifest. Not all 
possibilities are currently feasible. 
For expository purposes, these techniques will be grouped into three 
categories. The first category comprises those techniques capable of leading 
to the destruction or non-implantation of subjects with undesired traits or 
genes-the techniques of prenatal screening and testing (3.4.1). The second 
category comprises the most controversial means of influencing traits-the 
techniques of prenatal gene therapy and cloning (3.4.2). The final category is 
a miscellaneous group of other present and potential ways of influencing 
traits (3.4.3), comprising mainly non-genetic techniques, i.e., those not 
involving direct analysis or manipulation of genes. 
This chapter will conclude with a general overview of the legal and 
ethical issues raised by these techniques (3.5). 
l i 3.4.1 Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis 
It is possible to ensure that only those gametes, embryos, or fetuses 
possessing desiredM genes or traits are allowed to gestate. This can be done 
following some form of prenatal testing or screening. Before exploring the 
relevant techniques, we need to distinguish diagnosisltesting from screening. 
M Note the distinction between "desired" and "desirable." I do not wish to suggest that 
the traits that parents happen to desire in their offspring are, in any objective sense, 
necessarily valuable. 
Prenatal testing and diagnosis involves the testing (particularly genetic 
testing) of individuals thought to be at an increased risk of a particular 
genetic or congenital disorder. In contrast, prenatal screening involves the 
application of risk assessment procedures to populations of pregnant 
women for a condition where there is no family history or other evidence 
of its presence (see EGE 1996, para. 1.2; BMA 1998, 34-35). The 
&fference is the target population. Both can reveal diagnostic information, 
i.e., information capable of being used to influence traits before birth. 
However, since screening is not intended to provide a definitive diagnosis, . 
a more specific diagnostic technique is likely to be used before the prenatal 
entity is destroyed or discarded. 
Some techniques can be used for prenatal screening or as a means of 
prenatal diagnosis, whereas others might be used purely for screening or 
purely for diagnosis. As we shall see, many diagnostic techniques carry 
risks for the subject. Since prenatal screening is generally non-invasive, 
cheaper, and less complicated, it tends to be routinely available in most 
Western countries. In contrast, diagnostic tests are less freely available, but 
tend to provide more accurate information. 
Prenatal ultrasound can be used for prenatal screening or prenatal 
diagnosis. This technique enables visualisation of the fetus during its 
development and carries no proven hazard for either the mother or the 
f e t ~ s . ~ '  At present over 280 congenital malformations can be detected by 
ultrasound, generally at 18-20 weeks gestation (see Connor and Ferguson- 
Smith 1997, 202; ACGT 2000, 12). Thus, prenatal ultrasound provides a 
means of discovering whether a child has, or is likely to have, certain 
congenital traits or conditions. This raises the possibility of abortion to 
avoid the birth of a child with undesired traits,32 raising many ethical and 
regulatory issues. Aside from the degree of protection granted to the fetus, 
there is an issue of whether all detectable congenital differences have the 
same moral significance. For example, is aborting a fetus with anencephaly 
(no brain) in any way comparable to aborting a fetus with Down's 
syndrome? There are also issues relating to the amount of counselling and 
information that should be given to the parents, and the extent to which 
more specific diagnostic techniques should be offered. 
Genetic diagnosis is currently possible during pregnancy and before 
implantation. 
31 Researchers are, however, still exploring the possibility that ultrasounds carries risks to 
the fetus. A recent study by Kieler and colleagues (2001) provisionally concludes that 
men who were exposed to ultrasound in utero have a higher probability of becoming 
left-handed. Other studies are needed to establish whether this is more than a statistical 
oddity, as it suggests that ultrasound exposure is capable of damaging the brain of a 
gestating child. 
32 Ultrascans could also be followed by prenatal treatment of the developing child. 
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1~ Genetic diagnosis of the human oocyte (egg) or preimplantation embryo-preimplantation genetic dmgnosis (PGD)-has been performed 
since 1989.33 PGD is in fact a collection of techniques ranging from polar 
body biopsy on the first polar body (diagnosis of a sister cell of the 
unfertilised oocyte) to blasbcyst/trophoblast biopsy (diagnosis of part of the 
embryo at the blastocyst stage). The most popular method-blastomere 
biopsy-involves the diagnosis of 1-2 cells removed from the 
preimplantation embryo during cleavage (cell division) (see Handyside 1998; 
Harper et al. 1998). 
The embryo can also be genetically diagnosed during its gestational 
development, using prenatal diagnosis (PND). PND also refers to a 
collection of techniques (not all of which are f o m  of genetic diagnosis). 
One technique, chorionic villus sampling (CVS), involves the removal of a 
sample of the placenta from the womb by either a catheter (a thin tube) or a 
needle, usually between 8-12 weeks gestation. Another, amniocentesis, 
involves removing a sample of amniotic fluid by inserting a thin needle 
through the abdomen into the womb. This is usually performed at or later 
than 15 weeks gestation, but there is a form of early amniocentesis that is 
increasingly being used between 12 and . l5 weeks (see Connor and 
Ferguson-Smith 1997, 197). 
There are also a number of emerging forms of minimal or non-invasive 
PND techniques, such as diagnosis of fetal cells removed from the maternal 
circulation and diagnosis of transcervical cells (see Bianchi 1998; Findlay 
1998 et al., 1413; ACGT 2000, 12). These tend to be utilised for purely 
diagnostic purposes. 
Since an undesired result in PND is usually followed by termination, for 
some ethical positions it is significant that CVS can be performed at an 
earlier gestational stage than amniocentesis. However, amnimentesis 
remains the most popular procedure (see WHO and PAHO 1999,97). In fact 
it accounts for 90% of prenatal diagnostic tests performed in the UK (see 
ACGT 2000, 11). 
Since both CVS and amniocentesis are invasive procedures, they carry a 
small additional risk of spontaneous miscarriage. For amniocentesis this 
additional risk is 0.5-1% and for CVS and fetal blood sampling it is 1-3% 
(see ACGT 2000, 11). The importance of this depends on the degree of 
moral protection granted to the embryo or fetus at this stage of development; 
the greater the protection granted the more problematic running such a risk 
will be. 
A number of technical limitations beset the performance of genetic 
diagnosis; problems that increase when the number of cells in the sample 
33 It was first reported as successful in Handyside et al. 1989. In the future PGD might 
also be feasible on the sperm. 
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decrease. PGW is more prone to diagnostic fkilure and inaccuracy than 
PND, simply because PND tends to involve relatively large samples, 
providmg high numbers of cells for analysis." 
Also, genetic diagnosis-whether done before implantation or during 
gestational development in the womb-has the potential to reveal 
information about relatives. H u n w n 7 s  disease is a good example. This 
disorder usually manifests between the ages of 40 and 50, causing 
progressive neurodegeneration leading to involuntary movements, loss of 
motor control, and dementia, with death occurring 10 to 20 years later (see, . 
e.g., Sermon et al. 1998). It has no cure, the only treatment being symptom 
relief and support (see Braude et al. 1998, 1422). Since this is an autosomal 
dominant disorder, the discovery that a child has the Huntington's gene will 
indicate that (at least) one of its parents (and, at least one, of its 
grandparents, etc.) also has the gene.% So, genetic diagnosis of the prenatal 
child has the potential to reveal information not only about the person tested 
but also about relatives. These relatives will know that they are at risk 
because of their family history but might not want to know their own status. 
This is important, because the ethical weight attached to the right not to 
know might render the use of some techniques of prenatal influence 
unethical. 
It has, for example, been suggested that those at risk from Huntington's 
who do not wish to be tested themselves 
could be offered the option of having IVF37 with preimplantation biopsy and 
testing of their embryos for Huntington disease without ever being informed 
of the specific test results. (Sermon et al. 1998, 1434) 
34 For analysis of current methods of PGD see Wells and Sherlock 1998. 
" Diagnosis fkom a slngle cell by arnplifylng the DNA has been problematic because of 
the problems of allele dropout-failure to detect one of the two alleles present (see 
Findlay et al. 1998; Wells and Sherlock 1998, especially 1392)--and contamination of 
the sample with DNA fiom other sources (see Harper et al. 1998, 1343). Moreover, 
the method used to detect chromosomal abnormalities, fluorescence in sifu 
hybridisation (FISH)-which involves the staining of chromosomes with a f l u o r m t  
marker so that they can be easily examined under a micro- lead to 
misdiagnosis where the cell diagnosed does not carry the same chromosomes as the 
rest of the embryo, i.e., mosaicism (see ibid., 1343). Diagnostic inaccuracy (i.e., false 
positives and false negatives) can be increased by human error. 
Since Huntington's appears to have total penetrance, possessing the defective allele 
means that it will kill you, unless something else kills you first. 
37 IVF (in vim fertilisation) involves the fertilisation of an egg outside of the body. This 
acronym can also be used to describe the whole process from fertilisation to 
implantation. 
'p 
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l It is also suggested that such couples could also use PND (see ibid.). In practice, a number of practical problems are likely to arise: couples are 
likely to infer carrier status from unsuccessfbl implantations and + 
l confidentiality is harder to maintain with the necessary multiple medical 
participants (see ibid.; Braude et al. 1998, 1425). j, One obvious ethical question is whether it is acceptable to seek to know g 
the genotype of one's offspring with the intention of denying the same 
information about oneself to the h r e  child (were it to be allowed to 1 
develop). Many argue that such a practice is unacceptable. For example, the 
ethical guidelines of the International Huntington Association and the World 
Federation of Neurology Research Group on Huntington's disease (1994), 
recommend that prenatal testing that could reveal information about relatives 
should only be performed if the parent's status is known. 
Testing for late onset disorders raises additional issues. Any child born 
with such a disorder might have many years of disease-free life. 
Huntington's disease is a good example of such a disorder. Another example 
is the BRCAl mutation, which is thought to code for one of many forms of 
hereditary breast cancer commonly affectmg carriers of the mutation 
between the age of 30 and 50 (see Wagner. and Ahner 1998). This later 
mutation is associated with the following effects: 
l 
For women 80% lifetime risk of breast cancer and 
40% of ovarian cancer. 
For men 3 times more likely to develop prostate 
cancer. 
For both men and women 4 times more likely to develop colon 
cancer.38 
Although prenatal testing has not yet been used to detect the BRCAl 
mutation, it is now possible, and so, it is likely to be a matter of time before 
it is performed (see Wagner and Ahner 1998, 1 125). However, 
Particularly when breast cancer is diagnosed in its initial stage the chances of 
survival are excellent at >70%. Breast cancer caused by a BRCAI mutation is 
currently considered to have the same chances of recovery as sporadic breast 
cancer. (Wagner and Ahner 1998, 1125) 
Thus, the carrier of the BRCAl mutation-unlike a carrier of the Huntington 
gene-might not manifest its associated traits and, if the mutation carrier 
does, it might not be fatal. Does this render testing for the mutation 
immoral? 
38 Information derived from Wagner and Ahner 1998, 1 125. 
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Also, PGD requires the use of medically assisted reproduction (IVF or 
ICSI). For the one in ten heterosexual couples who are clinically infertilp 
this might be no greater burden than they would otherwise have to endure, 
but for those who are able to reproduce unaided, assisted reproduction 
involves many otherwise unnecessary risks and burdens. For example, the 
live birth rate for IVFIICSI, where the gametes are fertilised outside the 
body, is under 20% per treatment cycle." (However, the success rates will be 
considerably higher where the couples are fertile and are willing to undertake 
a number of treatment cycles.) Moreover, where PGD is used for a dominant . 
disorder such as Huntington's disease, the potential number of embryos 
available for transfer to the womb will be reduced by about 50%. In 
addition, the production of sufficient oocytes for removal involves hormonal 
stimulation that has many attendant risks for the woman. The ethical 
significance of these issues depends on the ethical theory invoked. For 
example, the significance of the attendant risks for the woman, where the 
woman is competent and has been informed of them, will be trivial for some 
autonomy-based theories and very important for more paternal theories. 
3.4.2 Prenatal Gene Therapy and Cloning 
Of the techniques of prenatal influence, cloning and prenatal gene therapy 
evoke the greatest number of science-fictional images and claim the loudest 
condemnatory cries. Yet, neither has been successfhlly applied to human 
beings. 
Prenatal gene therapy involves the direct manipulation of the genetic 
component of the phenotype. There are two forms: germ-line and somatic 
gene therapy. Germ-line gene therapy involves the deliberate genetic 
modification of germ cells (sperm or oocytes), their precursors, or the cells 
of early embryos where the germ-line has yet to be segregated. Whereas 
somatic (or somatic cell) gene therapy involves the modification of somatic 
(body) cells, which cannot ordinarily be passed on to h r e  generations. 
Although new genes were successfblly introduced into the germ-line of 
a d s  over a decade ago, human gene therapy has so far been restricted to 
somatic therapy and this has been relatively ~nsuccess l l .~~  Nonetheless, 
prenatal gene therapy might be the only way to prevent some genetic 
disorders-particularly those causing irreversible damage to the fetus before 
39 This is the standard estimate (see, e.g., Warnock 1985, para. 2.1,8). " The live birth rate of IVF treatments in the UK between April 1998 and March 1999, 
excluding fiozen embryo replacements, was 19.6% (see HFEA 2000, 14, Table 4.4) If 
fiozen embryo replacements are taken into account, it was only 18% (see ibid., 11 ). 
4' For good overviews of the current limitations and uncertainties of prenatal gene 
therapy see Senut and Gage 1999; Staff 2001; and Zanjani and Anderson 1999. 
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birth. However, at present the dominant view-which I will question in 
Chapter Five-is that prenatal gene therapy (especially germ-line gene 
therapy) is immoral and should be prohibited. 
Human cloning presents another possible method of influencing the 
genetic features of a child before it is born. Cloning is more than a method 
of manipulation; it is a method of creating a human embryo. For our 
purposes, cloning can be defined as the deliberate creation of a human 
being that is genetically identical to another human being or has the same 
nuclear gene set as another human being. In theory, this could be done by 
either splitting an early embryo (which occurs naturally in the creation of 
identical twins) or by transferring the nucleus of an egg, embryonic cell, or 
somatic (body) cell into a denycleated egg or embryonic cell. 
The creation of Dolly the sheep was a massive step towards the 
realisation of human clones. As is now common knowledge, Dolly was 
created by the transfer of the nucleus of a somatic cell (taken from an adult 
sheep's mammary gland) into an egg that had had its nucleus removed (see 
Wilmut et al. 1997). Over the last few years the "Dolly technique" has 
been developed and applied to mice, cows, goats, and pigs. 
Recently, the technique was applied to human cells (see Cibelli et al. 
2OOl)." Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a US biotechnology company, 
reprogramming eggs by somatic nuclear transplant so that they entered the 
pronuclear state (which is usually only found in fertilised eggs) and, in 
some of these, the nuclei proceeded to divide into six cells (ibid., 
especially 29). The published paper emphasises that the aim was purely to 
derive stem cells from these reconstituted embryos and not to create a 
human child. They state that, 
In order to prevent any possibility of reproductive cloning, the EAB [i.e., the 
independent Ethics Advisory Board used by ACT] requires careful accounting 
of all eggs and embryos used in the research. (Cibelli et al. 2001,27) 
At first sight, this research appears to bring the creation of a cloned human 
child one step closer. However, according to one of the pioneers of the 
Dolly technique, 
Even if you took the nucleus out of an unfertilised egg it would still develop to 
the six-cell stage under the right conditions without necessarily adding the 
nucleus of an adult cell. The fact that it did not develop beyond six cells 
" In 1999 a team of Korean scientists claimed to have inserted the nucleus of an adult 
cumulus cell-the type of cell that surrounds the ovary-before chemically activating 
the manipulated egg (see Baker 1999). They claimed that the conceptus was allowed to 
divide twice before it was killed, but this research was never published and met with a 
"global chorus of scepticism" (ibid., 16). 
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suggests it is fairly lightweight research. (Ian Wilmut, quoted in Connor 
2001).4~ 
Even after the successes with animals there are a number of uncertainties 
surrounding the use of the Dolly technique. For example, it is unclear 
whether the cloned being will have the tissue age of the egg or the somatic 
cell donor. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the technique carries 
increased risks of future complications, such as cancer. The consequences of 
cloning are already known to vary from species to species. 
At present, the dominant view is firmly against the creation of a cloned 
child. The ethical arguments against cloning-which will be evaluated in 
Chapters Five and Six-include claims that cloning involves unacceptable 
risks, undermhes genetic identity, instrumentalises or objectifies human 
beings, and opens the door to eugenics (see, e.g., UNESCO 1998; HGAC 
and HFEA 1998b; NBAC 1997). 
It should, however, be kept in mind that creating a clone of an individual 
will never replicate that individual. For example, creating a human child 
using the Dolly technique would not produce an exact copy of the nuclear 
donor, because it would have different mitochondrial genes," cytoplasmic 
products, womb environment, and a very different postnatal environment, 
including different individual choices and different personal relationships 
with others. Thus, a human clone would be far less like the person from 
whom its nuclear DNA was derived, than two identical twins are like each 
other. In short, producing a child that is genetically identical to another will 
not produce an exact replica of the cloned individual. Genotype is not 
phenotype. 
3.4.3 Other Techniques of Prenatal Influence 
So far I have concentrated on the best known techniques of prenatal 
influence. There are a number of other possibilities, many of which do not 
directly involve the identification, manipulation, or modification of genes. 
Attempts to influence traits by environmental manipulation become 
commonplace after birth. Most parents strive to ensure that their child's 
intellectual potential is maximised through education, that their health is 
ensured by adequate nutrition and medication, and so forth. Before birth the 
43 It has, e.g., been reported that a senior scientist on the editorial board of e-biomed has 
resigned claiming that he didn't think that ACT "have come anywhere near the mark 
of what it would take to prove" their claims (quoted in Arthur 2001, 10). 
However, ACT claim that other related research successes will be published in 
Science (see Gottlieb and McKie 2001,7). " Unless it shared the same maternal line with the nuclear donor. 
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phenotype is to some extent manipulable through environmental factors, 
such as the nutrition and drugs received by the mother before and during 
pregnancy, The effect of prenatal non-genetic factors is starkly illustrated 
by the thalidomide incident during the 1960's. Thalidomide, which was 
given to pregnant women to prevent morning sickness, caused severe 
congenital malformations. Alcohol is also known to have deleterious 
effects on the perinatal child (see Bagheri et al. 1998; Connor and 
Ferguson-Smith 1997, 194-195), as is smoking (see, e.g., Zenzes 2000). 
There are in fact many environmental factors, collectively called terogens, 
capable of causing congenital malformations (see Connor and Ferguson- 
Smith 1997, 194-195). 
In some cases the introduction of certain drugs, proteins, or vitamins 
during pregnancy could ensure or prevent the manifestation of certain 
traits. For example, the evidence suggests that taking folic acid before 
conception reduces the chances of the resulting infant having neural tube 
defect, such as spina bifida and anencephaly (see Anonymous 1991; Lancet 
199 1; Wald 1994). 
Since the Y-chromosome (which is necessary for a child to be male) 
can only be carried by the sperm, it might bt? possible to select the sex of 
one's future child by manipulating its conception or preconception. For 
example, some scientists believe that it is possible to influence the sex of 
one's offspring by sperm selection," or (although this is unlikely) by 
ensuring that the man has a certain diet before conception takes place. 
In practice, non-genetic forms of prenatal influence are often perceived 
as being less ethically problematic than genetic forms. It needs to be asked 
whether it should matter what type of technique is invoked for the purposes 
of prenatal influence. 
3.5 Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Techniques of Prenatal 
Influence 
Having explored the possibilities for prenatal influence it is now possible 
to expand upon the legal and ethical issues highlighted so far. 
The most obvious ethical (and regulatory) issue centres on the status of 
the subject of prenatal influence: the gamete, preimplantation embryo, 
embryo, and the fetus. The question is whether any of these entities are 
owed moral protection and, if so, what weight this moral protection has in 
comparison to the moral protection granted to others, such as the potential 
parents. This issue was addressed in the last chapter. 
45 E.g., a US clinic in Fairfax, Virginia claims to have sex selected nearly 200 babies with 
the h e l ~  of sperm sorting machine (see Irish Times 2001). See also Mayor 2001. 
The moral interests of potential parents also raise questions such as 
whether there is a moral right to reproduce, and if so, what the strength of 
this right is and whether it includes a right of access to medically assisted 
reproduction. These include the issue of whether any such right is purely 
negative (i.e., imposing duties of non-interference only) or also positive 
(i.e. imposing duties of assistance). Moreover, if there is a right to 
reproduce, it needs to be asked whether this right encompasses a right to 
reproduce in a specific way or with specific consequences. Does it, for 
example, include a right to clone? 
Another issue requiring consideration rests on the claim that PGD is 
superior to PND because it avoids abortion of a fetus. The validity of such 
a claim will depend on, inter alia, the legitimacy of abortion (generally and 
for trait selection), whether failure to implant is distinguishable from post- 
implantation abortion, the moral status of the oocyte and unimplanted 
embryo, and the weight given to the fact that PGD makes it easier to 
influence the characteristics of one's offspring and more difficult to 
prevent parents acting for certain motives. 
Techniques that have yet to be successfully performed on humans, such 
as cloning by nuclear substitution and germ-line gene therapy, raise other 
issues. For example, is it morally permissible to attempt to clone a human 
using the Dolly technique given that it will probably have a low success 
rate?46 Is it morally permissible to attempt germ-line gene therapy on 
humans given the difficulties highlighted by the "Beltseville pig" incident, 
where the genetic switch that was supposed to trigger the production of 
growth hormone was permanently switched on, resulting in an overly obese 
pig with many subsequent complications? Also, how effective and risk-free 
does a diagnostic technique have to be before it can be legitimately applied 
to a potential child? 
One question that keeps arising-the central question of this book-is 
whether it is morally legitimate to deliberately manipulate the 
characteristics of one's child before its birth. One appealing suggestion is 
that the legitimacy of prenatal influence depends on the characteristic or 
trait in question. This raises a number of questions. First, does it matter 
whether the trait is relevant to the possession of intrinsic moral status? 
Second, does it matter that some traits that are irrelevant to the possession 
of moral status-such as Down's syndrome and Huntington's disease 
where moral status is granted to those who are human, sentient, or 
agents-will hinder the future offspring's range of future purposes? Third, 
does it matter whether the trait can be treated, or influenced by other 
Although the technique has moved on since the creation of Dolly, her creation involved 
277 attempts to transfer the nucleus to the egg, and only one out of the 29 embryos 
implanted was born alive (see Wilmut et al. 1997). For a good summary of the present 
situation see Rideout et al. 2001. 
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l means, such as education or drug treatment, after birth? Fourth, are the 
1 1  needs and requirements of one's society relevant considerations? This book will address many of these questions by applying the 
l framework developed in Chapter Two. There are, however, a few general comments to be made here. l One suspects that if it were possible to choose the characteristics of ~l one's offspring, the vast majority of Western first born children would be 
l ~ thin, white, heterosexual males without any propensity for any purpose- 
selection of characteristics lacked by their existing children could cause 
psychological harm (feelings of rejection/inadequacy) to their existing 
children. The opposite might occur, i.e. not manipulating the characteristics 
of a child before it is born might actually harm existing children. For 
example, if a child is born with an avoidable genetic defect this will drain 
family resources that could have been utilised for the benefit of existing 
children. Second, prenatal choice could harm other potential parents, by 
increasing societal pressure on them. For example, attempts to avoid the 
manifestation of certain genetic traits might cause those carrying the . 
relevant genetic mutation to be subject to illegitimate pressure to use PGD 
and PND to avoid their having children with those traits. Third, prenatal 
choice might harm those existing persons who possess the trait that parents 
wish to avoid in their own children. For example, attempts to ensure a 
heterosexual phenotype could cause psychological harm to existing non- 
heterosexuals. In other words, unfettered parental choice could have the 
effect of legitimising social prejudices. Fourth, some forms of prenatal 
choice might-as I suggested earlier-reveal information about relatives 
who wish to remain ignorant. 
I have kept this overview relatively general because what is in issue to 
one moral theory or perspective is not necessarily so to another. However, 
since this book is concerned with the application of a specific criterion of 
moral permissibility, the following chapters will be less general. 
1 ~ 1  
unrealistic expectations of lugh-attrunment or, conversely, false images of future fatlure 
based on their genotype. One character, played by Jude Law, was so haunted by h s  
fiulure to live up to specially selected genotype that he attempts to take lus own life 
twice; becomng paralysed on the first attempt and succeeding on the second attempt 
Although thls film is purely fictional, these images are not beyond the realm of the 
possible 
l 
restricting genetic condition. There would inevitably be exceptions. For 
example, it is known that some couples with congenital deafness or 
achondroplasia (dwarfism), would choose to have children with these 
traits. Moreover, it is conceivable (though I suggest unlikely) that-if it l could meaningfully have a manipulable genetic component-some homosexuals would prefer to have homosexual offspring (see Davis 1997a). l Many parental preferences are specific to contingent tastes and cultural values. Some parents might value offspring with increased musical, 
sporting, or intellectual ability; others might prefer children with religious, 
mathematical, or artistic predilections. Many might want their child to have 
l the greatest all-round genetic potential possible. The burden of parental expectations leaps to the forefront of our concerns, but there is also a danger of the opposite, that where a child lacks 
l 
l ' 
the genetic component associated with a trait it will be assumed to lack the 
ability to display that trait.47 For example, if it became the norm to enhance 
innate potential for musical ability, parents of children who have not been 
"enhanced" might assume that their child lacked such potential. If this is a 
serious risk, the question is how much ethical weight should be attached to 
it. 
So far, I have concentrated on the potential harm to the parents and the 
future child. Indeed, later chapters will explore these issues further- 
particularly, the claim that parents have a right, legitimate interest, or even 
an obligation, to influence the characteristics of their children, and the 
issue of whether the birth of an "impaired" child can be said to harm that 
child. However, there are at least three other persons, or categories of 
persons, who might be harmed-if the conception of harm is sufficiently 
wide-by prenatal attempts to influence the traits of offspring. First, 
prenatal choice could harm existing children. For example, parental 
47 E.g., the film Gattaca presented a rather negative image of people burdened with 
Chapter 4 
Regulation of Genetic and 
Reproductive Techniques I: 
Prenatal Genetic Testing and 
Embryo-Fetal ~esearch'  
The legal and ethical issues raised in the last chapter present a number of 
regulatory possibilities. Regulatory overview could be triggered by specific 
techniques, by attempts to achieve certain purposes (irrespective of the 
method or technique used), or by the performance of specified activities, 
such as the use of specific expertise, facilities, or funds. The regulatory 
response could take a number of forms: it could (depending on the legal 
system) involve mechanisms such as constitutional provision, primary or 
secondary legislation, non-legislative codes of practice, or professional self- 
regulation. The response could be supported by powers of enforcement or 
sanction ranging from criminal or private law powerslsanctions to social 
pressure. Moreover, the stringency of the regulatory response could range 
from prohibitive to permissive. In short, regulatory potential is extremely 
diverse-there can be variation of the regulatory trigger, form of regulation, 
form of regulatory enforcement or sanction, andtor regulatory stringency. 
This chapter and the next will explore some of the issues raised by 
specific techniques of prenatal influence and their use as triggers for 
regulatory oversight. In the process I will analyse the regulatory 
mechanisms that have been adopted, or are likely to be adopted, in EU 
countries, Canada, and the US, with particular emphasis on the UK. 
Detailed summaries of these laws are to be found in the Appendices. 
Since, left unconfined, this area is potentially too broad for overview 
here, I will concentrate on the regulation of abortion and prenatal diagnosis 
(PND), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), embryo research, 
I cloning, and prenatal gene therapy. These are not the only methods of 
f prenatal influence (see Chapter Two), but regulatory responses do seem to 
1 centre on these techniques. Other methods of prenatal influence-such as 
l 
/ ' An earlier version of the information on the regulation of prenatal genetic testing and l embryo research in the EU countries-in sections 4.3.2, 4.4.1, and 4.5.2-was 
1 presented in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. 
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manipulation of the gestational environment-tend to attract different 
regulatory responses and appear to be universally ignored by legislatures. 
Moreover, the techniques explored here tend to attract more concern, 
primarily because they exhibit greater potential for prenatal manipulation. 
As its title indicates, this chapter will focus on the issues raised by the 
regulation of prenatal genetic testing--encompassing both PGD and PND- 
and embryo-fetal research. Since these techniques raise issues that are fiu 
too complex for definitive assessment, my conclusions will be highly 
qualified. Thus, I will tend towards the defence ofprima facie presumptions 
rather than conclusive answers. I will, however, indicate some of the main 
complexities and rule out those positions that clearly violate the 
requirements of the PGC. 
As before, I use the term "embryo" to include what is sometimes 
referred to as the pre-embryo or zygote, and the phrase "embryo-fetus" to 
encompass all stages of development from fertilisation to birth. 
4.1 Reiteration and Additional Remarks on the Application of the 
PGC 
This chapter will build on ideas defended in earlier chapters, especially 
Chapter Two on moral status. Thus, to reiterate, my contention is that moral 
status is proportional to the degree of agency-related behaviour and 
characteristics displayed. It might seem strange to take characteristics and 
behaviour that are manifestly below what we would expect of an agent as 
evidence of agency. Strange or not, we are morally obliged to treat even the 
most implausible hypothesis of agency seriously. When faced with a direct 
conflict between such hypotheses, the least plausible has less force. Less 
force is not, however, no force. The consequence is a gradualist view of the 
status of the embryo-fetus, so that its moral status gradually increases 
during its gestational development (cf. Warren 1973, 49, Tooley 1972; 
Sumner 1981). 
At the end of Chapter Two I hinted that there is no simple formula for 
working out the precise requirements of the PGC in many multi-variable 
conflicts. I Qd, however, argue for criteria to resolve single variable and 
simple multi-variable conflicts. Faced with a conflict between claims of 
beings displaying different degrees of agency-related behaviour and 
characteristics, the criterion of avoidance of more probable harm provides 
a hierarchical structure for determining priority. Faced with a conflict 
between different levels of harm or need, the criterion of degrees of 
needhlness for action provides a hierarchical structure. Faced with a 
conflict between different degrees of probability with regard to the 
occurrence of harm, a reformulated criterion of avoidance of more probable 
harm provides a structure for priority. It is, however, much more complex 
when the situation involves conflicts between more than one of these 
variables (i.e., moral status; level of harmheed; probability of harm 
occurring) simultaneously. 
Where someone is at fault for the creation of the dilemma, criteria can 
be offered to evade the difficulties of weighmg what appear to be 
incommensurable variables. Gewirth himself suggests that some dilemmas 
involving multi-causal Eactors can be solved by the principle of intervening 
action, which states that 
when there is a causal connection between some person A's performing some 
action (or inaction) X and some other person C's incurring a certain harm Z, 
A's moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there 
intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant 
circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z 
through recklessness. The reason for this removal is that B's intervening 
action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A's action (or 
inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs. (Gewirth 
1981, 12) 
Thus, he argues, if I am faced with the need to torture my mother on 
television as the only way of appeasing a terrorist's threat to kill thousands 
of innocent persons in a distant city with a nuclear bomb, I am justified in 
reksing to injure my mother because the terrorist's act is a sufficient 
intervening condition for the occurrence of the immoral act.' In response to a 
counter-example by Levinson (1982), Gew~rth adds the principle of prior 
wrong action to his armoury (see Gewirth 1982). This principle holds that 
agents who are responsible for the creation of a dilemma can be estopped 
from claiming priority in the resolution of this dilemma. 
While a lot can be said for principles like the principle of intervening 
action and the principle of prior wrong action, they are of no help in the 
resolution of many multi-variable conflicts. Theoretically, there are at least 
three ways of resolving more complex conflicts: 
(a) introducing criteria for resolving conflicts between the above criteria; 
(b) using a random method of choosing between the horns of a dilemma 
(e.g., tossing a coin); or 
(c) relying on procedural, rather than substantive, criteria for resolution of 
such dilemmas. 
' This example is unfortunate as by placing the subject's mother on the side of the 
dilemma that he favours, Gewirth adds intuitive baggage to his side of the scales. If 
Gewirth's argument for this principle is sound, then it applies irrespective whether 
the subject's mother is the one who must be tortured, or one of the thousand people 
threatened by the bomb. Although the side that the subject's mother is on might bring 
other considerations into play. 
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If (a) is possible then this is what we ought to aim to do. In the absence of 
such an approach (or, I shall argue, even in the presence of principles or 
criteria of dilemma resolution) the third option, (c), is a practical necessity, 
which might sometimes result in a solution being derived by random choice 
(b). 
The argument for (c) develops out of a more general objection, fiom 
which this specific problem arises. Accordmg to this objection, since we 
have no omniscient, infkllible Platonic philosopher king to work out the 
precise requirements of the PGC for us, a completely moral order is 
practically unobtainable. On a purely theoretical level, this objection has 
some force. However, the PGC can, without viola- its precepts, take into 
account the practical realities of the human condition. 
In practice, some decisions can legitimately be left to the discretion of 
individuals and other, more problematic decisions, must be delegated to 
appropriate decision-making bodies or persons. Without procedural 
measures for dealing with dilemma resolution difficulties, the force of the 
uncontroversial implications of the PGC could be undermined. It goes 
without saying that any such procedural mechanisms must be constrained by 
the PGC, as the PGC must not knowingly or.avoidably be violated. Thus, 
practical legitimacy must be given to the decisions of those, appointed in 
accordance with PGCderived  procedure^,^ who seek to make a "good fiuth" 
attempt to apply the PGC with a certain degree of competence (see 
Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994, especially 183-4). Where a "good faith" 
attempt is one that is sincere and committed, expendq effort that is 
commensurate with the importance of getting it right. 
Following Beyleveld and Brownsword, I am arguing that W with 
controversy over differing (but reasonable) interpretations of the PGC's 
application, or of the empirical evidence, we must, for practical purposes, 
have a legitimate system of dispute prevention and resolution. I can see no 
way of avoiding this conclusion. If we do not presume the legitimacy of rules 
or decisions made by those legitimately appointed, competently making a 
"good faith'' attempt to apply valid moral principles, attempted social 
regulation will be immoral at the level of attempt as well as achievement. 
What about everyday decisions on relatively simple matters? In practice, 
since people just do not have the time or competence to consider the morally 
relevant implications of all their possible acts or omissions, individuals must 
be inculcated with those beliefs and intuitions conducive to automatic and 
un- compliance with the PGC. Expanding on one of the arguments 
presented in Chapter Two (2.6.2) for the conferment of indirect moral status 
I do not concentrate on what procedures can legitimately be used to appoint decision- 
makers here, however, Gewirth argues for the "method of c o m t "  (see Gewirth 
1978,3 19-322). See also Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994, Chapters 7-9. 
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(i.e., the argument for development of virtues), I am suggesting, on epistemic 
grounds, a place for PGCderived intuitions and dispositions. 
This might strike the reader as akin to Hare's two levels of moral 
thinking: the intuitive and critical level (see Hare 1981, 39-53). Hare's 
intuitive level comprises "relatively simple, prima facie, intuitive principles 
or dispositions," justified at what he calls '%he critical level" (see Hare 198 1, 
40). Hare argues that the critical level is necessary because the intuitive 
principles 
are not self-justifymg; we can always ask whether the upbringing was the best 
we could have, or whether the past decisions were the right ones, or, even if 
so, whether the principles then formed should be applied to a new situation, 
or, if they cannot all be applied, which should be applied. To use intuition 
itself to answer such questions is a viciously circular procedure; if the 
dispositions formed by our upbringing are called into question, we cannot 
appeal to them to settle the question. (Ibid., original emphasis) 
Thus, Hare's critical level does not pennit appeals to intuition; instead all 
answers are to be worked out by application of the supreme principle of 
morality (which for Hare, as a preference utilitarian, is the Principle of 
Utility). 
There are similarities between the approach that I am advocating for the 
application of the PGC, and Hare's distinction between intuitive and critical 
moral thinking. What I am suggesting is that the choice of principles to 
inculcate individuals with (for use on the intuitive level) must be justified at 
a critical level defined by the PGC. This critical level must be understood as 
having both a substantive and procedural component, where the procedural 
component is that argued for by Beyleveld and Brownsword, i.e., 
legitimately appointed persons conductinia "good faith" attempt to apply 
the PGC. 
Therefore, procedurally, the PGC not only authorises but actually 
requires individuals to apply the PGC by the intuitive internalisation of its 
norms and constrained decision-malang mechanisms. For present purposes, 
this means that when evaluating regulatory attempts, it needs to be asked 
whether the resuh is a clear application or violation of the PGC, or could 
reasonably be the result of a competent decision-makmg body applying the 
PGC. 
4.2 Comments on the Indirect Application of the PGC 
Are those legitimately appointed to make decisions constrained by the 
requirements of competence and good faith without guidance in multi- 
variable conflict.? So fkr, all I have done is highhght the relevant variables: 
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Where the probability of agency is entirely metaphysical, lackmg any 
supportive empirical evidence (as is the case of just about all non-living 
 object^,^ such as tables), any straight conflict between its possession of 
possible generic rights and those of a being displaying evidence of agency, 
must be determined in favour of the latter. A number of considerations 
underpin this hypothesis. First, there is no supportive evidence of a table's 
agency, while (through the interpretative gauze of precautionary reasoning) 
there is some supportive evidence in the case of a living bemg, and so the 
risk of inflicting generic harm is fhr greater in the latter case. Second, the . 
burden of preventing possible harm imposed on ostensible agents would be 
too great if inanimate, non-interacting objects were to be granted protection 
(see the next paragraph). Third, a table cannot meanqfblly be granted 
duties of protection because (if it were an agent) it is equally likely to suffer 
generic harm by the alternative of any (in)action. For example, burning a 
table is just as likely to cause it generic harm as not burning it--on this point 
there is no relevant evidence favouring any metaphysical story over any 
other. Thus, for all practical purposes, the possible agency of such objects 
can be ignored. 
Where there is empirical evidence capable of supporting the hypothesis 
of agency that is (at most) margmd-as in the case of very simple 
organisms displaying only patterned life-sustaming behaviour-the 
probability of agency is so low that it can never coherently be given priority 
in the case of conflict with an ostensible agent. Even though precautionary 
reasoning will not allow a possible agent to be treated as a non-agent, in 
these circumstances the likelihood of agency is weighted finnly in the favour 
of the ostensible agent and granting more than extremely margmd duties of 
protection to such possible agents would require prohibitive, purpose- 
undermining caution. After all the precautionary argument is subject to the 
proviso that all things must be equal, and level of caution that would be 
required to protect bacteria, body cells, and other creatures displaying only 
minimal evidence of agency renders all thrngs h from equal. Living cells 
are killed when we scratch, bacteria are killed when we wash, insects are 
killed by our vehicles, etc. Thus, I suggest that any generic need of an 
ostensible agent should be able to override even the most basic harm (i.e., 
death) to such an entity. Nonetheless, non-generic concerns-mere whims 
not connected with the maintenance or advancement of an ostensible agent's 
generic features-will not be sufficient to override even this extremely low 
~' when comparing any action or inaction to its alternatives, an agent must take 
account of the probability that any potentially affected being is an agent, the 1~ level of PGC-relevant need and harm potentially brought about by that action, and the probability of the action bringing about this harm or need- 11 Ilfilment . One problem is that these variables seem to be measured in terms of 
'~~ incommensurable probabilities. The degree of moral status is measured in terms of probability of agency, giving us only a relative ordering; it does not precisely quantifl how much moral status a being has. The criterion of 
degrees of needfulness for action (applied to determine PGC-relevant harm l~ and need) also provides only a relative ordering; it does not measure how 
I say "just about all" because it is possible to envisage a non-living robot displaying 
some (or even, possibly, d c i e n t )  evidence of ostensible agency. Fiction offers numy 
hypothetical examples, such as the films Blade Runner, Bicentennial Man, and A.I. 
Note that outside clear cases there is some dificultly deflning "life" or a "living 
being (see, e.g., Silver 1998, Chapter 1). 
l much a generic feature is needed for action. We are faced with probabilities rather than commensurable units. 
Nonetheless, all mtra-vanable conflicts are to be resolved by versions of 
the criterion of avoidance of more probable harm. Even the criterion of 
degrees of needfulness for action is a version of this criterion, as it gives 
greater weight to those generic features whose hindrance or removal will 
more probably interfere (or tend to interfere) with an agent's ability to 
achieve its purposes. Thus, if possible, it is the criterion of avoidance of 
more probable harm that must be used for inter-variable conflicts, as a 
necessary means of avoiding or limitmg violations of the P m .  Clearly, no 
one category of variable-moral status; degree of harm/need; probability of 
hadneed manifesting--can take overall priority in a multi-variable 
l conflict. However, these categories don't share exactly the same degree of intimacy to the probability of harm occurring. For a being to be capable of 
suffering PGC-relevant harm at all, of any degree of severity or risk of 
occurrence, it must be an agent. 
Three other points should be borne in mind. First, for a being to be 
treated as a duty-bearer in any meaningful sense it must be an ostensible 
agent. Second, the precautionary thesis is subject to the proviso that all 
things must be equal, which will not be the case where the burdens placed on 
ostensible agents are very onerous causing basic generic harm by severely 
restricting their purpose-fulfilment. Third, workable regulatory policy 
requires practical solutions and assumptions, even where the relevant 
variables appear to be incommensurable or uncertain. Regulatory policy 
must be constrained by, but is not identical to, abstract moral theory. 
These four fhctors, I will suggest, require the degree of moral status 
possessed to be given marginally more weight than the other variables. The 
degree of moral status of all potentially affected beings must be the first (and 
in some extreme cases the only) variable considered as a means of achieving 
the best balance of moral variables. It must be given margmd presumptive 
supremacy. After tentatively evaluating certain hypothetical multi-variable 
disputes, my reasoning will be made more explicit. 
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degree of moral status. In practice, this is unlikely to prevent the exercise of 
any of an ostensible agent's presumed generic rights. 
It gets more difficult (and more controversial) where the degree of 
empirical evidence is low but above maqpal. Where, for example, we have 
a human gamete displaying marginal behavioural evidence of agency but 
also displaying a small degree of evidence of potential future ostensible 
agency, or an early embryo displaying slightly more evidence of agency. 
Neither example presents either significant or sufficient agency-related 
evidence. In fact, a laboratory rat displays considerably greater relevant 
characteristics and behaviour. Nonetheless, even when faced with a conflict 
with an ostensible agent, precautionary reasoning does not allow us to 
entirely ignore the evidence suggesting that such entities might possibly be 
locked-in agents. Thus, its possible intrinsic worth must be given a degree of 
protection. As the embryo develops the degree of protection required will 
incrementally increase, until it reaches a stage where only a realistic risk of 
basic generic harm to an ostensible agent will be sufficient to justify its 
destruction. 
Within these constraints, it should be clear that the indirect application 
of the PGC cannot support treating the embryo-fetus as if it had fill, or even 
nearly fill, moral status, nor can it support treatmg the embryo-fetus at all 
stages of development as a valueless thing. 
The four factors stated above suggest something more than this. The 
conclusion they suggest is this: when faced with a conflict between an 
ostensible agent and a being displaying far less agency-related evidence, all 
the ostensible agent's basic generic features are to be presumptively treated 
as at least as valuable as the other's most basic generic feature (i.e., its life). 
In other words, where the difference between the levels of moral status of 
two beings in conflict is large (as in the case of a normal adult human and a 
very early embryo), and the difference between the levels of harm is not (i.e., 
where both potential harms will be basic, etc.), the balance of variables 
prima facie favours the being with greater moral status. Thus, all things 
being equal, death to an early embryo runs less risk of violating the PGC 
than a less basic harm (such as the loss of an arm) to a normal adult human 
being. 
Four factors outlined above-the varying level of evidence supporting 
the hypothesis of locked-in agency, the reality that only ostensible agents can 
be practical duty-bearers, the moral and practical need to avoid unduly 
onerous burdens, and the practical constraints of workable regulatory 
policy40 not produce precise, mathematical guidance for resolving 
complex multi-variable conflicts. They do, however, point in certain 
directions. In some conflicts, as in the one above, the prima facie balance 
favours one party over the other. These W o r s  give margdly  more weight 
to any difference in the level of moral status compared to differences in the 
degree of potential hadneed-fulfilment or risk of its occurrence. If this 
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reasoning is sound it does not solve all our problems, but it does illustrate 
the type of reasoning required by competent attempts to apply the PG€. 
The next section will morally evaluate abortion and prenatal dqposis 
(PND), before exploring the regulatory positim in the member states of the 
EU, Canada, and the US. The 111 details of these laws are tabulated in 
Appendix 1. 
4.3 Abortion and Prenatal Diagnosis (PND) 
The legitimacy of prenatal diagnosis followed by selective abortion requires 
analysis of abortion. A pregnant woman might seek abortion on a number of 
potential grounds. Some are more controversial than others. Abortion to save 
the life of the pregnant woman is the least controversial. Indeed, since this is 
a relatively simple conflict where the same level of prospectwe harm will be 
suffered by either the pregnant woman or the gestational embryo-fetus, the 
pregnant woman's greater moral status is concl~sive.~ Abortion is justified 
in such 
Abortion is, however, fir more controversial where the variables are not 
quite as clear-cut. The considerations discussed above need to be kept in 
mind. These point to a number of h r s .  For a start, where there is a 
conflict between the protection of the pregnant woman's generic fixtures and 
the protection of the generic features of the embryo or fetus, the pregnant 
woman will just about always have h greater moral status. The ernbryo- 
fetus' moral status will, however, increase during its gestational 
development. Thus, early abortion will generally be easier to j u w  than late 
abortion. 
Another important factor is that pregnancy (and indeed abortion) carries 
risks to the life and (mental and physical) health of the pregnant woman.' 
This risk is affected by the gestational development of the embryo or fetus. 
During the early stages, aborting a developing child holds h fewer risks to 
The pregnant woman will just about always have greater moral status. There are, of 
course, exceptions. E.g., where the empirical evidence indicates that the pregnant 
woman is brainstem dead, requiring a life support machine for her essential functions. 
Assuming the probability of the harm occumhg is relevantly similar or irrelevant. 
7 The damage to the woman's mental health can be particularly severe where she does 
not want to cany or give birth to the child. The risk of psychological harm to the 
woman will be proportional to her desire to avoid pregna~cy. The general streqth of 
this desire is suggested by the common argument that any attempt to prohibit abortion 
will merely drive it underground. E.g., where abortion is prolubited women tend to 
use unofficial means or travel to other countries; e.g., more than 6,000 Irish women 
travel to Britain for abortions every year (see Payne 1999). 
! 
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the life and health of the pregnant woman than bringing it to term.8 This 
situation might, however, be reversed just before birth, as then abortion 
might hold greater risk of mortality than carrying to term. The psychological 
consequences of the pregnancy can, however, also affect the pregnant 
woman's short- or long-term health or survival. 
Also, as stated earlier, all positive rights to assistance are limited by the 
comparable cost proviso, which states that no agent has a positive right to 
assistance unless it can be provided at less than comparable cost to the 
provider. Thus, insoh as abortion raises issues relating to positive rights (of 
the pregnant woman or the embryo-fetus), these rights will be limited by this 
proviso. 
Before going any firther, it is useful to explore Judith Jarvis Thornson's 
famous article, where she argues that even if a fetus has moral status equal 
to a normal adult human, abortion would still be permissible in many 
circumstances (see Thomson 1971). Thomson draws an analogy between 
being pregnant and being involuntarily attached to a world-hous violinist 
who must remain attached for nine months if he is to survive. She argues 
that a woman has no duty to carry a fetus if she has no duty to allow the 
violinist to remain connected to her. There appear to be only three lines of 
response: one can accept that there is a duty in both cases (i.e., it is 
impermissible to disconnect the violinist or abort the fetus); accept that there 
is no duty in either case; or identifL a morally relevant disanalogy between 
the two cases.g 
The third option has attracted the most support. Some commentators 
wish to rely on a notion of fault, pointing out that, except in the case of rape, 
a pregnant woman has voluntarily run the risk of pregnancy by having 
sexual intercourse (see, e.g., Warren 1973, 49). However, it needs to be 
asked whether the woman's carelessness (e.g., failure to use contraception), 
or mere unluckiness (e.g., contraceptive failure), constitute prior wrongs that 
are sufficient to estop her from pleading the costs of pregnancy.'O The idea 
8 This is a frequently cited fact, see, e.g., Mason and McCall Smith 1999, 116; Petersen 
1996, 92. It is conceivable that where unsafe abortion practices are used, the risks to 
the pregnant woman could be greater for abortion than fiom carrying to term. 
However, unsafe abortion practice seems to occur in those places where mortality 
during pregnancy and childbirth is high. About 585,000 women die each year as a 
result of complications arising during pregnancy and childbirth, the vast majority in 
the developing world (see http://www.who.int/rht/msm/index.html), and about 78,000 
deaths occur as a result of the 20 million unsafe abortions undertaken around the 
world each year (see WHO 1998,8). 
Boonin-Vain 1997, suggests a fourth-rejecting the authority of such arguments fiom 
analogy. However, insofar as arguments fiom analogy are merely substitutive 
instances of the principle of universalisability, this is not a rationally acceptable 
option. 
'O Sufficient, that is, to invoke Gewirth's principle of prior wongdoing. 
Regulation of Genetic and Reproductive Techniques I 77 
seems to be that the woman usually has a degree of control over the 
occurrence of the pregnancy in the first place. Before holdmg the woman 
responsible for the pregnancy, and thus the occurrence of the dilemma, we 
need to explore the costs of pregnancy avoidance. The (PGC-measured) 
costs of the alternatives-using contraception, permanently removing one's 
reproductive capacity, or abstaining from sex-need to be taken into 
account. It is plausible to argue, on empirical grounds, that the most 
effective ways of avoiding pregnancy are likely to inflict basic generic harm. 
This is clearly the case with surgical means of removing fertility and 
arguably the case with abstaining from sex (at least in situations where the 
abstainer's only reason for abstaining is unwillingness to be involved in the 
reproductive enterprise)." Slightly less dramatic means of contraception are 
readily available in the developed world. Most of these carry h less risk of 
inflicting basic generic on the user.12 These are not, however, totally 
effective. If, despite the user's precautions, they h l ,  the user can hardly be 
held to be morally at fault for the pregnancy. In such circumstances, I 
suggest that abortion can provide the most appropriate method of limitmg 
harm to women who do not want to carry a child. 
To take stock of the factors I have emphasised so h: (a) the pregnant 
woman will (just about always) have greater moral status; (b) the early 
embryo has a very low moral status; (c) pregnancy is a greater threat to the 
woman's life than abortion (at least in early gestational development); (d) 
pregnancy can threaten the mental and physical health of the woman; (e) the 
costs of avoiding getting pregnant can be very damagmg to the basic generic 
features of adult humans (who are usually ostensible agents); and (f) any 
duties to aid the embryo or fetus will be limited by the comparable cost 
proviso. Together, these factors support at least a presumption in favour of 
early abortion where the pregnant woman does not at that time want to carry 
and give birth to any child, and attempted to avoid getting pregnant. 
I offer a presumption, rather than a definitive assertion, because of 
factors pointing in favour of the embryo-fetus: (a) abortion will result in the 
death of a possible agent; (b) the woman will usually have some control over 
the occurrence of the pregnancy in the first place, and (c) abortion can cause 
psychological harm to those who feel strongly for the unborn child. 
Moreover, if it were possible to remove the developing embryo-fetus from 
l1 My claim is that repression of sexual desire-which for fertile heterosexual couples is 
the only sure way of avoiding pregnancy-is likely to cause severe psychological harm 
or increase pressures favouring PGC-violating behaviour. It is also likely to damage 
the ability to form and maintain relationships between hetemsexual couples, which 
will have concomitant adverse consequences for individuals and society. 
Some contraceptive methods do cany risks. E.g., the contraceptive pill is known to 
carry increased risks to the life and health of the woman. These i n d  risks are, 
however, less than those associated with pregnancy. 
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l l the pregnant woman's womb without killing it7l3 then removal, rather than 
l 1  abortion is preferable, at least where adequate support mechanisms are 
' l  available for the pregnant woman (including supportive social attitudes), and the embryo-fetus is capable of developing into a child. Also, since the 
~ ' '  embryo-fetus does have moral status, the methad of abortion should, all things being equal, tend towards the one least likely to cause pain to it.14 
l 
4.3.1 Abortion to Avoid Undesired Traits 
So far I have avoided many of the issues raised by the use of abortion as a 
means of avoiding undesired traits. Most of my comments have been 
restricted to situations where the pregnant woman simply does not want to 
carry any child at that time. What about situations where the woman objects 
to carrying a child with certain traits? 
Many issues will have to be left until Chapter Six, as they go beyond 
this specific question. Some points, however, need to be raised here. Some 
traits are directly associated with the degree of agency-related evidence 
displayed and are, therefore, relevant to the possession of moral status. For 
example, an anacephalic child (i.e., one born without all or most of the 
brain) will manifest very little evidence of agency. It cannot display any 
significant stimulus response or any cognitive potential and, even with 
artificial aid, it is unlikely to survive after birth. Its limited moral status will 
thereby greatly increase the strength of any claim in favour of its abortion. 
Other traits do not affect the degree of agency-related evidence. For 
example, since a child with Down's syndrome will usually develop into an 
ostensible agent,15 an embryo-fetus with an extra copy of chromosome 21 
13 In the case of early abortion, for this condition to be satisfied it must be possible for 
the embryo to be gestated elsewhere, in either another's womb or an artificial womb. 
Where the fetus is capable of being delivered alive, all thugs being equal, this is what 
we should seek to do. In practice, some late term abortions result in the birth of a live 
fetus that is sometimes left to die, apparently without legal sanction in the UK (see 
Mason and McCall Smith 1999,132-1 33). 
14 All things might not be equal, where the methods have different degrees of risk for the 
pregnant woman. ' Albeit a societally incompetent ostensible agent, see Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998 for 
a discussion of specific task and societal incompetence. In simple terms, a "socially 
incompetent ostensible agent" is an ostensible agent that is not able to function in the 
society it lives in without unintentionally harmq itself or others, though its abilities 
are such that it would be able to function competently (i.e., without an unduly 
increased risk of inadvertent harm) in a less complex society. "Specific task 
incompetence" refers to an inability to perform the relevant task without 
unintentionally harmq itself or others. 
will usually have the same moral status as one with two normal copies at 
the same degree of gestational development. 
The greater degree of moral status possessed by the embryo-fetus, the 
harder it is to justify abortion. Thus, the defensibility of abortion can 
depend on the trait in question. 
In the last chapter, we saw that some forms of PND can cause 
spontaneous abortion (see 3.4.1). If abortion following PND is legitimate, 
those techniques presenting risk to the embryo-fetus create a dilemma. If 
the intention is not to abort after an undesired PND result, then to use PND 
techniques such as CVS is to put the embryo-fetus at unnecessary risk, but 
to require the pregnant woman to consent to abortion if the result of the 
diagnosis is unfavourable is to put coercive pressure on the woman to kill a 
possible agent. The practical significance of this is shown by a survey of 
obstetricians conducted in 1993, which found that one third required an 
undertaking to terminate an affected pregnancy before proceeding with 
PND (see Green 1995).16 This dilemma, insofar as it is a dilemma, can be 
evaded by merely explaining to the woman, the futility of diagnosis where 
she has no intention of acting on it. To force the pregnant woman to 
consent to abortion before using PND is, however, prima facie illegitimate, 
because she might want to use the information for other purposes. For 
example, the pregnant woman might want to find out whether her child 
will have a congenital abnormality before it is born so she can prepare 
herself for its birth. 
Fortunately, this possible dilemma often does not arise. Previous 
studies of termination decisions after prenatal diagnosis show that for a 
diagnosis of trisomy 13, 18, or 21, Tay-Sachs, anencephaly, spina bifida, or 
thalassaemia, between 73 and 100% choose termination (see Wertz and 
Fletcher 1993,555). 
Where, however, PND (or any diagnostic or screening technique) is used 
to test for late onset disorders that have no treatment or cure, the dilemma is 
far greater. Should the embryo-fetus not then be terminated it will develop 
into a child with knowledge that could cause it serious harm. Huntington's 
Disease, for example, is a late onset disorder-usually manifesting between 
the ages of 40 and 50-with 100% penetrance and invariably severe 
expre~sivity,'~ causing progressive neurodegeneration leading to dementia, 
and death 10-20 years later. It has no cure, the only treatment being symptom 
relief and support. Thus, should a parent choose to test for the mutation 
associated with Huntington's Disease and not terminate (or fail to 
implant) the embryo-fetus, the future child will have destructive knowledge 
Interestingly, "[tlhe BMA considered this approach to be unacceptable" (BMA 1998, 
52). 
l7 sek Chapter Three for explanation of these terms (3.1.1) and discussion of 
Huntington's disease (3.3.2). 
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about its own future that it might not want to have. In W, only 10 to 15% 
of at risk adults choose to be tested (see Report of a Working Party of the 
Clinical Genetics Society 1994, 791). If the test is positive, the evidence 
suggests that those with the mutation are likely to suffer severe 
psychological harm. In m, one study concluded that deaths due to suicide 
among persons with Huntington's are almost four times greater than the 
corresponding proportion for the US Caucasian population (see Farrer 
1986). 
If the test is negative, the evidence suggests that such individuals whose 
h l y  members manifest or are at risk of manifesting the disorder, are likely 
to suffer from " s u ~ v o r  guilt," similar to that suffered by wartime soldiers 
who live when their friends are killed (see Wexler 1985, 297-298; Andrews 
1991, 38). Thus, even if it were otherwise permissible to test for such late 
onset disorders, the possibility that the parents will choose to continue the 
pregnancy cannot be ignored. Since such knowledge is likely to cause 
generic harm to the h r e  child, and once the child's Huntington's-status is 
known it will be very difficult to keep it from the child without violating the 
PGC,I8 the presumption must be against permitting PND (or any prenatal 
diagnostic or screening technique) for incurable late onset disorders such as 
Huntmgton's. Ig 
This presumption seeks to protect the moral interests of the tested 
subject. These moral interests include those that it has when tested (embryos 
are possible agents) and those that it has as an ostensible agent in the future 
(the act of testing an embryo for an adult onset condition implies that the 
embryo is expected to become an adult in the future, so conduct towards it 
must be assessed with reference to the rights that it will have in the future). 
Since this is an autosomal dominant disorder, the discovery that a child 
has the Huntington's mutation will indicate that one of its parents also has 
the relevant mutation and will develop Huntington's disease. There are, 
however, mechanisms for revealing whether the fetus is at a high risk of 
inheriting the mutation without revealing whether the relevant parent has the 
mutation.20 Where the parents themselves do not wish to know of their own 
l8 E.g., the parents might be tempted to lie to the child, say, in response to questions 
provoked by the fact that family members will have the condition. 
Obviously, if a suitable cure for Huntington's disease develops the presumption will 
be rebutted. 
20 E.g., although a mutation test on the fetus will also reveal whether one of the parents 
has the relevant mutation, an exclusion test will not. The exclusion test is a "hkage" 
test that targets genetic markers close to the site of the mutation and seeks to identify 
(fiom blood samples taken fiom the relevant grandparent, parent, and the placenta) 
whether the fetus has inherited part of the relevant chromosome (chromosome 4). If 
the fetus has not inherited this marker fiom the affected side of the family, then it has 
not inherited Huntington's. Whereas, if it has inherited this chromosome, then its risk 
of having the condition, where one of its grandparents is known to have the condition, 
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status vis-a-vis Huntington's, the presumption against testmg the embryo- 
fetus is even stronger. All things being equal, parents cannot be permitted to 
gain the benefit of knowledge about their future child when they do not want 
their child to have such knowledge about themselves. A child is a potential 
b r e  carer of its enfeebled parents and, therefore, will have at least as 
much interest in discovering whether either of its parents have Huntmgton's 
as the parents have in discovering whether it has Huntington's. For the 
parmts to deliberately place themselves in a more fsvourable position than 
they intend to allow their future child to be in, where both have equal claim 
to be in such a position of knowledge, is to violate the future child's rights 
(see Beyleveld, Quarrell, and Toddqton 1998, 147- 155). 
Even if attempts to influence traits before birth are generally legitimate, 
it does not follow that PND is legitimate, at least where other less 
problematic techniques could have been used. Thus, the legitimacy of PND 
will always depend on the context of its use, including the available 
alternatives. 
A context where PND might be easier to justifl is where it is used as a 
means of identifjmg conditions so that they can be treated prenatally, rather 
than as a means of determining whether to abort the developing embryo- 
fetus. Where the condition to be identified by PND is potentially life- 
threatening for either the embryo-fetus or the pregnant woman, the use of the 
technique is (all things being equal) non-problematic. Where, however, PND 
is used to idenm whether prenatal manipulation to influence the traits of the 
developing embryo-fetus is viable, its permissibility will, once again, depend 
on the trait in question. 
Leaving the main issue-whether it is legitimate to attempt to influence 
traits before birth-until Chapter Six, the next section will explore the 
regulatory positions in the 17 countries studied. 
4.3.2 Regulation of Abortion and PND 
~bortion'is the most comprehensively regulated area falhg within the terms 
of this book. Of the 17 countries studied, 14 have specific legislation and the 
legality of abortion in the remaining three is affectsd by constitutional 
provision or equivalent. The legal situation is not, however, straightforward 
in all of these countries. In Canada, for example, over a decade ago the 
Supreme Court struck down the abortion provisions of the Federal Criminal 
Code as incompatible with a provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms:' thereby leaving the country with little by way of federal 
- -- 
increases h m  35% to 50% (see Beyleveld, Quarrell, and Toddmgton 1998, 134- 
137). 
R v Morgentaler [l 9881 1 SCR 30. 
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regulation. The US Supreme Court has been even more interventionist and 
1'1 has re-assessed the jurisdictional competence of individual states on l numerous occasions during the last 30 years. 
1~ Detailed tabulated lnforrnation on the laws of the EU countries, Canada, and the US can be found in Appendix 1, alongside full citation of the 
relevant legislation and legislative provisions. 
General Provisions on Abortion 
The vast majority of countries under study have dec-sed abortion up 
to a specific period of gestation, where certain conditions are satisfied. The 
most permissive is the legislation of the UK (excludmg Northern Ireland)z2 
and the Netherlands, which in practice allow abortion on demand up to 24 
weeks gestation. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal, abortion is generally restricted to gestational 
development of less than 12 weeks. Abortion is generally permitted up to 18 
weeks in Sweden, up to 16 weeks in Finland, and 12 weeks and six days in 
Italy. Until recently abortion was primarily restricted to the first 10 weeks in 
France, but reports suggest that this has recently been extended to 12 weeks 
(see Appendix 1). 
In Britain, the majority of abortions are performed under S. l ( l)(a) of the 
Abortion Act 1967 (as amended).u This provision permits abortion up to 24 
weeks only if performed by a registered medical practitioner, and two 
registered medical practitioners have formed the opinion that the 
continuation of the pregnancy will involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy 
were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the woman or 
her &ly. This will just about always be the case during the earlier stages 
of ~regnancy.2~ Thus, in practice, this provision appears to support abortion 
on demand in the UK up to 24 weeks gestation. 
22 In Northern Ireland it is illegal to carry out abortion other than to save the life of the 
mother or to prevent serious damage to her physical or mental health. This is because 
abortion is still govemed by the old British legislation as limited by the defence of 
necessity, as specified in R v Boume [l9391 1 KB 687. This old British legislation is 
the Offences Against The Person Act 1861, and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 
1929 as applied by the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 1945. 
23 In 19%,97% of abortions in England and Wales were performed under this provision 
(see Mason and McCall Smith 1999,116-1 18). " A m d u g  to Mason and McCall Smith, 
It is arguable that the risks of an abortion to the health of the woman are always 
less than those of full-term pregnancy+cularly if the termination is canied 
out in the first trimester. Equally, it is obvious that the mental health of a woman 
who is canying an unwanted pregnancy must suffer more damage if she is forced 
to carry her fetus than it would is [sic.] she were relieved of her burden. It can 
also be argued that simple economics dictate that a risk to the well-being of any 
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It is difficult to be certain whether the UK position is compatible with 
the PGC. On the one hand, it could be argued that it is not. The UK position 
appears to go beyond the presumption defended in 4.3, as it is not concerned 
with whether the pregnant woman has attempted to avoid getting pregnant in 
the first place. Thus, no distinction is made between a woman who 
deliberately got pregnant and later changed her mind because (say) the 
predicted birth was incompatible with her holiday arrangements, and a 
woman who took all reasonable precautim and accidentally became 
pregnant. This appears to be less of a problem in countries such as Be@um 
where the focus is on the pregnant woman's distress and determination. 
However, in the UK, in practice, abortion is permitted on demand without 
detailed consideration of such fixtors. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that, when other considerations are taken into account, the UK position is 
compatible with the PGC. Such considerations might include the 
psychological damage likely to be caused by investigation into the 111 
circumstances of the pregnancy and the consequential effects on the 
practitioner-patient relationship of restricting early abortion. These factors 
must be weighed against the moral claims of the early embryo. For present 
purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that (as the most liberal) the UK 
position requires more justificatory support than the simple presumption 
defended above. 
In all the countries under consideration, abortion is available for specific 
reasons beyond the period of gestation given above. Abortion is permitted up 
to birth where it is necessary to protect the pregnant woman's life in all 17 
countries. Indeed, this forms the only ground for abortion in Ireland, where 
abortion is prohibited unless there is a real and substantial threat to the lifk 
of the pregnant woman (see Appendix 1). On the basis of the arguments 
raised above, I suggest that the Irish position is far too strict, because it 
appears to disregard any risks to the pregnant woman's basic generic 
features other than her life (e.g., her mental and physical health), and 
appears to grant the embryo-fetus 111, or almost full, m o d  status. The 
relevant constitutional provision even goes so fiu as to declare the fetus7 
right to life to be "'equal" to that of the mother.25 Examined as if it were an 
application of the PGC, it appears to be fhr too categorically weighted in 
favour of the gestational embryo-fetus. 
As stated above, the Irish position flows fkom the constitutional 
acknowledgment of "the right to life of the unborn." It might be thought that 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights could have a similar 
effect on abortion in signatory states (which include all 15 of the EU 
existing members of the family is occa~ioned by the advent of another mouth to 
feed. (1999, 1 16) 
I l5 The Eight Amendment to the Constitution (Article 40.3.3). 
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countries). The UK has, for example, not only ratified the Convention but 
also given it circumscribed domestic effect in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Article 2 of the Convention provides that "Everyone's right to life shall be 
protected by law." The ambit of this Article has received some consideration 
in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In Paton v United Kingdom, 26 the European 
Commission of Human Rights pointed out that the term "everyone" is not 
defined in the Convention, but noted that the view that the term did not 
include the embryo or fetus was suggested by general usage and the context 
in which it is used in the C~nvention.~~ The Commission also noted that the 
term "life" was not defined.28 Since the issue before the court involved a 
woman who was only 10 weeks pregnant, however, the Commission felt that 
it was unnecessary to decide whether the fetus was not covered at all or has 
a "right to life" with implied limitations. It was held that any interests that 
such an early fetus might have were overridden by the pregnant woman's 
right to life and health, as to hold otherwise would give the life of the fetus 
higher value than that of the woman.2g 
The Commission returned to this issue in H v N ~ r w a y , ~  where a man 
sought to challenge his former partner's decision to abort their unborn child 
at 14 weeks on social grounds. The Commission noted that national courts 
have reached different decisions on whether Article 2 (or equivalent domestic 
provision) encompasses the fetus: the Austrian Constitutional Court has held 
that it does not, whereas the German Federal Constitutional Court has held 
that it does." Here the Commission avoided the rather strained reasoning 
adopted in Paton and held that the respondent state had not gone beyond the 
wide discretion granted on this issue.32 
Many other cases recognise the possibility that Article 2 might offer 
some protection to the fetus, but decline to expand on this, holding it to be 
unnecessary on the facts in issue.33 Thus, the full impact of Article 2 on the 
legality of abortion within signatory states remains largely unaddressed. It is, 
however, unlikely that Strasbourg will be willing to declare anythmg but the 
most extreme abortion provision to be outside the wide discretion granted to 
national states (i.e., outside their "margin of appreciation"). 
During the course of enacting the UK Human Rights Act, some MPS 
suggested that Article 2 could be used by British judges to undermine the 
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~ 
abortion legislati~n.~ The Act itself, however, retains the force of 
incompatible primary legi~lation.~' Also, in many cases decided since the 
Human Rights Act came into force, the domestic courts have shown reserve 
with regard to pre-existing law addressing morally controversial subjects. 
The common law position on withdrawing nutrition and hydration from 
patients in a persistent vegetative state has, for example, recently been held 
to be consistent with Article 2.= It is submitted that the courts are likely to 
adopt a similarly conservative approach to Article 2 with regard to abortion, 
especially in the light of the parliamentary concerns mentioned above and the 
legislative background on abortion. Thus, in my view, the domestic courts 
are likely to uphold the existing legal position and hold that the fetus has no 
legally recognised right to life until birth. 
26 (1981) 3 EHRR 408. 
27 Ibid.,413. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 415-416. 
Abortion Following Diagnosis of a Serious Congenital Condition 
1 I 
(1992) 73 DR 155. 
I " Ibid., 167. 32 Ibid., 169. li 33 See, e.g., Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v Z~land (1993) 15 EHRR 244. 
In many of the countries under study, diagnosis of a serious genetic or 
congenital condition also provides grounds for abortion. In fact, abortion 
following such dmgnosis is permitted 
(a) up to birth in Austria, Belgium,37 Denmadq France, GennanyYB Italy, 
and the UK (except Northem Ireland); 
(b) up to 24 weeks in Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal; 
(c) up to 20 weeks in Finland (by approval of the National Board of Health, 
B otherwise only up to 16  week^);^ 
M See, e.g., 306 HC Deb 828 (16 February 1998), M. David RufIley MP. 
35 See ss. 3(2)(b) and 4(6). However, "so far as possible," all legislation must be 
interpreted 'in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights": S. 3(1). 
NHS Trust A v M; MS Trust B v H [2001] Fam 348. 
37 The legislation does not provide any time limit on abortions where, if the child were 
born, it would have a serious and incurable disease. However, dunng parliamentary 
discussion the majority stressed that abortion is the endmg of pregnancy where the 
fetus is non-viable (information provided by Herman Nys). At present, there is no 
jurisprudence on late term abortions where the fetus is viable. 
38 The previous law, which permitted abortion for medical indications incl* 
hereditary diseases, was modified because it was thought to have implications 
associated with "eugenics" or, more precisely, associated with the highly immoral acts 
committed in the name of eugenics by the Nazi. Now, in practice, the risk of serious 
injury to the woman's mental health is interpreted to encompass abortion following 
PND, the emphasis beiig placed on the pregnant woman rather than the fetus. 
(Information obtained fiom Eser 2001, para. 37, 1761-1762; and Sabine 
Michalowski). 
39 SS. 1(5)&5,ActNo.239/1970.(SeeAppendixl). 
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(d) up to 22 weeks in Spain, and Sweden (by approval of the National 
Board of Health and Welfi~e);~" and 
l (e) up to 12 weeks in Luxembourg (see Appendix 1). 
In some countries, use of PND is limited by other legislative conditions. For 
example, in France and Germany, PND cannot be used for selecting the sex 
of the child, except in cases of incurable sex-linked hereditary diseases (see 
Appendix 1). Moreover, in some countries abortion following PND might 
also fall within other provisions. For example, under the UK legislation, 
abortion following diagnosis of the unborn child's sex might sometimes fall 
within S. l(l)(a), discussed above. S. l(2) of the Act states that, in making a 
determination as to the risk of injury to the woman's or her existing 
children's health, "account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or 
reasonably foreseeable environment." This seems to make abortion on 
grounds of sex permissible where the woman is likely to suffer as a result of 
her cultural environment (e.g., certain cultures value males more highly than 
females) or where she already has two children of one sex. The morality of 
such sex selection is explored in 6.2.3, below. 
In summary, abortion following the diagnosis of a genetic or congenital 
disorder is permitted, subject to specific ' conditions and gestational 
development, in all the countries under study, with the possible exception of 
Ireland. Many of the issues relevant to determining the extent to which these 
variable positions would be legitimate if they were indirect applications of 
the PGC (i.e., "good faith'' attempts to apply the PGC), will have to be left 
until the legitimacy of prenatal influence has been analysed (see Chapter 
Seven). Nonetheless, there are two points that can be made here. 
The first is that the presumption defended above, against the use of 
prenatal testing for incurable late onset disorders, does not appear to be 
given explicit recognition in the formal regulatory positions of those 
countries permitting abortion on the grounds of a viable fetus' condition. 
This is prima facie inconsistent with the PGC. In practice, it is to be hoped 
that most countries recognise this pres~rnption.~' 
In Sweden, abortion following diagnosis of fetal abnormality is given no special status 
under the law. S. 4 of the Swedish legislation states that permission cannot be granted 
by the National Board of Health and Welfare "if there is a reason to suppose that the 
embryo is viable." In practice, 22 weeks is usually taken to be the point of viability 
unless the fetus is very badly damaged. See Appendix 1 for references and more 
detailed information. 
4' In the UK, e.g., the non-statutory Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (ACGT) - 
whose functions have now been transferred to the Human Genetics Commission 
(HGC )-recommended that presymptomatic children should not generally be tested 
for late onset disorders and, 
Prenatal genetic testing for late onset disorders should only be undertaken in the 
context of full genetic counselling. (ACGT 1998,5). 
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The second point is best explained by examination of the relevant 
provision in the UK legislation. Under this provision," abortion is permitted 
up to birth where 
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer fiom such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
Under this provision, a "seriously handicapped unborn child is given far 
less protection than a non-handicapped unborn child. Nonetheless, the term . 
"seriously handicapped is not defined and there is no case law on this 
point." This provision is prima facie inconsistent with the PGC for at least 
two reasons. 
First, this provision appears to treat a "seriously handicapped embryo- 
fetus as having less moral status than a non-handicapped embryo-fetus 
without defining a serious handicap in terms of kctors that are relevant to 
the possession of moral status. As argued in Chapter Two, such factors 
relate to evidence of present and potential ostensible agency. 
In its guidance to practitioners, the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists (RCOG) suggest that consideration ought to be given to the 
following factors "not all of which will be relevant in every case" 
(a) the probability of effective treatment, either in utem or after birth; 
(b) the probable degree of self-awareness and of ability to communicate 
with others; 
(c) the suffering that would be experienced; and 
(d) the extent to which actions essential for health that normal individuals 
perform unaided would have to be provided by others (see RCOG 1996, 
para. 3.3.3). 
Thus, the RCOG (by implication) suggests that evidence of moral status is 
relevant (see, e.g., requirement (b)). However, since not all of these hctors 
are thought to be relevant in every case, this definition is wider than one 
restricted to moral status. The RCOG does assert that 
it is not possible to given an authoritative view of the meaning of "seriously 
handicapped" as this has not been interpreted by the courts. (Ibid.) 
42 S. 1(1Xd), the Abortion Act 1967, as inserted by S. 37(1Xd) of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
" The lack of an authoritative interpretation of the phrase "serious handicap" is 
addressed in Morgan 1990 and Murphy 1991, 382. LEXIS and Westlaw searches 
confirm that there is still no case law on this point, but that is hardly surprising given 
the discretionary power placed in the hands of practitioners under the British 
legislation. Indeed, accordmg to Mason and McCall Smith, "it is well-nigh impossible 
to perform an illegal therapeutic abortion in Great Britain" (1 999, 156). 
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Nonetheless, there is nothing preventing the provision from being interpreted ~ to include traits that are irrelevant to moral status, such as Down's 
syndrome. 
Second, the provision grants a "seriously handicapped embryo-fetus so 
little protection that neither the pregnant woman nor her family need to be at 
risk from harm as a result of the birth of such a child. In other words, under 
this provision there is no need to demonstrate that there is even a conflict 
between the pregnant woman's generic needs and those of the unborn child. 
In theory at least, this provision allows a seriously handicapped embryo- 
fetus' moral status to be overridden by a mere whim, even just before its 
birth. 
Although only l .  1% of the total abortions performed in Britain in 1996 
were performed under this section (see Mason and McCall Smith 1999, 
115), similar provisions exist in the legislation of many other countries (see 
Appendix 1). For example, the Finnish legislation permits abortion, 1 
l 
if there is reason to assume that the child would be mentally retarded or ~ 
would have or would develop a severe disease or physical defect." 
This provision appears to be subject to the same criticisms and reservations. 
In contrast, under the Italian abortion laws, the fetus' abnormalities or , 
malformations are only relevant where they constitute a threat to the 
woman's mental or physical health (see Appendix 1). 
4.4 Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
It is often contended that PGD is less problematic than PND, because it , 
avoids the thorny and emotive issue of abortion. While PGD avoids the need 1 
for gestational abortion in theory, in practice, PGD is usually followed by 
PND to ensure that the implantation of an embryo with an undesired 
genotype has been successfblly avoided. Moreover, PGD itself raises many 
additional issues. 
Obviously, PGD requires the use of IVF, which is one of many 1 
techniques of assisted reproduction. In general, the use of assisted 
reproductive techniques is paradigrnatically justified under the PGC where 
they are necessary to address the inability to participate in the reproductive 
enterprise, and the affected (osten~ible)~~ agent happens to value the ability 
to be such a participant. This is quite simply because of the severe damage 
S. 1(5), Act NO. 23911970 as amended. Act translated by Urho Kekkonen (Minister of 
Social Affairs and Health, Finland). 
45 For convenience, unless otherwise stated, hereafter I use the term "agent" to refer to 
an "ostensible" agent. 
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to a human agent's ability to act or act successfully that can result from 
involuntary childlessness. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
involuntary childless are likely to suffer generic harm that can be as 
distressful as grief, emotionally crippling its victims with feelings of 
inadequacy, loss, anger, and conf i~ion.~~ Moreover, the empirical evidence 
suggests that, even where IVF is unsuccessful,4' it tends to reduce the 
suffering of the involuntary childless by leading to acceptance of the 
~ondition.~' Of course, if the desire to reproduce is the result of misdirected 
social pressure, then the more appropriate long-term means of preventing 
this generic harm would be to remove this social pressure, rather than merely 
granting access to assisted reproduction. 
The use of IVF, where it is not necessary to address an inability to 
reproduce but simply as a means of using PGD to avoid gestatmg embryos 
carrying undesired genes or chromosomal abnormalities, is not immoral 
merely because it involves many otherwise unnecessary risks for a woman 
who could reproduce unaided. An agent does not have a duty to itself to 
avoid potential harm to its generic features, as the benefits of its generic 
rights are waivable (see 1.2.2). Thus, if the objections to PGD made on 
behalf of the legitimate interests of other possible agents can be answered, 
the use of IVF will be legitimate. So, it is towards some of these objections 
that I wish to turn my attention. 
PGD is typically used where the prospectwe parents wish to avoid 
implanting an embryo with a severe genetic or chromosomal abnormality. 
What if, however, prospective parents (a) wish to use the technique as a 
means of identifjmg a "defective" embryo so that they can implant it or (b) 
if faced with a choice of a number of embryos, will disregard the fact that 
some have a specific genetic abnormality? It is often assumed that it is 
immoral to deliberately implant an impaired embryo, at least where there are 
non-impaired embryos available for implantation. Is this the case? If, for 
example, prospective parents have a choice between two embryos, one with 
Down's syndrome and one without, must they give preference to the one 
without? 
If the genetic or chromosomal abnormality in question is relevant to the 
embryo's moral status--e.g., the evidence suggests it will prevent the 
embryo developing further or ever becoming an ostensible agent-then, all 
things being equal, this embryo should not be given the same level of 
46 For sources, see Menning 1977 and 1980; Hull 1992, 2; Warnock 1985, para. 2,2, 8; 
MorganandLee 1991,17. 
47 The live birth rate for W, where the gametes are fertilised outside the body, is under 
20% per treatment cycle (see HFEA 2000, l l and 14). The live birth rate for PGD is 
probably a little lower than for IVF generally (see HFEA and ACGT 1999, p m .  17). 
For sources, see Boivin et al. 1995, 805; Menning 1977 and 1980; Koropatnick et al. 
1993, especially 169; Lalos et al. 1985. 
90 Influencing Traits Before Birth Regulation of Genetic and Reproductive Techniques I 91 
protection as an apparently healthy embryo. Thus, in such circumstances it 
might well be immoral to give preference to such a defective embryo over a 
nondefective one. (Of course, in some situations the effects on the parents 
might mean that all things are not equal). 
If, however, the abnormality is irrelevant to moral status-as in the 
above example, Down's syndrome-then giving priority to it is not prima 
facie immoral. There might, however, be other reasons not to give preference 
to it. These might include the effects that this choice will have on existing 
and h r e  persons with that trait. Since such reasoning applies to any 
attempt to avoid one's offspring displaying a morally irrelevant trait, this 
issue will be explored in Chapter Six. 
PGD makes it likely that certain oocytes or unimplanted embryos will be 
discarded. All things being equal, this is something to be avoided. Perhaps, 
in some cases, the generic harm faced by those who wish to avoid the birth 
of a child with undesired traits outweighs the harm to the discarded embryos. 
Even if th~s  is so, the probable harm must be limited as much as possible. 
Perhaps, there should be a rebuttable, regulatory presumption that rejected 
embryos are to be donated for either implantation or research purposes 
tracking generic needs of ostensible agents (see 4.5.1). 
PGD, like the PND techniques, also risks the undesired destruction of 
wanted embryos, as the technique itself involves a risk to its subject. If, 
however, it is permissible to destroy an embryo with undesired traits then, all 
things being equal, it will be permissible to allow its destruction as an 
undesired side-effect of discovering whether it has those undesired traits. 
Many issues remain to be considered. Issues relevant to all the 
techniques of prenatal influence will be explored in Chapter Six. It would 
appear that if attempts to influence traits before birth are permissible, then 
PGD is a less problematic means of achieving this goal than many other 
means, at least it will be when it becomes accurate enough to avoid the need 
for result confirmation via PND. When the technique becomes more 
accurate, it would appear less problematic than the use of PND to achieve 
the same end, as the subject has less moral status. Moreover, since the 
technique is a prerequisite for germ-line gene therapy, it would appear to 
raise fewer issues than germ-line gene therapy, unless gene therapy is 
performed merely as a means of avoidmg the destruction of any embryos. 
4.4.1 Regulation of PGD 
There is no consensus for or against genetic diagnosis of the unimplanted 
embryo." Consequently, all four regulatory approaches towards PGD are 
49 In this section, unless otherwise specified, I use the term PGD to refer to genetic 
diagnosis of the unimplanted embryo. 
displayed by the countries under study. These approaches are shown as in 
Table l ,  below. 
Countries whose legislation permits PGD vary greatly in their level of 
permissiveness. Detailed tabulated information on these laws can be found in 
Appendix 2, alongside full citation of the relevant legislation and legislative 
provisions. 
Table 1 
by legislation Denmark France 
Permitted Spain UK 
in the absence of legislation Belgium Canada 
Finland Greece 
Italy Portugal Netherlands Sweden us 
by legislation 
Prohibited 
Austria Germany 
in the absence of legislation Ireland 
Unknown Luxembourg (no PGD is performed) 
The UK licensing authority, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, in accordance with the permissive legislation under which it 
operates, has licensed four centres to undertake PGD and its associated 
research (see HFEA and ACGT 1999, para. 11). It has also issued a Code of 
Practice, which provides that licensed clinics should not select the sex of 
embryos for social reasons.% Failure to comply with this Code of Practice 
will expose the clinic to the risk of losing its licence." Not surprisingly, it 
appears that licensed clinics comply with the prohibition on sex selection for 
social reasons. Only recently a couple, who had lost their three-yeardd girl 
in a bonfire accident, failed to gain access to PGD to provide a sister for 
their four boys.52 
The Code of Practice also asserts that licensed centres "should not use 
sperm sorting techniques in sex selection" (HFEA 2001, para. 9.10). 
This advice appeared in its last Code of Pmctice (see HFEA 1998, para. 7.20,45) and 
is re-asserted in the recently issued fifth edition (see HFEA 2001, para. 9.9). 
5' S. 25(6), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. " The HFEA's decision was widely reported, see e.g., Scott 2000. For further details 
see 6.2.3, above. 
92 Influencing Traits Before Birth 
Although not strictly a PGD techniq~e,'~ sperm sorting is another means of 
selecting a W r e  child's sex before implantation in the womb. It is, however, 
questionable whether the licensing authority has any legal basis for asserting 
or enforcing its prohibition of sperm sorting. The UK legislation does not 
require a licence for the use of non-stored gametes where "the services are 
being provided for the woman and the man together."" Thus, no licensed 
activity is performed where sperm sorting precedes artificial insemination in 
a woman receiving treatment with the sperm provider. It surely follows that 
the licensing authority cannot enforce this prohibition against the clinics that 
it licences and it certainly cannot enforce it against clinics that perform no 
licensed activitie~.~~ 
Other than the two Code of Practice provisions on sex selection 
mentioned above, the HFEA does not currently provide a list of conditions 
for which PGD is permitted. The decision is left for the clinical team to 
consider with individual patients. However, in practice 
centres are understood to be applying the criteria for termination of 
pregnancy for fetal abnormality published by the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG). . .. . This limits the use of PND to 
cases where there is a precise diagnosis and a "substantial risk" of "serious 
handicap." (HFEA and ACGT 1999, para. 34, 10) 
These conditions have already been examined in 4.3.2, above. 
The Spanish legislation expressly permits the use of assisted 
reproduction for the prevention and treatment of illnesses of a genetic or 
53 If PGD is defined as genetic diagnosis of the oocyte or unimplanted embryo (as in 
3.4.1) or if PGD is restricted to genetic diagnosis of the unimplanted embryo (as 
above). " S. 4(1Xb), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act imposes a licensing requirement on the 
(a) creation of an embryo outside of the body (ss. 3(1 )(a) & l(2)); 
(b) storage or use of in vitro embryos (ss. 3(1 Xb) & l(2)); 
(C) storage of gametes (S. 4(1 Xa)); and 
(d) use of gametes, unless "services are provided for the woman and man together" 
(S. 4( 1Xb)). 
These provisions have other implications. It also follows that genetic diagnosis of 
oocytes provided by the woman of a couple receiving treatment services together only 
falls within the Act if the oocytes are stored. S. 2(2) provides that references "to 
keeping, in relation to embryos or gametes, include keeping while preserving, whether 
preserved by cryopreservation or in any other way." Since this does not purport to 
provide an exhaustive defmition of "storage," in some cases where gametes have not 
been preserved it is difficult to be certain about whether the Act applies. 
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hereditary origin." However, S. 13 prohibits genetic selection for or against 
"non-pathological" characteristics. The Spanish position is, therefore, 
slightly more restrictive than the UK's. Similarly, in Denmark the genetic 
examhation of an embryo is expressly permitted where there is "a known 
and considerable risk" of "a serious hereditary disease" or to determine 
whether the embryo has "an important chromosome abn~rmality."~' The 
Danish legislation does, however, prohibit the sex selection of sperm or 
fertilised eggs, except to prevent a serious sex-linked hereditary disease.% 
(The morality of sex selection is explored in 6.2.3, below.) 
An example of a prohibitive legislative approach can be found in the 
German Embryo Protection Act (EPA) 1990. Under the EPA, it is an offence 
to fertilise a human egg for any purpose other than to start a pregnancy in 
the woman who produced the egg.59 Also, it is an offence to produce or 
remove an embryo for a purpose not serving its pre~ervation,~" and an 
embryo is defined to include any totipotent cell removed from an embryo 
that is assumed to be able to divide and develop into an individuaL61 This has 
led many commentators to suggest that the EPA does not forbid diagnosis of 
cells after they lose their totip~tency.~' Nevertheless, the clear intention of the 
EPA was to prohibit PGD and, in 1996, an application to conduct 
Germany's first PGD trial was rejected by a local ethics committee on legal 
grounds. Nonetheless, the application of screening or diagnostic techniques 
to gametes does not appear to @l within the terms of the Act. There is one 
notable exception; sperm cannot be selected for their sex chromosomes 
unless this has been done to avoid Duchenne-muscular dystrophy or a 
similarly severe sex-linked genetic illness.63 
f Whether PGD is acceptable in countries that do not have any specific 
legislation depends on that country's general legal and cultural framework. 
For example, genetic diagnosis of the unimplanted embryo is implicitly 
{ prohibited in Ireland by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.' LW 
f Many other countries do not have legislation or constitutional provisions addressing PGD. For example, in Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
\ S. 1, Act 35 of November 1988. S. 12(1) explicitly authorises PGD to test for 6 ,  hereditary diseases in order to treat them or advise against transfer to the womb. 
'7 S. 7, Law No. 460 of 1997. English translations kom International Digest of Health 
Legislation 1997. 
S. 8, Law No. 460 of 1997. 
! t S. l(lX2). 
' ! t S. 2(2). 
3 ,* 2 61 S. 8(1). 
a": According to information provided by Hille Haker, some scientists hold that on the k third day (when biopsies for PGD are usually made) no totipotent cells exist; others, such as Regine Kollek, consider the cells totiptent at the 6-10 cell stage. ' l f 63 S., .  ' Ireland is in the process of considering new legislation (see Appendix 2). 
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and Sweden, PGD is permitted by defa~lt.~' Less formal regulatory 
mechanisms are often ~ s e d . ~  For example, in Italy the Ethical Code of 
Practice 1998-which has uncertain legal for~e~~-restricts genetic tests to 
diseases and requires certain information to be offered to the person 
undergoing the test.@ Also, the Swedish Parliament has declared (without 
adopting any legislation on the matter) that PGD should be permitted only 
for the diagnosis of serious, progressive hereditary disease that leads to 
premature death and for which there is no cure or treatment. This position 
has been reiterated by the National Board of Health and Welfare, which 
stresses that PGD cannot be considered part of routine health care.69 
Countries that have signed and ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine will, however, have to take account of 
Article 14, which declares, 
The use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be allowed 
for the purpose of choosing the future child's sex, except where serious 
hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided. 
None of the relevant countries have raised reservations with regard to this 
provision. (The morality of sex selection is explored in 6.2.3). Also, Article 
12 declares that predictive genetic tests "may be performed only for health 
purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes." 
The Convention can also be signed by those non-member countries who 
were granted observer status during discussions, including the US and 
Canada.70 Nonetheless, neither these countries nor Austria, Belgium, Ireland, 
Germany, the UK have yet signed the C~nvention.~' In fact, so far only four 
of the 17 countries under study have ratified the Convention, namely, 
Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Spain." 
Portugal has constitutional provisions, introduced in the Fourth Revision of 1997, that 
might affect the legality of PGD, see 6.3.2. For the other countries, see Appendix 2. 
Also, proposed legislation is under consideration in many of these countries, see 
Appendix 2. 
Its legal force is widely regarded as an open question. Interestingly, a recent judicial 
sentence (Tribunale di Roma, 14 February 2000, Judge Chiara Schettini) recognised 
the right of a couple to have access to a surrogate mother, notwithstandq a contrary 
provision of the Ethical Code of Practice. (Information provided by Roberto 
Mordacci. ) 
Infonnation provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
Information provided by Elisabeth Rynning. See also Appendix 2. 
Article 33(1). For a discussion of the possible reasons why Canada has not signed the 
Convention, despite being directly involved in its framing, see Molinari 1998. 
See http://conventions. coe. intltreaty/EN/cadrepincipal .htm. 
The Convention does not provide for any enforcement mechanism. Article 29, 
however, provides that the government of a party to the Convention may ask for the 
Given the nondefinitiveness of the conclusions reached above, 
evaluation of these laws will, in the main, have to be left for a later stage. 
Nonetheless, on the basis of the reasoning regardmg incurable late onset 
disorders set out above (4.3), there must be at least a prima facie 
presumption that PGD will not be permitted to test for such disorders. Also, 
where PND is permitted PGD should be permitted, and where PGD is 
permitted, the conditions for which it can be used should be restricted. 
1 4.5 Research and Experimental Tmtment on the Embryo-Fetus 
- Embryo-fetal research and manipulation can be conducted on the 
preimplantation (in vitm) embryo or on the embryo-fetus in the womb (in 
utem). Such research (especially on in vitm embryos) is widely thought to 
be necessary for the development and improvement of many techniques of 
prenatal influence. Also, if a live birth results, then prenatal manipulation of 
the embryo-fetus is phgmatical ly a potential method of influencing the 
traits of a future child directly. 
It is important that I clarify some terminological matters before 
continuing. The phrase "experimental treatment" will be used to cover 
experimental manipulation of an embryo that is for the direct benefit of that 
specific embryo. The term "research is, therefore, restricted to all other 
experimental manipulations on the embryo-fetus. It follows from this that 
Austria and Germany are correctly characterised as prohibiting in vitro 
embryo research, even though they permit experimental treatment 
on embryos (see 4.5.2, below). 
Even experimental treatment, which aims to benefit the embryo-fetus 
directly, must treat its subject in a way compatible with its moral status. 
This includes the status that the embryo-fetus will have in the future, as it is 
(ex hypothesi) intended to manifest its full potential. Thus, it will not be 
permissible to experiment on the embryo-fetus in a way that is likely to 
damage its future generic abilities. It might, however, be permissible 
to conduct experimental treatment that (a) is the only or best means of 
preventing hture generic harm, (b) has a high probability of success, and (c) 
does not involve the violation of duties to morally relevant others. Where the 
experimental treatment is all or notlung, so that the embryo-fetus will either 
benefit or die in the process, the earlier its development the easier this will be 
to just@, simply because of its gradualist moral status. 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights on legal questions concerned 
with the interpretation of its provisions. 
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4.5.1 Embryo-Fetal Research 
Research on the embryo-fetus will be permissible only insoh as it is 
permissible to manipulate and destroy the embryo-fetus. The strongest case 
for research is where it is necessary to protect the basic generic features of 
an ostensible agent. I have already argued (4.4) that involuntary 
childlessness is capable of causing basic generic harm to human ostensible 
agents who wish to participate in the reproductive enterprise, and assisted 
reproduction can significantly reduce the risk of this harm. Thus, if such 
research is necessary for the maintenance and development of the techniques 
of assisted reproduction or the prevention of infertility, then it is arguably 
permissible, at least where it is performed on an early embryo and the 
subject is not treated as a valueless thing. 
Other purposes for which research might be necessary include 
investigation into the causes of early spontaneous abortioqn contraceptive 
research,74 and the development or improvement of many genetic and 
reproductive techniques. Where this research is necessary to protect the 
basic generic features of ostensible agents, use of the early embryo is prima 
facie justified. The moral defensibility of such research is suggested by the 
considerations outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Not all research is, 
however, compatible with these considerations. Unnecessary experiments 
and those performed purely for commercial gain or scientific prestige usually 
involve treating an embryo as if it has no moral status. An early embryo has 
less intrinsic moral status than a healthy adult rat, but it does have moral 
status. 
There is a great deal of controversy over whether, if it is justified at all, 
research ought to be restricted to embryos that are left over fiom IVF 
treatment ("surplus embryos"), rather than conducted on embryos 
specifically created for the purpose. For example, the Canadian Discussion 
Group on Embryo Research was of the opinion that, 
It is unacceptable to subject women to any increased risk or reduced medical 
benefit (including a reduced likelihood of pregnancy) in order to procure ova 
or embryos for research. (Discussion Group on Embryo Research 1995,6) 
My thesis is that all moral conclusions must be supportable by the PGC. 
Where, however, the woman has voluntarily consented to this increased risk, 
73 According to Eisenberg and Schenker (1997, 12), 10-15% of clinically recognised 
pregnancies terminate in spontaneous abortion and up to 60% of fertilisations do not 
last long enough to cause a missed menstrual period. 
74 The importance of research into contraceptives is suggested by the high demand for 
abortion, the risks of unsafe abortion, and the destructive effect that unwanted 
children can have, especially on those at subsistence level. 
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since the benefits of all her generic rights75 are waivable, the argument 
presented by the Canadian Discussion group is to be rejected. 
The Discussion Group also employed other arguments against the 
creation of embryos for research. It dismissed such a practice as 
tantamount to treating the viable human embryo like a tissue culture, because 
of their numbers and because there would be no chance of their gestation into 
personhood. We would find these scenarios totally unacceptable. (Discussion 
Group on Embryo Research 1995, 18) 
If embryos are created for research without regard to the necessity of the 
research, the potential benefits of the research, or the likelihood of 
the research manifesting these benefits, then it will, indeed, be the case 
that the embryo is being treated like a tissue culture. Where, however, this is 
not the case, the embryo is not being treated as a valueless thug. It might 
still be impermissible to do research on the embryo, but this is something 
that must be shown. The pmsumption must be in favour of early in vim 
embryo research where it is necessary to protect the basic generic features of 
ostensible agents (see below). 
In contrast, due to the greater moral status of the developing fetus, no 
such presumption should operate in favour of research on the fetus. Where, 
however, the pregnant woman has, for other reasons, decided to abort the 
fetus within the constraints of the PGC, the case for allowing research on it 
is stronger.76 Of course, mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that the 
woman's decision to abort is not connected to the desire to research on the 
aborted fetus and to ensure that the fetus is not used in a way likely to add to 
the woman's distress. 
There are a number of potential sources of embryos for research, 
including surplus embryos left over from assisted reproduction by IVF, 
defective embryos that cannot be used for IVF, aborted embryos obtained by 
flushing methods (induced or spontaneous abortion), and embryos created 
for the purpose of research (see Eisenberg and Schenker 1997, 12-13). Of 
the embryos used for research purposes in the UK between August 1991 and 
March 1998, 48,444 were surplus after IVF treatment and 118 embryos 
were created in the course of the research (see Department of Health 2000a, 
Table 2, 32). An additional 237,603 embryos created by IVF were not used 
for any purpose and destroyed (ibid.). 
Given the arguments presented so fsu; those embryos displaying the least 
actual and potential evidence of agency will be the ones on whom research is 
- 
75 I am, of course, assuming that the woman is an ostensible agent. 
76 This book does not address the regulation of fetal research and experimental treatment 
on fetuses. It is, however, interestmg to note that in some US states "research is 
forbidden on an aborted child or its remains" (Andrews 2000, A-5). 
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easier to justifl. Unfortunately, it is likely that defective embryos obtained 
from IVF or abortion won't be adequate for some research purposes. Indeed, 
even surplus embryos are not adequate for some research projects, 
Research involving the creation of human embryos is needed particularly in 
the development of techniques involving gamete manipulation, such as intra- 
cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) with immature sperm, in order to 
determine that normal fertilization and embryonic development is likely to 
result. Allowing research on spare embryos, which have been created for 
treatment purposes, is not appropriate for this type of research, which 
nevertheless underpins the safety of assisted conception techniques. (Gunning 
2000,432) 
Thus, a blanket prohibition of creating embryos for research, irrespective of 
the purpose of the research, would be problematic from the point of view of 
the PGC. 
One point that must be kept in mind is that the use of any embryos for 
research can only be justified if the alternatives involve a greater risk of 
violating the PGC. Thus, it needs to be asked what other uses embryos could 
be put to. With regard to surplus embryos, John Hams (1998a, 60-63) 
argues that if it is permissible to destroy them, then ipso facto it is 
permissible to use them for research. While this seems plausible, given that 
their destruction involves the most basic generic harm that could be inflicted 
on them (if they are in fact agents) there are other possible alternatives to be 
considered. For example, embryos left over after IVF, or created for 
research, could be used to alleviate some of the distress faced by those who 
are involuntarily chldless. Thus, it might be the case that it is permissible 
(or even required) for access to IVF to be conditional upon donation of 
surplus embryos to the involuntarily childless. My point is that it does not 
follow from the fact that it was permissible to allow the creation of surplus 
embryos (as an undesired sideeffect of IVF treatment), that these embryos 
can be treated as non-agents. 
Since research is easier to justify on the early in vitro embryo than on 
the embryo-fetus at a later stage, the next sub-section will explore the 
regulation of in vitro embryo research. 
l 4.5.2 Regulation of In Vitro Embryo Research 
Given the well-known divergence of views on embryo research, it is no 
surprise to discover that the regulatory approaches of the EU countries, 
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Canada, and the US are fhr from uniform. In fkt, all possible regulatory 
approaches can be seen, as shown in Table 2, below.n 
Detailed tabulated information on these laws is presented in Appendix 3, 
along with M1 citation of the relevant legislation and legislative provisions. 
Table 2 
by legislation (subject to Denmark Finland 
conditions) France Spain 
Permitted (exceptionally if Sweden non-impairing) UK 
in the absence of legislation Belgium Canada 
Greece Italy 
Netherlands Portugal us 
by legislation 
Prohibited 
Austria Germany 
in the absence of legislation Ireland 
(constitutional 
provision) 
Unknown Luxembourg (no legislation and no embryo research is 
performed) 
A minority of countries-Austria and Germany-prohibit in vitro embryo 
research by legislation. In these countries, procedures on embryos are 
prohibited for any purposes other than to achieve a pregnancy with that 
embryo or to maintainlpromote its healthy development. This approach, 
prohibiting research no matter how vital the interests it tracks, seems to 
grant too much protection to the early embryo. This is tantamount to treating 
the early embryo as if it has full moral status, especially since non-impairing 
research is prohibited (cf. France, below). 
All countries permitting research by legislation explicitly restrict it to 
within the first 14 days after fertilisation, except France. Although the 
French legislation does not specifl a time limit,% since it only permits 
For discussion of whether it is desirable or possible to harmonise the regulatory 
approaches towards embryo research adopted in the EU countries, see Beyleveld and 
Pattinson 200 1. 
78 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. Cf. MacKellar 1997, 9; European 
Parliament 2001a, 16, European Parliament 2001b, 5, which assert that there is a 
seven day restriction. 
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research on embryos if it does not impair the embryo,79 in practice, the 
French legislation restricts research to well within 14 days. A 14 day limit is 
somewhat arbitrary. We have seen that the gradualist moral status of the 
embryo does not create bright line divisions between different gestation 
stages. Moreover, there are many other gestational stages that are more 
significant in terms of the embryo-fetus7 display of agency-related evidence, 
such as the first signs of a developing nervous system displayed by 
rudimentary electrical signalling between groups of cells at about six or 
seven weeks. There are, however, a number of other considerations. First, as 
long as embryos cannot be sustained for longer periods outside of the body, 
the issue is of little practical significance. Second, the regulation of embryo 
research does not occur in a socio-political vacuum and a 14 day threshold 
has the benefit of being clear and attracting widespread support. 
Nonetheless, a threshold without exceptions, or means of creating 
exceptions, is prima facie indefensible. 
All these countries prohibit the creation of embryos for research, except 
the UK.80 Denmark might also appear to pennit the creation of embryos for 
research (but only for the improvement of IVF or similar techniques and 
PGD).8' However, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine must be taken into account with regard to those countries that 
have signed and ratify it.82 Although this Convention does not prohibit 
embryo research, Article 18(1) states, 
Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it shall ensure adequate 
protection of the embryo. 
The term "adequate protection" is not defined, but Article 1 8(2) prohibits the 
creation of embryos for research.83 
Although Article 36 of the Convention allows countries to invoke their 
preexisting law to make a reservation to modify or avoid being bound by 
certain of its provisions, none of the four countries that have ratified it- 
Article L. 152-8 of the Public Health Code. 
Note the definition of "embryo" under the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990, discussed in 5.4, below. 
The proposed legislation in Belgium and Luxembourg also prohibits the creation 
of embryos for research (see European Parliament 2001b, 4). 
S. 25, Law No. 460 of June 1997. 
See http://conventions.coe.inflreaty/EN/Cadre1ListeTmites.htm for information on 
signatures and ratifications, discussed below. 
Accordmg to Zilgalvis (200 1,42), 
an additional Protocol on the Protection of the Human Embryo and Foetus is 
under preparation by a working party under the authority of the CDBI [i.e., the 
Council of Europe's Steering Group on Bioethics]. 
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Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Spain-have made reservations with regard 
to embryo research. It follows that the creation of embryos for research is 
now prohibited (in international law at least) in Denmark, Greece, and 
P ~ r t u g a l . ~  As indicated in 4.5. 1, such a blanket prohibition to the creation of 
embryos for research is difficult to reconcile with the PGC. 
Where embryo research is permitted by legislation, the purposes for 
which it is permitted are prescribed (see Appendix 3). Finland is the most 
liberal as all research is permitted except for genetic modification and, even 
then, it is permitted if the aim is to prevent or cure a serious hereditary 
disease. Although the Spanish legislation restricts research on viable 
embryos to diagnostic, therapeutic or prophylactic purposes where the "non- 
pathological genetic patrimony is not modified,'g5 it is more liberal with 
regard to non-viable embryos. Research is permitted on non-viable embryos 
for ten specified purposes.86 These purposes are similar to those permitted in 
the UK for all embryos, where research must be "necessary or desirable" for 
promoting advances in the treatment of infertility, congenital disease, 
miscarriage, contraception, or gene/chromosome abnormalities." Both Spain 
and the UK allow these purposes to be extended-by regulation in the UK 
and by regulation or the Multidisciplinary National Committee in Spain. 
However, in the UK, the purposes that may be added are restricted to 
research that would "increase knowledge about the creation and development 
of embryos, or about disease, or enable such knowledge to be applied',." On 
the recommendation of various bodies,* the UK has recently passed relevant 
secondary legislation to extend the purposes for which research can be 
performed to include increasing knowledge about the development of 
embryos and about serious disease, and enabling such knowledge to be 
applied in developing treatments for serious disease. 
Denmark will only allow research for the improvement of IVF (and 
similar techniques) or PGD.90 France, the least liberal country permitting 
research by legislation, only permits research "exceptionally" for the direct 
benefit of the embryo itself or to improve the techniques of assisted 
reprod~ction.~' All research must not impair the embryo.* However, since 
the vast majority of research that is usekl for the advancement of assisted 
reproduction is likely to harm or impair the embryo, the French legislation is 
It was already prohibited in Spain. 
S. 15(2), Law 35 ofNovember 1988. 
Specified in S. 16, Law 35 of November 1988. 
Schedule 2, para. 3(2) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
Schedule 2, para. 3(3) of the Act. 
See HGAC and HFEA 1998b, para. 9.3, and the report of the Chief Medical mcer's 
advisory committee: Department of Health 2000a, para. 5.10,45. 
S. 25, Law No. 460 of June 1997. 
Article R 152-8-1 to 12, Public Health Code. 
Article L. 152-8, Public Health Code. 
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effectively allowing the moral status of the embryo to ovemde the moral 
interests attached to the possible benefits of research, including the interests 
of the involuntary childless. 
Where no specific legislation has been enacted, in vitro embryo research 
is often addressed by other legal means (such as constitutional provision) or 
non-legal means (such as professional guidelines). In Ireland, for example, 
the Medical Council's ethical guidelines require any fertilised egg to be 
implanted and prohibit the creation of embryos for research. Additionally, 
the Eighth Amendment to the constitution implicitly prohibits embryo 
research by declaring that, 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to 
the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
Consequently, in Ireland, no research is being conducted on human 
embryos.93 
In contrast, in Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal94 
and the US,95 research has been conducted despite the absence of any 
relevant legislation. All these countries have proposed legislation at various 
stages of consideration (see Appendix 3). 
It might be thought that the European Convention on Human Rights 
might also have an effect on embryo research, especially in the UK where it 
has been given circumscribed domestic effect by the Human Rights Act 
1998. Article 2 of the Convention provides that "Everyone's right to life 
shall be protected by law." However, the Strasbourg jurisprudence grants a 
wide discretion to national states and does not conclusively determine 
whether Article 2 encompasses the fetus (see 4.3.2). The relevance of the 
sparse case law is also complicated by the abortion issue, which pits 
whatever interests the fetus has against the pregnant woman's. On the one 
hand, in vitro embryo research is less problematic because such an embryo 
is separate from the woman's body. On the other hand, Article 2 is likely to 
grant less status to the early embryo than it grants to the early fetus and the 
early fetus appears to be granted little or no protection.% If addressed 
93 See Appendix 3 for references and more detailed information. 
94 Some provisions of the Fourth Revision of the Constitution might, however, affect the 
legality of embryo research, see 7.4.2. 
95 Until recently the US prohibited the federal funding of all embryo research. This has 
since been modified. In August 2001, President Bush announced that federal funding 
will be available for stem cell research on existing cell cultures, but would not be 
available for research on stem cells not derived from embryos already existing at the 
time of the announcement (see Fletcher 2001). 
% The limited case law is concerned with the early fetus and emphasises the early 
gestational stage. 
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directly, it is likely that the Strasbourg courts will leave the issue to the 
discretion of the individual states. 
At this stage opera- only on nondefinitive conclusions, I suggest that 
the approaches of Austria, Germany, and France are harder to justrfL than 
that of the other countries under consideration. Where, however, embryo 
research is permitted, it would appear that the purposes for which it is 
permitted should be heavily proscribed, so perhaps the extremely permissive 
stance of the Finnish legislation goes too fir in the opposite direction. Also, I 
have suggested that prohibiting the creation of embryos for research, 
irrespective of the purposes for which such research is necessary or usefil, 
appears to be too restrictive to be compatible with the requirements of the 
PGC. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Since many key issues have been left until later, this chapter does not go 
very far towards addressing the permissibility of prenatal influence and the 
adequacy of current attempts to regulate its practice. Unfortunately, this is 
the nature of the project as the issues are by no means simple and even 
tentative presumptions cannot be established without exploring the full 
complexity of the debate. 
The next chapter will examine the moral issues raised by the regulation 
of cloning and prenatal gene therapy (the latter encompassing both somatic 
and germ-line gene therapy). 
Chapter 5 
Regulation of Genetic and 
Reproductive Techniques 11: 
Cloning and Prenatal Gene Therapy 
We have seen that many techniques enable parents to influence traits before 
birth, but only some of these are currently fesrsible and generally legal. This 
chapter concentrates on two of the most controversial-cloning and prenatal 
gene therapy. As with the previous chapter, I will analyse the regulatory 
mechanisms that have been adopted, or are likely to be adopted, in the EU 
countries, Canada, and the US, with particular emphasis on the UK. The 
approach of this chapter will, however, be somewhat &&rent to that of the 
previous chapter. Since both cloning and germ-line gene therapy are widely 
rejected as immoral, requiring legislative prohibition, this chapter will focus 
on the arguments that have been cited for and against these techniques. I will 
argue for prima facie presumptions in hvour of permitting use of these 
techniques in specifiable circumstances. 
5.1 Cloning Humans 
Since the creation of Dolly the sheep in February 1997, the possibility of a 
cloned child is frequently revisited by the media who seem keen to re-ignite 
public fears. There is, it seems, a widely held view that cloning a human 
being would be immoral. 
Before exploring the arguments underpinning such views, I wish to 
clarifL two points about my use of "cloning" and related terms. First, unless 
otherwise indicated, I use the term to refer to the deliberate creation of a 
human being that is genetically identical to another human being or has the 
same nuclear gene set as another human being (see Chapter Three, especially 
3.4.2). Second, since my focus is on the use of cloning technology to 
influence traits before birth, I restrict my comments to what is often termed 
l 
I l An earlier version of the information-used in sections 5.4 and 5.8-on the regulation 
of cloning and prenatal gene therapy in the EU countries was presented in Beyleveld 
and Pattinson 2000b. 
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"reproductive" cloning, i.e., cloning aimed at producing a child.2 Even when 
defined so narrowly, cloning attracts many different regulatory responses 
and ethical views. Many of which seem to be formulated in the belief that the 
age of widespread human cloning is nearly upon us. 
Predicting the h r e  of nascent technology is a path littered with traps. 
One only has to read the words of two well respected developmental 
biologists 13 years before the creation of Dolly the sheep: "[tlhe cloning of 
mammals, by simple nuclear transfer, is biologically impossible" (McGrath 
and Solter 1984).3 Nonetheless, it does appear to be only a matter of time 
before the most controversial cloning technique, nuclear transfer, is used to 
create a human child. This seems to be a widespread view. For example, 
Panos Zavos and Severino Antinori recently announced an intention to use 
the technique to create a human clone by late 2002 (see Borger 2001, 1). Not 
surprisingly, this announcement elicited a dramatic m d a  response. 
Our purpose here is to take a less impassioned view by addressing the 
major arguments against cloning, before turning to arguments seeking to 
support use of the technique. 
5.2 Arguments Against Cloning 
Developments such as the creation of Dolly the sheep have provoked a 
hsillade of claims to the effect that the application of the technique to 
humans would be immoral and ought to be prohibited. Many of these 
arguments also apply to other techniques of prenatal influence. Arguments 
tracking the goal-prenatal influence-rather than cloning as a specific 
means of achieving this goal will be explored in Chapter Six. Such 
arguments include variants of the slippery slope argument, such as those 
asserting that cloning will be abused causing a slide towards impermissible 
"eugenic" selection. Chapter Six will also address those arguments invokmg 
a conception of human dignity, such as those denouncing cloning as 
involving the use of human beings as a mere means, rather than ends-in- 
themselves. 
Some more specific arguments seem rather ad hoc, designed solely to 
support the intuition that there is something immoral about c10ning.~ One 
See HGAC and HFEA 1998a, para. 1.3 
For a wider discussion of the histo~y of cloning, see Kolata 1998. 
Andrea Dworkin argues that "[c]loning is the absolute power over reproduction that 
men have wanted and have destroyed generations upon generations of women to 
approximate" (1 998, 76). However, cloning a human using the Dolly technique would 
enable a child to be born without the involvement or contribution of a man (other than 
the man who was originally the genetic father of the person from whom the source 
material derives). 
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that can be quickly rejected is the argument that cloning would undermine 
genetic diversity. Firstly, this is highly unlikely given the number of human 
beings in the world and the high cost of cloning. Secondly, even if cloning 
did become so widespread that genetic diversity was threatened, whose rights 
would this violate? Under the PGC, there can be no duty to hrther the 
human race because of the implications and burdens of such a duty.' Just as 
there can be no duty to reproduce, there can be no duty to ensure that there 
is widespread genetic diversity. Interestingly, if specified too widely, such a 
duty would actually require the use of germ-line gene therapy to increase the 
level of genetic diversity in the population; something that is unlikely to 
appeal to supporters of this argument. 
In some ways not all cloning techniques are equivalent. A distinction 
between cloning techniques is suggested by the arguments of Chapter Two. 
Since moral status is proportional to development, cloning techniques might 
appear distinguishable according to the developmental stage of their 
subjects. We have seen that under precautionary reasoning, all things being 
equal, an early embryo has (marginally) greater moral status than a gamete 
or somatic cell. Thus, if cloning is taken to involve the destruction of its 
subjects, then the Dolly technique is less problematic than embryo splitting. 
However, the Dolly technique raises moral concerns not raised by embryo 
splitting, particularly those centred on the cloning of an existmg adult 
(including its potential for making parents of persons without their 
knowledge or consent), and the scientific uncertainties of the technology. 
Further, many of the arguments against cloning where presented after 
the anival of Dolly the sheep and were concerned with that technique. For 
this reason, unless otherwise made clear, the following discussion will focus 
on nuclear transfer techniques. Commonplace examples of arguments 
presented against their application to humans include claims that it would 
violates a person's right to genetic individuality, selfiood, a unique identity, 
or two biological ~a ren t s .~  According to Jim McLean (1998, 26) "[aln 
artificially cloned human being would have been denied the right to be the 
product of a genetic blueprint having two different sources." Related 
arguments are presented in the resolution on human cloning passed by the 
European Parliament in January 1998, which declares that "every individual 
has the right to his own genetic identity and . . . human cloning must be 
prohib~ted.'~ 
Note, e.g., the provisos attaching to positive rights. See 2.7, above. 
6 With the exception of the right to have two biological parents, these alleged rights 
will apply to all cloning techniques. 
Resolution on Human Cloning, 15 January 1998 (see the website of the European 
parliament at http://www.e~~oparl.eu.int). This statement also appeared in the earlier 
resolution on cloning animals and human beings of 12 March 1997 (see Bulletin of 
Medical Ethics 1997). 
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There are a number of obvious limitations and problems with such 
arguments. One is that any "right to genetic individuality," etc. would appear 
to apply to identical twins. Cloned humans would effectively be timedelayed 
twins, being less identical to each other than naturally occurring identical 
thins, because of their different intrauterine environment and different 
mitochondrial DNA.' McLean claims that his "right" is not violated by the 
existence of identical twins because "each monozygotic sibling still draws its 
genetic blueprint from two sources, two parents not one" (1998, 26). 
However, a clone would have at least two different sources of genetic 
material, namely, the genetic parents of the nuclear DNA donor.g With regard 
to other asserted "rightsy-such as the right to genetic individuality-it 
might be claimed that it is deliberately bringing about the existence of a 
clone that is wrong (see, e.g., Brock 1998, 152). Insofhr as this distinction 
requires a separation of acts and omissions it is at least prima facie 
problematic under the PGC. Moreover, the fact that one is genetically 
identical (or very nearly genetically identical) to another does not (by itself) 
prevent individuality or harm one's generic features. 
Such arguments do, however, raise a key question--can cloning be a 
violation of the clone's rights? Can our duties to the clone itself include a 
duty not to create it? This question raises issues that are relevant to many 
arguments for or against cloning. 
5.2.1 Can the Clone be Harmed by its Mere Creation or Birth? 
The argument that a wrong can be done to a child by its mere creation or 
birth is one possible justification for private law actions commonly referred 
to as "wrongful life" actions (see Pattinson 1999). Despite not being 
concerned with private law mechanisms triggered by the birth of a child with 
undesired traits or prospects, this book cannot ignore this argumentative 
strategy. For convenience, I will address this issue in the abstract before 
returning to the issue of cloning. In the abstract, the issue is whether merely 
allowing or causing the conception or birth of a child can ever constitute a 
wrong to that child. Applied to cloning, the issue is whether the use of a 
cloning technique can constitute a wrong to the resultant clone. 
Stated in this way, the claim that a wrong has been done might appear to 
be implausible and not worth discussing. It is, however, a claim that is 
presupposed by many arguments against cloning. 
p- ' If clones produced by embryo splitting are implanted at the same time, then they 
would also share the same intrauterine environment and mitochondrial DNA. Thus, 
McLean's alleged right must be addressed at the Dolly technique. 
Also, with the Dolly technique the clone might have different genetic parents 
providing the nuclear and mitochondrial DNA. 
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A wrong might have been done to such a child if it has been harmed. 
However, many philosophers have questioned whether a child could be 
harmed by conduct causing it to be conceived or born where the only 
alternative was for it not to have been conceived or born. 
This raises an objection referred to by Parfit as the "non-identity 
problem." This objection is, perhaps, best conveyed using one of Parfit's 
thought experiments involving a 14-year-old girl. 
The girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child 
a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout this child's 
life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for 
several years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have 
given a better start in life. (Parfit 1987,358) 
Using this example, Parfit argues that such a child, born to a 14-year-old 
mother, is not harmed merely because a child born later would be in a better 
position, as these would be two different children. According to Parfit, the 
child born was not harmed because that child's only alternative was not to 
exist at all: ''the girl's decision was not worse for this child" (1987, 358).1° 
Feinberg expands this point using a different thought experiment, 
whereby a couple conceive a child knowing there is a risk that it will have a 
genetic deformity. He argues that such a couple do not harm that child, 
because 
to be harmed is to be put in a worse condition than one would otherwise be in 
(to be made "worse off'), but if the neghgent act had not occurred. . . [the 
child]' would not have existed at all. (Feinberg 1984, 102) 
Nonetheless, according to Feinberg, such a child will have been wronged 
where its condition is "so severe as to render his l& not worth living 
(ibid.)." 
Parfit and Feinberg are claiming that to be harmed is to be made ''worse 
off' relative to one's alternatives. Accordmg to this definition, a child's 
conceptionlbirth cannot harm it unless that specific child could have been in 
an alternative lesslnon-harmed state. This, they argue, leads to the 
conclusion that (a) a 14-year-old girl cannot harm the specific child that she 
'O Parfit goes on to argue that it can nonetheless be wrong for a chld to be born to a 14- 
year-old girl: "it would have been better if she had waited and had a child later" 
(Parfit 1987,360). See 4.2.2 for a discussion of this type of claim. 
He also argues that where a child has not been harmed or wmged, the mother's act 
can be m n g  where it involves "wantonly introducing a certain evil into the world" 
(Feinberg 1984, 103). See below for a discussion of this type of claim. 
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gives birth to by merely giving birth to it, and (b) conceiving a child in the 
knowledge that it will have a genetic defect cannot harm that specific child. 
This definition of harm does not, however, receive universal assent. 
Harris contests Feinberg's definition of harm, preferring to define harm as 
p u m  an individual into a position "in which that individual is disabled or 
su&ring in some way or in which his interests or rights are frustrated" 
(Hams 1998a, 109). 
For Harris, to be harmed is to be put in "a disabling or h 6 1  condition, 
even though that condition is only rnargvlally disabling and even though it is 
not possible for that particular individual to avoid the condition in 
question" (ibid., my emphasis). Thus, Harris explicitly rejects the idea that 
being made "worse off' relative to one's altematives is a necessary condition 
for being harmed.'* This definition of harm renders it possible that a clone 
could have been harmed by its mere creation or birth where the clone is born 
disabled or suffering, despite not being denied any alternative. 
Insofar as being put into a position in which one's "interests or rights are 
frustrated" constitutes harm, Harris' redefinition appears contradictory. For 
one's interests or rights to be capable of frustration it must be possible for 
one's interests or rights to be fulfilled (i.e., not frustrated), which 
presupposes the possibility of an alternative nodless-harmed position in 
which they are fulfilled. Thus, if Harris' rejection of Feinberg's definition is 
to be meanqfitl, he must be arguing that being made worse off is a 
sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for being harmed. 
This means that Harris' definition of harm is wider than Feinberg's 
definition. However, both Harris and Feinberg purport to offer coherent 
definitions of harm. Since this book seeks to apply the PGC, I will address 
this conflict using this moral principle. 
Under the PGC, a wrong can only be done to an individual where that 
individual's (actual or presumed) rights have been violated. Thus, under the 
PGC, for a wrong to be done to an individual who matters morally, that 
individual must have been made worse off relative to its alternatives.13 It 
follows that insofar as Harris' redefinition of harm does not presuppose an 
alternative lesslnon-harmed state, it cannot be used to show that any wrong 
has been done to the cloned child by its cloning. 
It also follows that Feinberg's claim that a child can be wronged by its 
birthlconception if it has a life not worth living, is subject to the same 
requirement. So, a child can only be wronged in a sense relevant to the claim 
that we owe that child duties to prevent that wrong, if it has been made 
worse off relative to its alternatives. Moreover, the PGC does not permit us 
'' A similar position is presented by Green 2001, 120-121. 
13 Since, in the abstract, the PGC grants rights to the generic features (i.e., the 
categorical needs) of agency, ''worse off' is measured in terms of an agent's 
possession of the generic features. 
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to assume that another agent's life is not worth living. I (any agent) can 
decide that my life is not worth living-and release others from the burden 
of their obligations towards me-but no one else is entitled (without my 
consent) to decide for me that my life is not worth living.14 
Thus, we need to ask whether it is possible for the cloned child to have 
been made worse off relative to its alternatives by the mere W of its being 
cloned. This requires the cloned child to have been denied an alternative 
existence by the cloning process and that alternative to be better for it with 
regard to its possession of the generic features. Satis@mg these two 
conditions will demonstrate that the child has suffered aprima facie harm. It 
would, however, still need to be established that others have failed to fulfil 
their duties to it by causing or fhiling to prevent this prima facie harm. 
Can cloning deny that cloned individual (X) the opportunity of a better 
existence? A positive answer might be generated by combining a number of 
highly implausible metaphysical  assumption^.'^ The problem is that, without 
making more assumptions than can be justified, using the cloning process to 
create X appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of X. Thus, no 
matter how bad the clone's traits, prospects, or situation it does not appear 
that a wrong has been done to it by its mere cloning. 
To be clear, I am arguing that the act of cloning as such cannot violate 
that clone's generic rights. It remains possible that the act of cloning might 
violate the rights of others, and the act of cloning might also be characterised 
by an immoral intention to violate the rights of the clone in the fbture.16 
These possibilities are examined below. 
We are now better placed to examine the two main types of arguments 
against cloning, i.e., the argument that cloning is wrong because of the 
future suffering that the clone is likely to endure and the claim that it is 
wrong because of the unpredictability and risks of the technology. 
5.2.2 Cloning as Wrong because of the Likely Future Suffering of the 
Cloned Child 
A common objection to cloning is that the cloned child will suffer harm. It 
has been argued, for example, that the clone will be harmed by the fearfbl or 
l4 Remember, that here I am only talking about duties to the cloned child; it remains 
possible that our duties to others (or the child's limited moral status) require us to 
treat the child's life as if it were not worth living. I am not addressing this point here. 
Examples of possible scenarios whereby a cloned individual X would be in a worse 
position because of the cloning process seem to require assumptions such as dualism 
and the cloning process somehow foreclosing X's alternative corporal existence. 
16 Since the PGC is only concerned with the suffering of unwilled generic ham by 
agents, it is also incompatible with the notion of a victimless wrong. 
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prejudicial attitudes of others, by the demands and expectations of parents or 
genotype donors, or by their own awareness of their 0rigi11.s.'~ Ruth Deech, 
the head of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, has 
argued that it is "reasonable to fear that a cloned child's well-being might be 
threatened" (1 999, 100). She asks rhetorically, 
Would cloned children be the butt of j i b  andor be discriminated against? 
Would they become a subcaste who would have to keep to each other? Would 
they be exploited? Would they become media objects?. . . Would a cloned 
child be subject to excessive control from its parents or from one parent, who 
may already be too dominating as evidenced by the choice of the cloning 
technique? (ibid., 98). 
Similarly, Rarnsey claims that, 
Growing up as a twin is diacult enough anyway; one's struggle for self-hood 
and identity must be against the very human being for whom no doubt there is 
also the greatest sympathy. Who then would want to be the son or daughter of 
his twin? To mix the parental and the twin relation might well be 
psychologically disastrous for the young. (1970,71-72) 
These objections depend on the defensibility of at least two premises: the 
empirical likelihood of such h r e  harm occurring and the claim that it is 
impermissible to clone a child if it kces a risk of such future harm. 
Many of the empirical presuppositions of such views are either 
implausible or lack evidential support. This is especially the case where it is 
argued that the clone will be psychologically damaged by its being a clone. 
Perhaps, a cloned child will suffer psychological harm-it might be 
traumatised by knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of its genetic origins, by 
the (mistaken) belief that it lacks a unique identity, or by feelings of 
inadequacy. But it might not. Perhaps, a cloned child will feel secure about 
its genetic origins (many children are adopted or have unidentified genetic 
fathers), will feel very unique (after all clones are likely to remain rare), and 
will have no unusual feehgs of mdequacy (it might achieve more than its 
genotype donor ever did or accept that its parents wanted it so much they 
used such a controversial technology). These hypotheses are best tested 
using existmg correlates, such as identical twins, adopted children, and 
children produced by donor insemination or a surrogate. 
Even if, however, the pessimistic predictions prove to be defensible, it 
does not follow that cloning is impermissible. In many cases the feared harm 
is not the result of the child's condition as a cloned individual, but the 
17 Such aquments are summarised in Burley and Hanis 1999, 108; and Brock 1994, 
155-158. 
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immoral conduct of others. This is the case where, for example, a cloned 
individual suffers harm because of the f e h l  or prejudicial attitudes of 
others, or because of the illegitimate demands and expectations of others.I8 
Prohibiting cloning on the ground that the cloned child will be (immorally) 
harmed is Ear from straightforward. In many ways the anticipated immoral 
conduct of others towards clones is analogous to predictions of prejudice 
towards mixed-race children. All thmgs being equal, it is the predicted 
(future) immorality that ought to be addressed. Of course, all thmgs might 
not be equal, because addressing the predicted b r e  harm directly might 
require problematic constraint on prospectwe parents. As always, the 
application of the PGC must, insofar as possible, take account of the 
realities of the situation; no prospective parent will be perfect but many 
illegitimate prejudices and expectations can be addressed by education and 
counselling. 
Arguments premised on the future suffering of the clone must be 
carefully formulated if they are to avoid claiming that a wrong was done to 
the clone by its creation. Such an argument was rejected above, on the basis 
that the cloned child cannot be assumed to have been deprived of a better 
alternative existence by the mere fact that it has been cloned and, therefore, 
it cannot be taken to have suffered PGC-relevant harm by being cloned. 
If concerns in relation to the predicted future suffering of the clone are 
justified,lg cloning might, however, violate the PGC for other reasons. Two 
possibilities remain. First, if it can be shown that, as a result of this 
predicted future suffering, the motive or intention characterising the act of 
cloning involves the violation of the rights that the clone will have in the 
future, then the action of cloning will be imrn~ral .~ Second, permitting 
cloning irrespective of the future suffering of the clone might, in some 
circumstances, be a wrong to presumed agents other than the clone. I will 
address each possible line of argument in term. 
An extreme example of a situation where the first possible argument 
would be relevant would be where a person intended to create and raise a 
clone for the purpose of causing it future suffering. This involves an 
uncontroversial intention to violate the rights of the clone-in-the-&re. 
However, cloning in general need not have any such an intention, and 
'* Prejudices, defined as attitudes and behaviour that treat agency-irrelevant features as 
if they were relevant to the possession of moral status, clearly violate the generic 
rights of agents. Similarly, demands and expec$ations not derived from, or protected 
by, the PGC are immoral. Burley and Hanis argue along similar, but non-PGC based, 
lines (see Burley and Harris 1999, 110 and 11  1). 
l9 It is, of course, possible to envisage situations where future suffering to the clone can 
be justifiably predicted. Where, e.g., the person(s) intendmg to rear the child are 
known child abusers. 
20 This is the futurality argument that was briefly discussed as an argument for indirect 
selfconnected protection in 2.6.1, above. 
114 Infuencing Traits Before Birth 
knowledge that the clone might have a ditticult childhood cannot be equated 
with an intention to violate the rights of the clone in the future. Although it is 
easy to envisage circumstances where the act of cloning would be 
characterised by an immoral intention that is likely to cause future suffering 
for the clone:' such an intention is not necessarily corn& to the act of 
cloning. 
The second possible type of argument that uses the predicted suffering of 
the clone as a ground for claiming that cloning is immoral involves 
characterising cloning as a wrong to possible agents other than the clone or 
future clone. It might, for example, be argued that creating a clone with 
knowledge of the fbture suffering that it is likely to endure-if indeed it is 
likely to endure such fUture suffering--displays an undesirable tolerance 
towards the suffering of others on the part of the person performing or 
commissioning the creation of a clone. Accordmg to this argument, such 
indifference is likely to express itself in other situations leading to the 
violation of the generic rights of others. I am not aware of anyone presenting 
such an argument, so it is something of a straw man. In general, the 
argument that those who clone are likely to be indifferent to the suffering of 
possible agents other than the clone-which is an instance of the argument 
presented as "possibility two" in 2.6.2-requires highly implausible 
empirical support. Moreover, it is not enough that it is merely possible to use 
the technique in a manner incompatible with the PGC.2Z 
Another possible argument is that creating a clone who will suffer is 
likely to cause harm to others by negatively affecting their sensibilities. As I 
pointed out in 2.6.2, when addressing the use of such an argument to 
establish indirect moral status, protecting agents' sensitivities is required by 
the PGC only as a means of protecting the generic features of agents, and 
only when these sensitivities are themselves consistent with the requirements 
of the PGC, includmg the requirement to treat all agent subgroups as agents. 
This is important, because where the sensitivities of others are affected by 
the immoral behaviour of some towards the clones, the belief that the clones 
lack intrinsic moral status, or misunderstandmgs of what clones are, they 
have little force as arguments against cloning. (There might, however, be 
contingent circumstances where the protection of other's sensitivities would 
require the prohibition of cloning.) 
An added complication is that cloning might, in some circumstances, 
maintain and enhance the generic features of agents other than the clone. For 
a small minority, cloning represents the only potential means of alleviating or 
2' An intention to violate the rights of the cloned child in the future may be imputed 
h the evidence. In general, regulatory mechanisms must enable such imputations of 
intention; otherwise the epistemic gap would prevent regulatory responses to rights- 
violating conduct. 
22 For further discussion of this point, see 7.1. 
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evading psychological harm resulting from involuntary childlessness based 
on an overwhelming desire to have a genetically related child (see 4.4). 
Thus, something more than a prima facie wrong is required to justify 
denying access to cloning technology (see below). 
5.2.3 Cloning as Wrong because of Safety Concerns, such as 
Increased Risks of Abnormalities, Cancer or Shortened 
Lifespan 
Another popular objection to permitting the cloning of human beings relies 
on the risks of this nascent technology. The UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) and Human Genetic Advisory Commission 
(HGAC) produced a joint report on cloning stating, 
Safety is itself an ethical issue. Nuclear replacement in animals is at present 
very inefficient. . . . In humans, the waste of human eggs and the high risk of 
miscarriage and congenital malformation alone would exclude the possibility 
of reproductive cloning. (HFEA and HGAC 1998b, para. 4.4) 
A year earlier the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 
had reached a similar conclusion, 
the use of this technique to create a child would be a premature experiment that 
exposes the developing child to unacceptable risks. This in itself is sufficient to 
justify a prohibition on attempts to clone human beings at this time. (1997, 87) 
Also, the Canadian Tricouncil report stated, 
It is not ethically acceptable to undertake research that involves . . . cloning 
human beings by any means including somatic cell nuclear transfer [i.e., the 
Dolly technique]. (Medical Research Council of Canada et al. 1998, Article 
9.5)23 
There are a number of "safety" concerns raised. First, as pointed out in 3.5, 
cloning technology is currently extremely unreliable and will result in many 
failed attempts. Although the success rate has improved since the creation of 
Dolly, it took 277 attempts to transfer a nucleus to the egg, out of which only 
29 were suitable for implantation, and only one live birth resulted. Thus, 
unless the Dolly technique is dramatically improved, its application to human 
will require large-scale embryo research and destruction, risks of 
spontaneous miscarriage, and risks to the surrogate mother. Second, there 
23 More recently, Health Canada reiterated this position (see Health Canada 2001b, p.5). 
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are womes that cloning will result in a child with restricted future purposes, 
because it is, perhaps, at a higher risk of cancer or will have the age of the 
person from whom its nuclear material was derived. Moreover, the cloned 
child might actually lack the potential for ostensible agency. 
These two safety concerns raise different issues. W~ regard to the first 
it should be noted that the success rate for use of the Dolly technique is 
actually better than what it was for the first IVF trials; in the experiments 
leading up to the creation of Dolly, since 29 reconstructed embryos were 
implanted into 13 ewes, the live birth rate was one in 13.24 Moreover, the 
technique has already been improved (see Wakayama et al. 1998; Rideout et 
al. 2001). However, improvement has been very slow and even now only a 
few percent of re-nucleated eggs result in surviving offs~ring.'~ Also, the 
fertility of animals such as sheep is actually greater than human fertility. 
Many of the issues raised by the low success rate of cloning are the 
same as those raised by the deliberate creation of embryos for research (see 
4.5.1). If it is permissible to conduct embryo research as a means of 
addressing the generic harm potentially suffered by ostensible agents (by say 
involuntarily childlessness), then research into cloning for this purpose is 
prima facie permissible. 
With regard to the second claim, the fear that the resultant child would 
have a genetic defect, it has been argued that 
cloning is actually genetically safer than normal sexual reproduction because 
it bypasses the most common form of birth defect - having the wrong number 
of chromosomes. (Kolata 1997,202) 
Birth defects caused by recessive genes can also be largely avoided by 
cloning a healthy adult. At present, though, cloning has many unknown risks 
and consequences and so Mls fkr short of this potential. 
Once again we return to the rejected notion that a wrong is done to a 
clone by its mere cloning (5.2.1). It must be emphasised that this conclusion 
is not undermined by any damage to the clone that is unavoidable if that 
speclJic child is to exist. Where, however, safety concerns are likely to cause 
future suffering for the cloned child, this might be relevant to the rights of 
other agents (see, e.g., 5.2.2). More specifically, safety concern are 
particularly relevant when considered with re& to the reality of lirmted 
resources and consequent resource allocation difficulties (see Chapter 
Seven). If faced with a choice between permitting access to cloning (which is 
currently unpredictable and might cause more distress to the prospecbve 
parents than it removes) and permitting access to a IVF (on which there is 
24 The live birth rate for IVF, where the gametes are fertilised outside the body, is under 
20% per treatment cycle (see HFEA 2000, 11 and 14). *' A good summary of the current position can be found in Rideout et al. 2001. 
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over 20 years of experience), the latter is more likely to address relevant 
generic needs. As it currently stands, cloning is unlikely to reduce the 
suffering of the involuntary childless and might even increase it. Thus, in 
many cases the safety concerns currently attached to the majority of cloning 
techniques are sufficient to generate a presumption in favour of less 
problematic techniques, especially where the choice is between two or more 
claimants where only one can be offered access. 
Thus, the safety concerns raised by cloning are not nearly as conclusive 
as they are often assumed to be. Insofkr as they have force, they merely 
repeat objections to embryo research or indicate the futility of using cloning 
to influence traits before the technology is mastered. 
5.3 Arguments in Favour of Cloning 
Cloning is not without its supporters. I am not, here, concerned to analyse 
the reasons why people might wish to clone so much as the moral 
justifications capable of being offered for cloning. 
The two main arguments in hvour of cloning, considered below, are that 
cloning is justified as part of one's general right to liberty or as part of one's 
right to reproductive freedom, and that cloning is justified because it can 
replace socially important people, dead relatives, or provide important 
sources of material such as organs. 
5.3.1 General Liberty and Reproductive Freedom Justifications 
Since, under the PGC, an* that does not violate the rights of others is 
morally permissible, the startrng assumption must be that any willed act or 
omission is morally permissible. This assumption is, however, easily 
rebutted by demonstrating that the rights of others are violated by the 
exercise of such reproductive choice. 
P The general liberty argument is often used in the context of scientific r enquiry, often combined with the hrther assumption that freedom of 
I scientific enquiry is an intrinsically worthwhile pursuit worthy of much 2 greater protection. However, scientific enquiry per se does not necessarily 
carry any greater weight than any other liberty. Under the PGC, the only 
activities entitled to protection are those that are protective of the generic 
features of agents. Thus, some scientific enquiry is entitled to greater 
protection, but the general activity is worthy of no more protection than any 
other activity. In short, the pursuit of scientific knowledge is an instrumental 
good to be constrained where it is likely to harm others. Research into, say, 
cancer is more likely to be justifiable than the use of cloning to investigate 
the genetic contribution to homosexuality. Nonetheless, the mere possibility 
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that research into human cloning might make important advances in 
scientific knowledge possible is not enough to provide strong presumptive 
foundations in fivour of cloning. 
The right to make reproductive choices can, however, be given firmer 
foundations than reliance on the general liberty right. As I have already 
indicated, the inability to exercise one's reproductive choices, such as the 
choice to participate in the reproductive enterprise, can severely affect the 
generic features of those (ostensible) agents who happen to value the ability 
to exercise such choices (see 4.4). Thus, where cloning presents the only 
means for an involuntarily childless person to have a a carrier of a 
mitochondrial disease to have a child without the or a person to 
avoid other undesired traits, and the denial of such an opportunity will cause 
generic harm to an ostensible agent, there is a prima facie presumption in 
favour of allowing cloning. This is aprima facie presumption because of the 
complexities raised by the ikct that the use and development of cloning 
technology requires embryo research and the goal of prenatal influence to be 
a legitimate goal." In general, however, cloning shares similar ground to 
assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF. Nonetheless, in some (and 
perhaps many) cases access to counsellmg might (all h n g s  considered) be a 
more appropriate way of addressing the distress caused by involuntary 
childlessness where other options are unlikely to be successfbl. Moreover, 
given the early stage of cloning technology, other assisted reproductive 
techniques would often be more appropriate subjects of this presumption. 
The presumpon in play here can, with qualifications, be expressed as a 
prima facie right to procreative autonomy. I point this out, because Ruth 
Deech, when r e j w  John Harris' defence of a similar claim argued that 
"Harris's putative right to procreative autonomy cannot j u m  human 
cloning because this right would violate important provisions of the 1990 
Act" (Deech 1999, 98). Taken out of context this claim appears to beg the 
question, as moral justification cannot be presumed to be constrained by the 
contingencies of the UK legislation. However, Deech argues that the 
provisions of the 1990 Act that (she believes) implicitly reject cloning as part 
Cloning will, e.g., enable women who have no ova, men who have no sperm, or those 
without a partner to produce offspring that are genetically/biologically related. 
27 Since Dolly's mitochondrial DNA came h m  the enucleated oocyte with which the 
udder cell merged (see Evans et al. 1999), using the enucleated egg of a woman 
without mitochondrial disease could enable a woman with such a condition to 
reproduce without passing it on to her offspring. There are more than fifty inherited 
metabolic diseases thought to be caused by mitochondrial DNA (see Department of 
Health 2000a, p. 22,8). 
There is also the complexity of the predicted low success rate for human clone 
(suggested by the animal studies). This means that cl- is unlikely to satisfy the 
generic needs of the vast majority of the involuntary childless. 
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of a right to procreative autonomy, are morally defensible. She argues that 
there are two very important provisions of the UK legislation to consider, 
The first of these is the rule governing the use and creation of embryos. Few 
would disagree that it is unacceptable to clone humans if doing so would 
involve (and it most certainly would) wastage of large numbers of embryos in 
the process. Second, the 1990 Act also requires that when assisted conception 
technology is used, due consideration must be given to the well-being of any 
resulting child. (Deech 1999,97-98) 
The position of the UK legislation with regard to cloning will be explored in 
detail below (5.4). However, a few points about Ruth Deech's interpretation 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 need to be considered. 
First, the UK legislation actually allows the creation of embryos for 
research, including research that is "necessary or desirable" for promoting 
advances in the treatment of infertility: Schedule 2, paragraph 3(2) (see 
4.5.2 and Appendix 3). Thus, the rules governing the use and creation of 
embryos do not unequivocally rule out the use of embryos for research into 
cloning.2g Further, even if they did, Deech gives no argument as to why this 
is a morally defensible position. Second, although the UK legislation does 
require consideration to be given to the welfare of any resultmg child 
(S. 13(5)), I have already argued that cloning per se cannot violate the moral 
interests of the cloned child. Indeed, the specific argument used by Deech 
was rejected in above (5.2.2). Therefore, the presumption that I have 
defended above is not rebutted by these concerns. 
5.3.2 Cloning Can Replace Socially Important People, Dead Relatives, 
or Provide Sources of Material 
There are many purported justifications for cloning that rely on the purposes 
for whlch the clone could be used. Some of these demonstrate a misguided 
understanding of the technology. For example, for reasons given below, the 
claim that cloning could replace socially important people rests on 
implausible genetic determinism, correlating the replication of an 
individual's genome with the replication of that individual. This particular 
example needs careful consideration under the PGC, as social utility must be 
interpreted in terms of rights-fulfilment, and the creation of clone to replace 
a socially important individual suggests that the intention is to subject the 
clone to morally illegitimate social pressure to conform to the behaviour of a 
29 The purposes for which embryo research is permitted have, since Deech wrote, been 
extended even further (see 4.5.2). Also, the use of the Dolly technique since has been 
held to fall outside the scope of the UK legislation (see 5.4). 
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prior social figure. It would be illegitimate to attempt to force the clone to 
conform to such a pre-set pattern or standard when the clone has no duty to 
do such. Thus, cloning wrth such an intention will usually be characterised 
by an immoral intention, i.e., an intention to violate the rights of the clone-in- 
the-future. Nonetheless, due to complexities introduced by the fact that a 
certain degree of parental expectation and constraint appears to be 
unavoidable, the mere possibility that cloning could be performed for such a 
purpose is not sufficient to prohibit all attempts to clone (see 6.1). 
Clones might also be created because of the benefit that the clone's body 
(or body parts) could have for others. The creation of a clone might be 
attempted to provide spare or replacement body parts, such as organs or 
tissue, for the original (see, e.g., Savulescu 1999; Harris 1998% 128). 
Where, for example, a child is in desperate need of a kidney transplant and 
no compatible donor is available, the creation of a genetically identical clone 
would appear to be the perfect solution for that child. An organ from a 
genetically identical being would be histocompatible and, therefore, unlikely 
to be rejected or require the use of immunosuppressive drugs. If such a use 
is to be justified it must take into account the moral claims and status of the 
cloned being, and the alternatives available. If, for example, cloning 
technology could be combined with germ-line gene therapy to produce an 
anencephalic organ donor, the moral status of this clone would be very low; 
perhaps, sufficiently low to permit its destruction so that its organs could be 
used to save the life of an ostensible agentsM 
There are reported instances of children being conceived to act as donors 
for existing children, albeit not by cloning methods. For example, in late 
2000, two families approached IVF clinics seeking to use PGD to obtain a 
donor for an older child who was critically ill with Fanconi's anaemia (see 
Hazlewood 2000). There was a precedent for this, as embryos had been 
created and genetically selected to help Molly Nash, an American girl also 
suffering from Fanconi's anaemia. Molly received (stem) cells from her 
brother's umbilical cord to help her fight the inherited bone marrow disorder, 
which causes bleeding, immune system problems, and leukaemia. After 
receiving the transplant from her brother, she was thought to have an 85 to 
95 cent chance of being cured (see Orr 2000). Had she not received the 
transplant, she would probably have died within a year (see Ledward 2000). 
Predictably Molly's situation was the source of some concern. However, I 
all the evidence suggests that a child donor is not harmed by the removal of 
cells from its umbilical cord. Therefore, its creation for this purpose did not 
M In the future, perhaps, some of the brain cells ti-om an embryo could be removed after 
cell differentiation so that it can be grown into a brain-dead child (creating something 
like an anencephalic newborn). 
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display an intention to violate its rights in the future3' and (given that its only 
plausible alternative was not to exist) the resultant child has not been harmed 
by its selection or birth." If cloning technology were more likely to produce 
a compatible donor, it is difficult to see what would be wrong with creating a 
cloned child for this purpose. 
In most cases, however, the required donation is far more invasive. For 
example, there have recently been reports of a family who seek to use PGD 
to select an embryo capable of developing into a suitable bone marrow donor 
to save the life of their son who suffers from the potentially fatal blood . 
disorder beta thalassaemia (see Boseley 2001). Even more problematic are 
those cases involving solid organs. Here, other potentially less problematic 
alternatives to cloning need to be explored. The use of cloning to provide 
organ donors is appealing primarily because of the current shortage of spare 
organs for those in need, causing people to die who could be saved by a 
transplant. However, according to Harris, 
Indeed it seems clear that the benefits from cadaver transplants are so great, 
and the reasons for objecting so transparently selfish or superstitious, that we 
should remove altogether the habit of seeking the consent of either the 
deceased or relatives. This we already do when post-mortem examinations are 
ordered without any consents being required and despite the fact that these 
too involve interference with the dignity of a dead body and the removal 
(albeit it) temporarily of organs. (1998a, 125) 
As Hams recognises, UK practice does not follow this suggestion. The 
relevant legislation-the Human Tissue Act 1961-is far fiom 
unproblematic. S. l(1) states that the removal of an organ for therapeutic, 
educational, or research purposes can be authorised by the "person lawfhlly 
in possession" of the body if the deceased "either in writing at any time or 
orally in the presence of two or more witnesses during his last illness" had 
previously consented to such removal. In the absence of such prior consent, 
S. l(2) states that the "person lawfully in possession of the body" may 
authorise such removal if, after making "such reasonable enquiry as may be 
practicable," that person has no reason to believe that the diseased had 
expressed an objection to organ removal or that "the surviving spouse or any 
, 31 If such an intention was suggested by the circumstances, this would provide grounds 
for preventing the conception/creation of the child in the first place. 
32 In line with these considerations, in a press announcement on 13 December 2001, the 
UK licensing authority announced that it will now allow tissue typing in conjunction 
n with PGD to be used to select an embryo for the treatment of an existing sibling 
suffering fkom a serious genetic disease. The boundaries and application of this 1 changed policy will be considered on a case-byas  basis. This press announcement 
can be found on the HFEA website: http://www.hfea.gov.uk. 
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surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt with." 
There are a number of issues raised by the Act (see, e.g., Mason and McCall 
Smith 1999, 3 5 0 ) . ~ ~  Most strikingly, although the relatives cannot object to 
donation under S. 1(1), in practice, transplantation does not go ahead if an 
objection is made. However, the moral position is not quite as simple as the 
passage quoted from Hanis suggests. Preventing people from opting out of 
posthumous donation threatens the deeply held values of some, including 
strongly held religious beliefs, and is likely to cause considerable distress to 
those who are worried about their organs being harvested before they are 
actually dead or before they become incapable of feeling pain. Some of these 
concerns are far from irrational. To take just one example, many 
anaesthetists have expressed considerable unease with the removal of organs 
from "brainstem dead donors without anaesthetic, on the basis that there is 
a possibility that these people can still experience pain (see Boseley 2000).34 
These concerns can also apply to relatives who object to such donation. 
While many of these concerns can be simply dismissed as hierarchically less 
important than the basic harm threatened to those in need of a transplant, 
thls will not always be the case. The positive right of those in need of a 
transplant must be weighed against the costs, in terms of predicted basic 
ham, on those who object, and the cost of ignoring such objections. Thus, 
although the PGC would support a presumption in favour of transplantation, 
this must be rebuttable to protect hierarchically greater PGC-protected 
values-which admittedly given the almost inevitability of death to those in 
need of the organ are not nearly as prevalent as commonly assumed. 
To return to my main point, if cloning is to be justified as a means of 
providing suitable donor organs, the alternatives need to be explored and 
legitimately rejected, and one apparently less problematic alternative would 
be to operate an opt out system for organ donation where the opt out 
provisions were limited.35 Of course, this alternative does not address the 
other major drawbacks of transplants: namely, cost (e.g., it costs about 
£100,000 or US$160,000 to replace a heart) and the need for donor 
recipients to be given immunosuppressive drugs (see Gurdon and Colman 
1999, 744). There are also other alternatives, such as the use of animal 
organs or the creation of suitable organs from genetically reprogrammed 
33 S. l(8) states that "[nlothing in this section shall be construed as rendering unlawful 
any dealing with, or with any part of, the body of the deceased person which is lawful 
apart from this Act." Thus, non-compliance with the Act's main provision has no 
direct civil or criminal law consequences, rendering the Act little more than a 
statement of good practice. 
34 All things being equal, precautionary reasoning would require that all "brain stem" 
dead patients be given anaesthetic before their organs are removed. 
3' Although the UK legislation allows for some policy change, since the legislation has 
not been applied in this way, new legislation would be a much more defensible way of 
changing UK policy with regard to organ donation. 
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stem cells. These, however, are currently infeasible and raise other ethical 
issues.% Moreover, like cloning a donor, these are not alternatives for those 
whose medical need is urgent. 
In summary, the use of cloning technology to produce donor tissue for 
existing persons is not unequivocally immoral. If it became scientifically 
feasible, its acceptability would depend on the donor's moral status, the 
invasiveness of tissue removal for the donor, the purpose for which the tissue 
is needed, and the alternative ways of obtaining that tissue. 
5.4 Regulation of Cloning37 
The regulation of human cloning is p a t ~ h y . ~  Where legislation does address 
cloning, it is often influenced by the previous scientific orthodoxy that 
cloning by nuclear substitution would be done by either replacing the 
nucleus of an embryo or replacing the nucleus of an egg with a nucleus from 
an embryonic cell. In other words, replacing the nucleus of an egg cell with a 
nucleus of a somatic cell taken from an adult (the "Dolly technique"), was 
not considered to be a possibility before the creation of Dolly the sheep. It 
follows that the application of the Dolly technique to human beings might 
evade legislative provisions that have been drafted too narrowly. 
In addition to the licensing requirement imposed on the storage, use, or 
creation of an embryo outside the body, the UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 prohibits the granting of a licence for the nuclear 
substitution of an embryo.39 This led the Human Genetic Advisory 
Commission (HGAC) and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) to declare that, depending on the method used, cloning 
was either prohibited or subject to a licensing req~irement.~' However, since 
E.g., the use of animal organs, xenotransplantation, poses considerable risk of inter- 
species virus transfer. 
37 The fill details of the law as summarised in this section can be found in Appendix 4. 
I am, of course, deflning a clone as above. Thus, unless otherwise specified, when I 
claim that certain countries prohibit cloning, I am claiming that they prohibit the 
production of a child using cloning techniques-i.e., those involving the deliberate 
creation of a human being that is genetically identical to another human being or has 
the same nuclear gene set as another human being. 
39 S. 3(3Xd). " This view was first expressed in their jointly written consultation document (see 
HGAC and HFEA 1998a, para. 2, 10). In the final report they declared that they have 
taken Counsel's advice, 
As a result, both Ministers and the Authority . . . are content that the Act does 
allow the HFEA to regulate nuclear replacement into an unfertilised egg through 
its licensing system. (1998b, para. 3.4) 
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the Act defined an embryo as "a live human embryo where fertilisation is 
complete," including "an egg in the process of fertilisation," it was 
questionable whether this definition was sufficient to encompass the Dolly 
techmque. After all, as Dr. Wilmut and Professor Bulfield put it, 
The oocyte is an egg but it has not been fertilised and it never is fertilised 
because the nucleus is transferred to it. (Quoted in Science and Technology 
Committee 1997, xii.) 
Although the English courts have historically tended to construe statutes 
literally or narrowly:' they now tend to adopt a purposive or broad 
con~truction.~' Thus, I (with a co-author) ventured the view that the legal 
situation was uncertain, but 
in practice, it is very likely that the term "fertilisation" will be judicially 
construed to include the nuclear substitution of an egg, especially since the 
HFBA seems to be acting according to this construction of the term. 
(Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b, 233) 
If the relevant section did encompass the Dolly technique, since the HFEA 
had declared that it would not "license any research which has reproductive 
cloning as its a im (HGAC and HFEA 1998% para. 5.4, 1 l)," it would not 
be legal to create a cloned child fiom a somatic cell in the UK. However, in 
November 2001, Mr Justice Crane ruled that the Dolly technique was not 
covered by the Act." 
- 
This was also the view of the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group (see Department 
of Health 2000a, para. 5.10,47). 
4' See, e.g., Fisher v Bell [l9611 1 QB 394, where it was held that the display of a flick 
knife in a shop window was not an "offer for sale" under S. l(1) of the Restriction of 
Offensive Weapons Act, 1959, as the term "off'er' was to be construed narrowly 
according to the law of contract. 
42 Many examples could be given, e.g., see Smith v Hughes [l9601 1 WLR 830 and 
Davis v Johnson [l9791 AC 264. In Smith, a statutory provision rendering it an 
offence "to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution" 
was held to apply to prostitutes who solicited passers-by from inside a private 
building overlooking a street in London. In Davis, the House of Lords construed a 
statute enabling the court to exclude a person h m  the "matrimonial home," defined 
as extending to "a man and woman who are living together," to protect an unmarried 
woman who was no longer living with her violent cohabitant. 
" See also HGAC and HFEA 1998b, paras. 3.8, and 9.2. 
R (on application of Quintavalle) v Secretaty of State for Health [200I] EWHC 918, 
[2001] 4 All 1013. Although concedmg that the argument for a purposive 
interpretation of section 1 was "a powahl one," Crane J held that to interpret S. 1 so 
as to encompass embryos created by the Dolly technique would require "an 
hpermissible rewriting and extension of the defmition" of an embryo (ibid., 1024). 
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A Bill was introduced into Parliament just over a week later.45 S. l(1) of 
the resulting Human Reproductive Cloning Act declares, 
A person who places in a woman a human embryo which has been created 
otherwise than by fertilisation is guilty of an offence.46 
This blanket prohibition is hard to defend on grounds other than political 
convenience. As the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act shows, 
legislative prohibitions can quickly become dated. As the science develops, . 
the technology is likely to become increasingly predictable and the public 
less fearfUl of its application to human beings. A suitably appointed 
regulatory body would be well placed to act on such developments, whereas 
an unspecialised legislative chamber is likely to be slow to amend such a 
legislative prohibition. Add these concerns to the conclusions defended above 
and this new provision is difficult to A better approach would have 
been to modify the definition of an embryo under the 1990 Act so that it 
covered any human embryo or equivalent capable of implantation. Thls 
would cover possible future developments (such as, perhaps, 
parthen~genesis~~ or ectogenesis4') and enable defensible applications of 
cloning, as a new assisted reproductive technique, to be permitted in the 
h r e .  
A situation similar to that under the UK legislation of 1990 exists under 
the Swedish Law No. 1 15 of 14 March 199 1, which only regulates 
experiments performed on a fertilised ovum or gamete beforefertili~ation.~ 
This has led the National Council of Medical Ethics and the National Board 
of Gene Technology to suggest that cloning using the Dolly technique might 
not be covered by the Swedish legislation. It also appears that research into 
cloning by embryo splitting is permitted up to 14 days after fertilisation, 
- 
This decision has been appealed to the Court of Appeal, so it might have been 
reversed (or upheld) by the time that this book is published. 
45 The Government had anticipated passing such an Act, even if cloning was covered by 
the 1990 Act (see Department of Health 2000b). 
46 Given its drafting, the Act does not regulate the creation of an embryo by nuclear 
transplantation where the embryo is not implanted. Thus, reconstructed embryos 
failing outside of the 1990 Act can be subjected to unrestricted research. By the time 
this book goes to press, this regulatory gap could well have been closed. 
47 Note that M e r  considerations of relevance to cloning are explored in later chapters. 
I Consequently, these conclusions are refined in Chapter 7 onwards. 
i " Parthenogenesis involves stimulation of an unfertilised human egg causing ~t to divide and develop into a child (this, female, child would be genetically identical to the 
producer of the egg). Although no human child has ever been produced (naturally or 
artificially) by parthenogenesis, it IS a theoretical future possibility. 
49 Ectogenesis involves gestation in an artificial womb. This is currently infeasible. 
Ss. 2 and 4. Further details and references can be found in Appendix 4. 
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because such experiments escape the prohibition (in S. 2 of Law No. 115) on 
experiments that have the purpose of developing methods for achieving 
potentially hereditary genetic effects. 
The German Embryo Protection Act 1990 was clearly intended to 
prohibit cloning. S. 6 of this Act renders it an offence to create an embryo 
that is genetically identical to another embryo, fetus, or any living or dead 
person. Many believe that this provision is sufficient to prohibit cloning by 
any method (see, e.g. Wmter 1997). However, since the Act does not define 
the term "genetically identical,"" it is questionable whether it is wide enough 
to encompass a clone produced using the Dolly technique, whose 
mitochondrial DNA will not be identical to that of the nuclear DNA donor.52 
Even if it is not, given that the clear intention of this provision was to 
prohibit cloning by any method, and the fact that this act invokes penal 
sanctions for activities such as conducting embryo research, it would be 
extremely unwise to attempt to clone a human being in Germany. 
One would expect the French legislation to be subject to the same 
problems, especially since cloning is not explicitly mentioned (see Appendix 
4). Nonetheless, the consensus is that human cloning is implicitly prohibited 
in France. This conclusion is supported by.the Parliamentary preliminary 
workss3 and re-asserted in opinion No. 54 of the National Consultative 
Ethics Committee (CCNE 1997). Nonetheless, the Committee was divided 
on whether more explicit wording would be worth adding when the 
legislation is revised. A later opinion, No. 60 of 25 June 1998, recommended 
(by majority) making the prohibition more explicit (see CCNE 1998). In its 
Opinion No. 67 of 18 January 2001, the CCNE again recommended explicit 
prohibition of reproductive cl--this time unanimously (see CCNE 
2001). 
Similarly, in Denmark cloning by any method is expressly prohibited. 
Under the Danish legislation, assisted fertilisation must aim to unite a 
genetically unmodified egg with a genetically unmodified sperm cell, the 
implantation of genetically identical (fertilised or unfertilised) eggs is 
prohibited, and experiments intended to produce genetically identical 
individuals are ~rohibited.'~ Unusually these provisions appear to catch all 
forms of cloning.55 
" As translated in Winter 199 1, 19 1. This phrase is translated as 'bhth the same genetic 
information" in the Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990, 10; and as "having the same 
genetic information" in European Parliament 2001b, 
52 Unless the recipient denucleated egg is fiom the same maternal line as the nuclear 
donor. 
53 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. " Ss. 2,4, and 28 of Law No. 460 of 1997. 
Also, in Finland although cloning as such is not prohibited, all research conducted for 
the purpose of facilitating the cloning of a human being is prohibited: S. 26, Medical 
Research Act No. 488 of 1999. 
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Similarly, the Spanish legislation renders it an offence to create human 
beings by cloning.% Interestingly, this legislation also renders it an offence to 
create identical human beings where it is aimed at race selection. This 
suggests that the Spanish parliament also objected to cloning on the grounds 
that it can be used to express racism. This issue is explored in Chapter Six. 
Italy, a country renowned for political problems enacting legislation 
regulating genetic and reproductive technologies, has managed to regulate 
cloning by a form of secondary legislation. A Ministerial Decree, issued on 5 
March 1997, prohibited all forms of experimentation and intervention aimed . 
at (even indirectly) cloning a human. This decree was initially allowed to 
lapse after the 90 day period for which such decrees have force, but has now 
been rene~ed.~' 
In general, where legislation exists it has attempted to prohibit cloning. 
Even those countries without legislative provisions addressing cloning-such 
as in Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and 
the US58-often have regulatory mechanisms pointing towards prohibition 
(see Appendix 4). In Canada, for example, there has been a voluntary 
moratorium on the cloning of human embryos since July 1995, although the 
effectiveness of this moratorium is questionable (see Caulfield et al. 1997, 
8). Also, in Portugal, there are constitutional provisions in the Fourth 
Revision of 1997 that might affect the legality of cloning (see 6.3.2, below). 
All countries without legislation are, however, currently considering 
legislation that will prohibit cloning (see Appendix 4). 
It is possible that cloning by any method will soon become illegal in just 
about all the countries under study, because of the pressure for a global legal 
ban on the development and use of this technique on human beings. In k t ,  
ten of the fifteen EU countries have now signed the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine and its additional protocol on the prohibition 
of cloning human  being^.^ Canada and the US are not member countries of 
the Council of Europe but were granted observer status during the 
S. 20, Law 35 of November 1998. 
Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims regulatory jurisdiction over human 
cloning and has indicated that it will not permit the creation of a cloned child because 
of "unsolved safety questions.. .at this time" (FDA 2001). Recently, the House of 
Representatives passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Bill, which if passed by the 
Senate will prohibit the cloning of human beings for any purpose. There is also some 
state legislation (see NBAC 1997, ch. 5, table 1, 104). 
The Convention opened for signature on the 4.4.97 and its additional protocol opened 
for signature on 12.1.98. The ten EU signatories are Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Four of 
these countries have now also ratified the Convention (i.e., Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain). Of these four, all but Denmark have also ratified the Additional 
Protocol. 
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negotiation of the Convention, so they can also sign it if they so wish." 
Article l(1) of this protocol makes what was implicit in the Convention6' 
explicit, by stating, 
Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to 
another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited. 
Since "genetically identical" is defined, under Article 1(2), as "sharing 
with another the same nuclear gene set," use of the Dolly technique on 
humans is included within this prohibition. 
The term "human being" is also not defined in the Convention, so the 
Netherlands, when it signed the Convention and its protocol, added an 
interpretative statement. 
In relation to Article 1 of the Protocol, the Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands declares that it interprets the term "human beings" as referring 
exclusively to a human individual, i.e. a human being who has been born.'j2 
This statement aims to make room for cloning experiments on embryos 
within the first fourteen days after fertilisation. Despite this, however, the 
legislation recently proposed by the Dutch government seeks to prohibit 
cloning and its necessary research. 
There are a number of other international instruments banning human 
cloning. For example, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of the 
Human Genome and Human Rights states, 
Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of 
human beings shall not be permitted. 
The General Conference unanimously adopted this Declaration on 11 
November 1997 (see UNESCO 1998). 
The European Union (EU) has also taken some steps in this regard. 
The Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, for 
" Article 33(1). For a discussion of the possible reasons why Canada has not signed the 
Convention, despite being directly involved in its framing, see Molinari 1998. 
Provisions capable of being read as implicitly prohibiting cloning include Article 1, 
which requires parties to the Convention to "protect the dignity and identity of all 
human beings," and Article 18, which states that the creation of human embryos for 
research purposes is prohibited. 
These provisions are important, because it is possible to sign the Convention 
without signing the protocol. Should a country, such as the UK, which has pre-existing 
laws on cloning, not wish to prohibit cloning it can make a reservation to these 
provisions of the Convention by invoking Article 36. 
62 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. 
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example, states that "processes for cloning human beings" are 
~npatentable.~~ This is very likely to act as a disincentive for commercial 
research and investment into cloning. It might be argued that the 
disincentive is minimal, because the results of any investment can be 
protected by other intellectual property mechanisms, such as trade secrets. 
However, patent protection has particular appeal to commercial 
l organisations and the condemnatory nature of the political will behind the Directive is itself a disincentive. 
Although the EU has no general competence in this area, it has 1 expressed reservations about cloning.* The European Parliament, for example, has passed numerous resolutions in support of a prohibition on 
the cloning of human beings, including the Resolution on the Cloning of 
the Human Embryo of 28 October 1993, the Resolution on Cloning 
Animals and Human Beings of 12 March 1997, the Resolution on Human 
Cloning of 15 January 1998, and the Resolution on Human Cloning of 7 
September 2000. Similarly, the European Commission has declared that it 
opposes cloning and will not subsidise experiments. Cloning is also 
mentioned in some non-legal text, such as the Charter of Fundamental 
l Rights of the European Union, Article 3(2) of which states, 
In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in l particular: . . . the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings. 
Since it is not clear that cloning per se violates the PGC, restrictive 
regulatory approaches to cloning are in need of reconsideration. Although 
it is questionable whether much of the existing legislation covers the Dolly 
technique, all those countries with legislation have attempted to prohibit 
cloning. This dominant prohibitive stance stands in need of justification. 
This is not to deny that some prohibitions might be necessary to 
prevent abuses. Prohibitions might, for example, be necessary to prevent 
the Dolly technique being used to clone living persons without their 
consent. However, not all use amounts to abuse. 
5.5 Prenatal Gene Therapy 
There are two potential forms of prenatal gene therapy. The first, somatic (or 
somatic cell) gene therapy, involves the genetic modification of somatic 
(body) cells only. The second, germ-line gene therapy, involves the genetic 
modification of germ cells (sperm or eggs), their precursors, or the cells of 
63 Article 6(2)(a), Directive 98144lEC. 
i * Cloning has also been condemned by the former European Group on Ethics in Science 
l 
t and New Technologies (see EGE 1997, para. 2.6-2.10). 
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early embryos where the germ-line has yet to be segregated. In practice, 
most gene therapy has the potential to affect both somatic and germ cells 
(especially where it is carried out on the embryo), therefore, in some cases, 
attempted somatic gene therapy might unintentionally alter the germ-line. 
Only changes affecting the germ-line can be passed on to future 
generations. It is, however, possible to envisage a situation where a 
genetically altered somatic cell is subjected to the Dolly technique, thereby 
producing a child using the nuclear material of a somatic cell. In this case, 
what was a somatic nucleus is, in effect, re-programmed to become germ- 
line nuclei. To avoid this complexity, I use the phrase "somatic gene 
therapy" to refer to a situation where only somatic cells are genetically 
altered (ignoring the possibility of these cells being subjected to nuclear 
transfer, resulting in a genetically modified child). 
Somatic therapy is not, however, the focus of the next sections. Before 
proceeding we need to address a background terminological dispute. Many 
claim that it is a misnomer to denote germ-line manipulations as "therapy" 
as there are no affected individuals to be treated (see, e.g., Glannon 1998, 
195; Baird 1994, 571). This claim presupposes that neither germ cells nor 
the early embryo constitute relevant individuals. Against this, it was argued 
in Chapter Two that precautionary reasoning requires us to countenance the 
possibility that such entities could be relevant individuals, i.e., agents. Baird 
and Glannon also claim that the term "therapy" suggests the treatment of an 
existing condition rather than the prevention of such a condition. However, 
there is no reason why preventative strategies cannot be encompassed by the 
term 'therapy," as long as what is encompassed by the definition is clear. 
Thus, I will continue to use the phrases germ-line gene therapy and germ- 
line modification as synonyms. 
The next sections will explore the arguments made for and against 
deliberate germ-line gene therapy. The discussion is restricted to deliberate 
germ-line gene modifications to avoid the complexities raised by 
unintentional alterations of the germ-line that can flow from chemotherapy, 
radiation therapy, and other mutagenic contaminants. These additional 
complexities are beyond the scope of this book and the laws examined 
below. Despite the focus on the germ-line modifications, the conclusions 
reached have implications for prenatal somatic therapy (especially since 
such therapy is likely to lead to unintended germ-line effects). 
Also, as with the arguments made in relation to cloning, where they 
typically address the goal of prenatal influence, rather than this specific 
technique, they will be addressed in Chapter Six. Thus, arguments that are 
often presented using slippery slope metaphors will be left for the next 
chapter. 
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5.6 Arguments Against Germ-line Gene Therapy 
At present, deliberate germ-line gene therapy has not been success~lly 
performed on human beings. It has, however, been performed on animals for 
over a decade. For example, transgenic m i s m i c e  whose germ-line has 
been deliberately genetically modified-have been created since the mid- 
eighties. Genetically modified, or transgenic, humans are a possible 
extension of this. Although this is still far from being a reality (see, e.g., 
Danks 1994, 15 l), the first transgenic primate has been created (see Chan et 
al. 2001). 
In the view of many advisory bodies, germ-line gene therapy is simply 
morally unacceptable. For example, accordmg to a recent Tricouncil Report 
in Canada, 
Gene alteration (including "gene therapy") that involves human gemline 
cells or human embryos is not ethically acceptable. Gene alternation for 
therapeutic purposes and involving human somatic cells may be considered 
for approval. (Medical Research Council of Canada et al. 1998, Article 8.5)65 
Many of the standard arguments against germ-line gene therapy are easily 
rebutted as either implausible or insufficiently specified. Arguments rejecting 
germ-line modification as "playing G o d  or interfering with nature usually 
either illicitly attempt to derive normative conclusions from non-normative 
premises or fail to explain how the normative premise is justified. Moreover, 
these arguments almost universally fail to provide an adequate explanation 
as to how we can distinguish the permissible natural from the impermissible 
non-natural, or how we are to know what God's will actually is. 
Also, like cloning, germ-line gene therapy attracts rather ad hoc 
arguments against its development and use. There are, for example, those 
who argue that this technique violates the integrity of genetic patrimony, the 
right to inherit an unmodified genetic endowment, or the right not to be 
intentionally modified (see, e.g., Mauron and Thevoz 199 1; Juengst 199 1, 
590). Such conclusions are certainly not uncontroversial under the PGC, 
because it might be the case that prenatal gene therapy could, in some 
circumstances, be necessary to maintain or advance the generic features of 
agents. Insofar as these ad hoc arguments have force it is because they carry 
other arguments in their wake. What is really an issue is not a right to be 
unmodified but the moral issues arising from the subjection of a prenatal 
human to a risky procedure. Thus, I will concentrate on the two more 
specific arguments arising out of this concern. 
p- P 
65 More recently, see Health Canada 2001b, 5. 
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5.6.1 Germ-line Gene Therapy Has Too Many Scientific Risks and 
Uncertain Consequences 
The first is the most prevalent argument against germ-line modification and, 
indeed, all the experimental techniques of prenatal influence. This points to 
the fact that the scientific risks and consequences are uncertain. Indeed, the 
UK Clothier Committee when reviewing gene therapy took the view that it 
should be confined to somatic cells, because of this risk and uncertainty (see 
Department of Health 1992). 
The empirical evidence does suggest that genetic manipulation carries 
present and h r e  risks for the subjects, i.e., for the entity that is 
manipulated and its h r e  offspring. The technique itself involves risks to 
the manipulated subject, in that it could cause its destruction. Moreover, the 
future risks and effectiveness of the technique are an issue. For example, it 
has been pointed out that, 
From animal models, we know that transgenic mice can have multiple gene 
insertions, higher mutation rates, and greater propensity to cancer than their 
normally generated counterparts. (Lap@ 1991, 626, citing Orian et al. 1990, 
393-397y 
Other possible consequences of germ-line gene therapy raise concern. It has, 
for example, been argued that the use of this technique to modifl, remove, or 
counteract an apparently deleterious gene could inadvertently remove any 
positive effects of that gene (see, e.g., Suzuki and Knudtson 1989, 202; 
Coghlan 1994, 15). The classic example cited is the gene associated with 
sickle cell disease. Two copies of this recessive gene result in sickle cell 
disease, but a single copy provides a degree of resistance to malaria. For at 
least two reasons this argument is much weaker than it appears. First, 
apparently deleterious genes with positive effects are extremely rare and so 
there is a relatively low probability of this consequence occurring. Indeed, 
the undiscovered effects of any gene might also be deleterious. Second, any 
positive effects, and the probability that germ-line gene therapy will remove 
them, must be weighed against the negative effects of the gene to be modified 
and the probability of these being removed. In the case of malaria, for 
example, the positive effects of the sickle cell gene can be replicated by 
vaccination and are only relevant to those who &ce an environmental risk of 
getting malaria. Also, those who are forced to suffer sickle cell disease suffer 
greater risk of harm to their generic features than is avoided by possession of 
this limited genetic resistance to malaria. 
A similar response is to be given to arguments emphasising the allegedly 
deleterious effects on the human gene pool that might result from germ-line ~ See also Berger and Gert 199 1,678; and Silver 1998,270-273. 
gene therapy. First, it is unlikely that germ-line gene therapy alone could 
successfully eliminate any allele from the human gene pool and, even if this 
were not so, this would not be a problem unless we have a duty to maintain 
these genes in the gene pool. Any such duty is unlikely to be derivable from 
the PGC, as to use humans as maintainers of genetic diversity, when this 
diversity has a negative effect on them, is prima facie a violation of their 
generic rights. 
What the current uncertainty and risks of germ-line gene therapy do 
mean, however, is that the technique is often likely to cause more harm than 
it cures. Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage circumstances where germ- 
line gene therapy, even with its current unpredictability might be justifiably 
used under the PGC. If, for example, it is used in an attempt to remove traits 
associated with non-viability and extremely low moral status (e.g., 
anencephaly), since the subject has so much to gain and apparently no 
alternatives, germ-line gene therapy is unlikely to violate our duties to the 
subject. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that it is impermissible to put 
possible agents at risk of generic harm where this is not likely to prevent 
greater generic harm to a possible agent. Thus, in general, prenatal gene 
therapy raises the same issues as other experimental and potentially 
therapeutic prenatal manipulation. 
5.6.2 Germ-line Gene Therapy Involves Unconsenting Subjects 
The second argument rejects germ-line gene therapy (and by implication all 
prenatal gene therapy) because it involves research and manipulation of 
early human embryos and their future offspring without their consent (see, 
e.g., Juengst 199 1, 590; Moseley 199 1, 642). Clearly, even when operatug 
under the precautionary assumption that the subject is an agent, it can never 
consent to prenatal gene therapy. Nonetheless, the PGC does not impose an 
absolute duty of non-interference towards those unable to consent, as our 
duties of protection to possible agents can be overridden by other moral 
considerations, and intervention legitimately aimed at maintaining or 
advancing the subject's display of the generic features fully complies with 
our duties to it. 
Therefore, more specific arguments are needed to show that germ-line 
gene therapy violates our duties to the nonconsenting subject. Ooe popular 
argument points to negative psychological effects on the b r e  child that 
might follow from germ-line gene therapy. It has been argued, for example, 
that they might "suffer . . . an 'identity crisis,' concerned with who she is, 
where she's coming from, and where she is going" (Chadwick 1992, 126). 
This prediction is far from incontrovertible. Many children do not know their 
true genetic origins, and not just those who are adopted or resulted from 
assisted reproduction. Various studies indicate that as many as one in ten 
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children do not have the genetic father that they think they have. Also, in 
many ways the children previously subject to germ-line gene therapy will 
know more about their origins than other children will. Empirical 
predictions of this sort cannot be assumed to be sound without supportive 
empirical research. Moreover, even if such predictions are defensible this 
predicted harm needs to be weighed against the predicted benefits of the 
intervention. 
In general, if germ-line gene therapy were sufficiently safe and 
efficient at advancing the generic needs of the subject, it would be as 
justifiable as other, more standard, therapeutic interventions on a subject 
incapable of consenting. 
5.7 Arguments in Favour of Germ-line Gene Therapy 
When germ-line gene therapy becomes feasible, it might be the most 
effective, or in some cases the only effective, way of addressing certain 
deleterious genetic traits. Moreover, according to Zirnmerman, 
Germ-line therapy is more ejJicient than the repeated use of somatic cell 
therapy in successive generations . . . . Why subject each generation to having 
to undergo major, invasive intervention, when elimination of the culprit genes 
from the germ-line is possible? (1991,597-598, original emphasis) 
Zirnmerman's ostensibly rhetorical question is, however, not as easily 
answered as it first appears. A number of possible reasons might be offered 
for restricting certain genetic manipulations to somatic cells. If, for 
example, a specific genetic modification was likely to mutate in future 
generations, repeated somatic gene therapy might be more efficient than 
germ-line intervention. Nonetheless, the general point is that if it is 
permissible to conduct prenatal somatic gene therapy it will generally be 
permissible to conduct germ-line gene therapy. I agree, simply because the 
types of considerations justifying the former intervention on a prenatal 
entity will just about always justify the same intervention in future 
generations. If prenatal gene therapy were to present a reliable means of 
advancing the generic features of offspring, all things being equal, it could 
be justifiably used on both present and future prenatal entities. 
There are many other arguments capable of being raised in favour of germ- 
line gene therapy, including those based on respect for parental autonomy 
considered in relation to cloning (5.2.1). Nonetheless, parental desires 
to influence traits prenatally will rarely require the use of prenatal gene 
therapy. This is simply because, except in very rare circumstances where all 
the potential children of a couple have a high genetic risk of being 
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afnicted with an undesired genetic di~order,~' PGD (which is actually a 
prerequisite for g e d i n e  gene therapy) is a more practical means of 
prenatal influence. Not least because prenatal gene therapy is currently 
untested and unpredictable. Nevertheless, were it to become a realistic 
option, rejecting an embryo following PGD would be harder to justify. 
5.8 Regulation of Prenatal Gene Therapy 
In general, research into somatic gene therapy is less stringently regulated 
than germ-line intervention, often without prenatal somatic gene therapy 
being distinguished from its postnatal counterpart. Moreover, even in those 
countries without legislation, somatic gene therapy is looked on more 
favourably than germ-line gene therapy. In Italy, for example, the National 
Bioethics Committee (CNB) has published a document accepting somatic 
gene therapy whlle condemning germ-line  intervention^.^^ 
In the UK clinical b-ials of gene therapy products must be authorised by 
the Medicines Control Agency, which must be satisfied that the research is of 
sufficient safety, efficacy, and quality.69 Also, in practice, any gene therapy 
protocol must be approved by the Gene Therapy Advisory Commission 
(GTAC)" and an appropriate research ethics committee.71 GTAC and the 
research ethics committees are, however, non-statutory bodies and, therefore, 
lack statutory powers to investigate or enforce compliance with their rules. 
GTAC has issued guidance advising the restriction of research into gene 
therapy to 
(a) disorders that are "life-threatening or cause serious handicap" and for 
which treatment is either unavailable or un~atisfsctory;~ and 
(b) limited to somatic cells.= 
67 E.g., where both parents are homozygous for an undesired gene (have two copies of 
the relevant allele) or where the mother's mitochondrial DNA is defective. 
Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. The proposed legislation does not directly 
address germ-line gene therapy. 
The Medicines Act 1968 (as amended) regulates the handling and preparation of 
medicinal products and applications for their use in clinical trials. Products for gene 
therapy trials appear to fall within the scope of the Act. The factors stated in the text 
are specified in S. 19 of the Act. m GTAC was set up in 1992 following the report of the Committee on the Ethics of 
Gene Therapy (the Clothier Committee): Department of Health 1992. 
71 Before research on humans can be carried out in the NHS the research protocol must 
be approved by an appropriate local or regional ethics committee, i.e., a local research 
ethics committee (LREC) or multi-centre research ethics committee (MREC). * See GTAC 1994, para. 6. The Clothier Committee had previously recommended this. 
73 See GTAC 1994, para. 8.9. 
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Further, in its 1998 report on prenatal gene therapy, GTAC stated that 
the use of direct, or vector, mediated gene therapy in utero are unlikely to be 
acceptable for the foreseeable future, in view of the safety and ethical 
difficulties. (GTAC 1998, para. 27(e)) 
Thus, all forms of prenatal gene therapy are prohibited by non-legislative 
mechanisms in the UK, the legal force of which is necessary indirect.74 
In the UK, as in many other countries, germ-line gene therapy also 
receives more direct regulatory oversight, as shown in Appendix 5. In fact, 
in the countries under study, where germ-line gene therapy is addressed by 
legislation it is either prohibited or heavily restricted. 
The Austrian, Danish, German, and Swedish legislation 
expressly prohibit germ therapy (see Appendix 5). The Swedish legislation 
seeks such a prohibitive stance by declaring that experiments on fertilised 
ova for the purposes of research or treatment "may not have the purpose of 
developing methods for achieving potentially hereditary genetic effects."76 
Thus, the Swedish legislation does not appear to prohibit germ-line 
modification and its associated research on urtfertilised gamete cells. 
Even the generally permissive UK Act prohibits germ-line gene 
therapy by declaring that a treatment licence cannot "authorise altering the 
genetic structure of any cell while it forms part of an embryo.7q7 
Nonetheless, the UK legislation does permit its associated research if it is 
specifically allowed by reg~lation.~~ No such regulation currently existsY9 
73 See GTAC 1994, para. 8.9. 
74 Non-compliance with the rules or recommendations of GTAC (and the research ethics 
committees) does not, by itself, give rise to legal liability. It might, however, be 
relevant to related legal actions, such as claims in the tort of negligence for harm 
caused by the use of gene therapy. Moreover, when in comes to publishing the results 
of such research, many refereed journals require compliance with ethical scrutiny 
procedures. 
75 The French legislation states, 
Without prejudice to research for the prevention and treatment of genetic diseases, 
no modification can be made to genetic traits with the purpose of modifying the 
descendants of a person. (Translated in CCNE 1997) 
Thus, by implication, research into germ-line gene therapy is permitted. See, however, 
the restrictive regulation of in vitro embryo research in France (Appendix 3). 
76 S.2,Law115of1991. 
77 Schedule 2, para. l(4) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
78 Schedule 2, para. 3(4). 
79 Although the UK Act appears to leave germ-line modification of gametes unregulated, 
as stated earlier, gene therapy research is also regulated by the Medicines Control 
Agency (MCA), GTAC, and LRECs. However, as stated above, GTAC and the LRECs 
lack statutory powers to investigate or enforce compliance with their rules. 
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Slightly different approaches are adopted by the Spanish and Finnish 
legislation. The Spanish legislation prohibits embryo research where the 
"non-pathological genetic patrimony" is The Finnish legislation 
prohibits research on embryos or gametes for the purpose of developing 
methods to alter hereditary characteristics, unless it aims to find a cure for, 
or prevent, a serious hereditary disea~e.~' Thus, research into germ-line gene 
therapy appears to be permitted in specified circumstances. 
Germ-line gene therapy might be permitted by defhult in some countries 
that have no specific legislation. Such countries include Belgium, Greece,"- 
and Italy. Not all countries without legislation take a permissive approach to 
germ-line gene therapy. For example, in Canada the voluntary moratorium 
that has prohibited cloning since July 1995 also prohibits germ-line gene 
therapy. The effectiveness of this moratorium has, however, been questioned 
(see Caulfield et al. 1997, 8). 
Moreover, all those countries currently without legislation are in the 
process of considering legislation, with the possible exception of the US (see 
Appendix 5).* 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine might 
have an effect on those countries without legislation, because Article 13 
states, 
An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be 
undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its 
aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants. 
Where a signatory country does not, or is unable to, make a reservation 
under Article 36 in regard to this provision, germ-line gene therapy is 
prohibited. However, Article 13 does not prohibit research into germ-line 
gene therapy for "preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes," where it 
does not involve the creation of an embryo (which is prohibited by Article 
18(2)). Nonetheless, unless such reservations are made the Convention 
renders the majority of such research of little practical use.84 
Many other international instruments share the prohibitive inclinations 
of the European Convention. For example, Article 24 of the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights states that the 
* S. 15(2Xb), Law 35 of November 1988. 
" S. 15, Medical Research Act No. 488 of 1999. 
Greece has, however, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, considered below. 
83 Although the US has no federal legislation explicitly addressing gene therapy, the 
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims regulatory jurisdiction over the 
safety and eficacy of such products (see Appendix 5). 
84 Provisions on genetic research are anticipated in the additional Protocol on Human 
Genetics currently being drafted by the Council of Europe (see Zilgalvis 2001,43). 
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International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO should contribute to 
dissemination of the principles set out in the Declaration and make 
recommendations to the General Conference 
in particular regarding the identification of practices that could be contrary to 
human dignity, such as germ-line interventions. (My ernphasi~)'~ 
Also, Article 6(2)(b) of the European Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions declares that "processes for modifjmg the germ- 
line genetic identity of human beings" are unpatentable. Although 
disallowing the patenting of such processes does not, itself, prevent their I development, it does remove some of the incentive for doing so. I 
5.9 Conclusion 
Despite the complexity of the issues involved, widespread uneasiness and 
revulsion to cloning and germ-line gene therapy has led many countries to I prohibit these technologies. I have argued.that legislative prohibition of 
cloning seems to be an unduly restrictive and paternalistic response, I especially since there is a prima facie right to reproductive freedom and the 
main arguments against cloning are based on the misguided idea that the 
clone has a right not to be cloned. Although prenatal gene therapy is often 
divided into somatic and germ-line gene therapy, the two are not always 
morally distinguishable. Further, since the primary argument against 
l 
prenatal gene therapy relies on its unpredictability, making it likely to cause 
more harm than it prevents, an absolute prohibition seems too restrictive. I f  
these risks are the only sound reason for prohibition, then this prohibition 
should be revocable should those risks be satisfactorily removed or 
addressed. Although my conclusions are only tentative and provisional, 
certain approaches do appear to be easier to reconcile with the PGC than 
others. Nonetheless, many issues raised by the goal of prenatal influence still 
require examination and the next chapter will do just that. 
'' The Declaration also declares that all procedures affecting an individual's genome 
should only be undertaken after "rigorous and prior assessment of the potential risks 
and benefits" (Article 5(a)). 
Chapter 6 
Prenatal Influence of Traits: 
Legitimate Goal? 
The developing genetic and reproductive technologies are often presented as 
the latest step in our evolutionary process, i.e., the development of what 
might be termed "artificial selection." As I have already indicated, there are 
a number of ways in which the preferences of parents can be satisfied. The 
most obvious method of prenatal influence is simply to select those 
individuals, or the genes of those individuals, displaying the desired trait or 
to select against those individuals with undesired traits or genes. It is also 
feasible to envisage the prenatal modification of a chld's actual or 
prospective traits using either genetic or environmental manipulation. The 
techniques discussed in earlier chapters involve variants of such means. This 
chapter explores the ethical and regulatory issues evoked by the goal itself. 
In other words, my concern here is to examine the legitimacy of prenatal 
attempts to influence traits in isolationfrom the speciJic technique used. 
Arguments cloaked in the metaphor of the "slippery slope7' (hereafter 
slippery slope arguments) are frequently invoked against just about all new 
developments in reproductive and genetic technologies. Although some 
instances of this argumentative strategy are restricted to one specific 
technique, there are sufficient common features to devote the majority of this 
more general chapter to such arguments. I will argue that the majority of 
slippery slope arguments are insufficiently specified. Nonetheless, I will 
uphold one particular variant as strong enough to ground a prima facie 
presumption. 
Another type of argument almost routinely thrown at new developments 
in genetic and reproductive technologies is the human dignity argument. This 
concept will also be analysed in this chapter and a specific conception will 
be defended. 
Finally, this chapter will explore the idea that permissible prenatal 
treatment must be distinguished from purportedly impermissible genetic 
enhancement, the issues raised by resource allocation, and Feinberg7s "right 
to an open future." A prima facie presumption along the lines of (but wider 
than) Feinberg7s claim will be defended. 
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6.1 Variants of the Slippery Slope and the Conditions for Soundness 
A collection of arguments utilise the metaphor of a slippery slope. These 
arguments share certain features and seek to convey the idea that pursuing, 
or not pursuing, a given purpose "A " will metaphorically take us down the 
slippery slope towards an undesirable result "B. " The literature typically 
utilises such arguments as a means of justifjmg the prohibition of A. We 
shall see that such arguments are commonly used with regard to the 
techniques of prenatal influence as a means of j u s t i h g  prohibiting the 
development or use of these techniques. 
More generally, slippery slope arguments (understood as feared endpoint 
arguments) can take two forms with regard to regulation: 
(i) Permitting A will lead to B. Therefore, we ought to prohibit A; or 
(ii) Prohibiting A will lead to B. Therefore, we ought to permit A. 
In such arguments A might be morally permissible in itself but B is 
considered to be a morally impermissible outcome. 
A might be said to "lead to" B on either empirical or logical grounds. 
Thus, slippery slope arguments can be divided.into "empirical" and "logical" 
slippery slope arguments.' 
Empirical slippery slope arguments claim that permitting/prohibiting A 
is likely to cause or hilitate the occurrence of B. In such arguments the 
slope's slipperiness depends on the likelihood of B being the end result. 
Although the link between A and B is empirical/predictive, it might be 
expressed in a number of ways. It could, for example, be argued that 
allowing/prohibiting A is likely to lead to B because regulating A in this way 
will provide the means (or additional means) for nefatious persons to bring 
about B, or will mobilise irresistible social pressure that is likely to result in 
B. The slippery slope metaphor seems most appropriate where the empirical 
link comprises a gradual slide, especially where it is based on the prediction 
that relevant distinctions will not be made or upheld. However, for 
convenience, I will use the label "empirical slippery slope" to encompass all 
types of empirical link between A and B. 
l At first sight, logical slippery slope arguments can be divided into two principal versions. First, there is a universalist version, which is merely an 
' The literature offers many alternatives, but generally complementary, classificatoxy 
frameworks. See, e.g., Williams 1985 (who distinpshed between "horrible result" 
and "arbitrary result" slippery slope arguments); Walton 1992 (who distinguishes 
between "Sorites," "causal," and "precedent" arguments); Lamb 1988 (who discusses 
a wide range of distinctions); van der Burg 1992 (who distinguishes between 
"empirical" and "logical" slippery slopes, but utilises diffkent defmitions); Holtug 
1993 (who supports van der Burg's distinctions); McGleenan 1995 (who distinguishes 
between logical and rhetorical slippery slope arguments). 
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instance of the logical principle of universalisability (see 1.2.2, above). 
According to this version, the justifjrlng reason for permitting or prohibiting 
A also justifies permittmg/prohibiting B purely logmlly, as A and B are 
equivalent in all their morally relevant properties (i.e., A B). Second, there 
is a gradualist version, which claims that no non-arbitrary reason can 
justifjr drawing a line between A and B. Thus, allowmglprohibiting A will 
justifjr incremental steps down the slope until we hit the bottom, B (i.e., A, 
A l . .  . An=B). 
In practice, when slippery slope arguments are made, the version in play 
is not usually explicitly declared, and sometimes an argument will invoke 
more than one version simultaneously. The danger with metaphors w that 
they can suggest diferent arguments to dzflerent people. There is also the 
rhetorical argument, which is not really an argument at all but merely a 
rhetorical device warning of the dangers inherent in any new knowledge or 
technology. In this chapter, I ignore all but those versions of the slippery 
slope argument outlined above. Also, unless otherwise stated, this chapter 
will concentrate on arguments that seek to establish that A ought to be 
prohibited (i.e., type (i) arguments abo~e) .~  
It follows from the fact that there are numerous types of argument 
capable of being cloaked by the slippery slope metaphor, each making 
different conceptual claims, that there are few satisfactory generally 
applicable stock-responses. Such arguments must, however, satisfl a 
number of requirements if they are to have theoretical force. First, the 
bottom of the slope (B) must be a morally impermissible outcome, i.e., a 
transgression of the PGC. Second, the connection between the top of the 
slope (permitting A) and the bottom (B) must be supported by relevant 
argumentation and (in the case of empirical slippery slope arguments) 
empirical evidence. 
More specifically, a satisfactory empirical slippery slope argument must 
establish that 
(a) it is morally impermissible to allow the occurrence of B; 
(b) there is sound empirical evidence of the slope's slipperiness, i.e., that 
allowing A is likely to lead to B; 
(c) there is no morally acceptable or preferable way of avoidmg the slide 
down the slope once A is permitted; and 
(d) the moral desirability of permittmg A does not outweigh the risk of B 
occurring. 
The vast majority of what I say will, however, also apply to type (ii) arguments. One 
example of a type (ii) argument is the claim that prohibiting research into new genetic 
techniques will mobilise researchers creating a gradual brain-dram, whereby talented 
researches move to less restrictively regulated countries. See Chapter 7. 
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Condition (a) is shared by all slippery slope arguments, simply because their 
force rests on the idea that the bottom of the slope is somethmg that cannot 
be permitted. 
Condition (b) is specific to empirical slippery slope arguments and 
involves demonstrating that allowing A will indeed facilitate or cause the 
occurrence of B. This often requires more than a mere suspicion that B 
might occur, as the strength of such arguments is related to the likelihood of 
the predicted outcome occurring. The empirical link between allowing A and 
B occurring can be long or short, direct or incremental. To use a domino 
analogy, the length of a slippery slope can be analogised to the number of 
dominoes lined up. Just as the likelihood of the last domino falling will 
depend on the weakest (i.e., least likely to fall) linking domino, the strength 
of a slippery slope argument will depend on the weakest empirical premise. 
Condition (c) merely requires consideration of alternative ways of 
preventmg B. If, all things considered, any alternative to prohibiting A is 
more likely to prevent the occurrence of the unacceptable outcome (B), or is 
in any way morally preferable to prohibiting A, then that alternative ought to 
be pursued instead. Difficulties satisfjmg thls requirement will become clear 
when examples of empirical slippery slope arguments are explored below. 
The basic difficulty is a fBmiliar one-applying the PGC to multivariable 
confiicts. 
Condition (d) requires consideration of the moral benefits of allowing A. 
I Any empirical slippery slope argument not satisfying this requirement--or, indeed, requirement (c)-wil invite reductio ad  absurdum, because of the 
Inherent ability of humanity to use (just about) anythmg for an immoral 
purpose. The arrival of germ-line gene therapy will provide another means 
for evil dictators to conduct large-scale eugenic programmes. The creation of 
the World Wide Web provided a means of disseminating bomb-making 
instructions to evil terrorists. The discovery of fire created a means of 
deliberately burning others. However, germ-line gene therapy also brings the 
potential to prevent some otherwise fatal conditions, the World Wide Web 
brings the potential to disseminate medical and educational information, and 
fire has the potential to prevent people from freezing. If empirical slippery 
slope arguments are sound without the need to address the potential benefits 
of allowing the relevant activity, then they require the prohibition of every 
new development. Indeed, they would require regression to a state of being 
that is incompatible with human freedom of action, simply because human 
l freedom enables the occurrence of immoral  outcome^.^ This outcome cannot be supported by the PGC, because it is incompatible with the possession and ! exercise of the generic rights. 
This point is also made in Beyleveld 1997 with regard to what the author terms 
"tendential slippery slope arguments." 
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Two versions of logical slippery slope arguments were also outlined 
above, i.e., the universalist and gradualist. Where B is a genuinely immoral 
outcome, the universalist version presents no theoretical a c u l t i e s  insofhr 4 as permitting A logically entails permitting B because A and B share the 
; relevant moral properties. In practice, what is more difficult is demonstrating 
that A and B do indeed share the relevant moral properties. Therefore, the 
universalist version can only be the last step of an argument for prohibiting 
A. Also, since the link between A and B is direct and purely logical, the 
metaphor of the slippery slope again seems inappropriate. 
The gradualist version claims that once A is permitted there is no 
morally defensible stopping point until the arrival of outcome B, so that 
allowing A will justifi incremental steps down the slippery slope until we 
reach a point that is equivalent to B. Where such a claim merely 
demonstrates the equivalence of A and B (i.e., that the reason for prohibiting 
B applies with equal force to A), it reduces to the universalist argument. 
Another argument capable of being presented in such terms relies on 
definitional or epistemic uncertainties. If the distinction between A and B (or 
the reason for drawing such a distinction) does not itself provide a 
determinate cut-off point, some might wish to suggest that we are logically 
required to take steps down the slope towards B.4 However, if there is a 
reason (of appropriate weight) for distinguishing A and B, then the absence 
of a determinate cut-off point will justifi upholding an otherwise arbitrary 
cut-off point, rather than treating A and B as equivalent. 
This is best explained using an example. For the sake of argument, lets 
S assume that, because of the (empirical and moral) uncertainties presented 
when trying to balance the need for quick and convenient travel with the 
need to limit road accidentsY5 a 29 miles per hour urban speed limit is 
f insignificantly different from a 30 limit, which in turn is insignificantly 
!': 
L l $  
Some uses of the slippery slope metaphor suggest the Sorites paradox-"if one grain 
of sand is not a heap and one more does not make it a heap, there can never be a 
heap." This trades on vagueness and ambiguity. Only where one operates without a 
definition of a heap-or with a defintion that can never be satisfied-will it be the 
case that "there can never be a heap." A group of sand grains can only be given the 
label "heap" if one has a precise definition of a heap (say, five or more grains) or a 
visual image of a heap (which, if i n ~ ~ c i e n t l y  precise, will create a range of 
situations for which there is no non-arbitrary way of detennining whether the term 
applies). Thus, in my view, all the Sorites paradox demonstrates is that loose terms 
produce grey areas. The absence of a distinction cannot be implied from the absence 
of a determinate cut off point. 
The PGC requires such a balance to be made. The availability of quick and convenient 
travel is required to protect and advance the generic needs of those living in modern, 
vehicle dependent societies, but vehicular accidents can also cause generic harm to 
possible agents. 
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different from 3 1 miles per hour.6 Here, the lack of a sharp dividing line does 
not require these speeds to be treated as equivalent nor does it demonstrate 
the unacceptability of speed limits. Where there is a moral reason (of 
appropriate weight) for upholding an otherwise arbitrary stopping point, any 
chosen stopping point consistent with that moral reason will be defensible as 
long as it is chosen by a morally defensible procedure. Thus, any chosen 
speed limit will be defensible as long as it represents a competent attempt to 
balance competmg needs by an appropriate regulatory procedure or body 
(see 4.1). As argued in 4.1, episternic uncertainties are inescapable htures 
of decision-making. Also, blanket refusals to uphold relevant distinctions, 
simply because they fail to provide clear cut-off points, will produce 
immoral outcomes. 
In sum, arguments cloaked by the metaphor of the slippery slope can be 
reduced to those malang predictive claims and those relying (directly or 
indirectly) on the logical principle of universalisability. If these are to have 
rational force, certain conditions must be satisfied. These require rationally 
adequate argument for accepting the morally impermissibility of B and the 
strength of the logidempirical connection between allowing A and reachmg 
outcome B. 
Before moving on to examples of the type of arguments that I have in 
mind, I wish to make one final point. It might be objected that my 
classificatory framework is too wide, as it captures arguments that are not 
really slippery slope arguments at all-it captures all feared endpoint 
arguments. The slippery slope metaphor might, for example, be plausibly 
restricted to a sub-category of what I have called the empirical slippery 
slope, i.e., situations where A is likely to lead to B because of failure to make 
or uphold relevant distinctions. Such an objection would be purely 
terminological. A metaphor, by its nature, is ambiguous and, in the end, it 
makes little difference whether or not its use is considered appropriate. As 
defined, the empirical and logical universalist arguments are argumentative 
strategies capable of being applied to the subject matter of this book. 
6.2 Slippery Slopes and the Techniques of Prenatal Influence 
6.2.1 Prohibition or Restriction of the Techniques 
Many slippery slope arguments have been used to support a prohibition of 
specific techniques of prenatal influence. 
In reality, a rounded number might be easier for drivers to remember, resulting in 
greater observance. However, if cars were programmed to stay within speed limits, 
without the driver's irnput, this consideration would not arise. 
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A logical gradualist slippery slope argument is considered by Berger and 
Gert, who state that an 
argument against gene therapy is that if we use the procedures to cure sickle 
cell anemia and other genetic disorders, we will be unable to draw the line 
against using gene therapy to improve our species. This is an example of what 
is known as a "slippery slope7' argument. The argument involves denying that 
a non-arbitrary line can be drawn between negative and positive eugenics, 
and therefore to protect against positive eugenics, we should not even start 
with negative eugenics. (Berger and Gert 1991,674) 
Berger and Gert go on to claim that such a line can be drawn, i.e., there is a 
defensible stopping point between permitting A and the occurrence of B.7 
They believe that a defensible line is provided by the concept of a malady, 
defined as "[dleath, pain, disability, and the loss of freedom or pleasure" 
(ibid., 672). They argue that using "gene therapy for these maladies would 
constitute negative eugenics" (ibid., 671), and using gene therapy for other 
traits and conditions would constitute positive eugenics. They aver that 
maladies are universal evils requiring removal, 
The avoidance of evils, unless there is a reason, does not seem to depend on 
any particular culture, politics, or personal preference, but seems to be 
generally universal. The existence of such evils provide explicit objective 
criteria that we may apply in distingwshing maladies from non-maladies. 
(Berger and Gert 1991,672) 
However, widespread appeal is not the same thing as justification and, even 
if values in favour of allowing "negative eugenics" are rationally 
supportable, this does not demonstrate the need to draw a line between 
"negative" and "positive" eugenics. As stated above, it also needs to be 
established that B is morally impermissible. The moral permissibility of so- 
called "positive eugenics," and indeed so-called "negative eugenics," will be 
explored in 6.4.1. 
Arguments capable of being read as empirical slippery slope arguments 
are prevalent in the literature. Two specific instances spring to mind, the 
second of which will be explored in 6.2.2. The first rests on the claim that 
allowing the development and use of the techniques of prenatal influence will 
The argument explored by Berger and Gert would have been an empirical slippery 
slope if they had claimed that allowing negative eugenics is likely to lead to positive 
eugenics because, in practice, the relevant distinctions will not be made or upheld. 
Instead, the argument that they address denies that a distinction between A and B can 
be made. 
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lead to genetic enhancement or eugenics. Anderson summarises an example 
in fhvour of prohibiting somatic gene therapy, 
Successful somatic cell gene therapy also opens the door for enhancement 
genetic engineering, i.e., the supplying of a specific characteristic that 
individuals might want for themselves (somatic cell engineering) or their 
children (germline engineering) which would not involve the treatment of 
disease. (1989,682) 
William Gardner presents a slightly more detailed example, 
It is widely feared that human gene therapy is at the top of a slippery slope, 
such that therapeutic engineering of human genes will generate technological 
change of such momentum that it will force the adoption of genetic 
enhancement. (1995,65) 
Also, in March 1997 the European Parliament passed a resolution on 
cloning animals and human beings in which it denounced cloning "as it 
permits eugenic and racist selection" (Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1997, 10).' 
It has been argued above that claims such as these, need to address the 
benefits of allowing A. It is not selfevident that the moral desirability of 
permitting A in these examples cannot outweigh the risk of B occurring. The 
arrival of knowledge and technological developments capable of being used 
for evil is an unavoidable side effect of human freedom, and should not be 
prohibited unless there is no legitimate purpose for which the knowledge or 
technology could be used, or the potentially beneficial purposes are not 
sufficient to legitimate running the risk of B. I suggest that this is the 
reasoning behind Harris' claim that, 
To ban cloning on the grounds that it might be used for racist purposes is 
tantamount to saying that sexual intercourse should be prohibited because it 
permits the possibility of rape. (1998% 32) 
The other conditions of a satisfhctory empirical argument, set out above 
(6.1), are also not easily satisfied by these examples. Having a fear that 
permitting A will causally lead to B is not the same thing as having empirical 
evidence that this is likely to be the case and empirical evidence supporting 
For yet another example of an empirical slippery slope argument-"that allowing 
research on embryos created by cell nuclear replacement would be a fmt step on a 
'slippery slope' towards human reproductive cloning"-see Department of Health 
2000a, para. 21, 8. This particular example is rejected on the basis that the stringent 
controls of the UK legislation are sufficient to prevent the slide. Ironically, this UK 
legislation was later shown to be inadequate, see 5.3. 
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this prediction is rarely offered. This is particularly relevant to the example 
presented by Gardner. This is important because the strength of such 
arguments will be proportional to, among other things, the likelihood of B 
occurring. Occasional vague references to the evils of the Nazi regime are 
not sufficient to establish a link between allowing gene therapy and eugenics. 
There are many factors standing in the way of the slide predicted in the 
above examples, not least the unpredictability of both gene therapy and 
cloning and its inevitably high financial cost. Also, detailed consideration 
needs to be given to the alternative ways of preventing the slide towards B 
once A is permitted. All thls is assuming that the bottom of the alleged 
slope-genetic enhancement-is indeed a morally impermissible outcome. 
This needs to be established. Against this conclusion Harris (1998a, 171- 
174) argues that there is no obvious moral difference between social 
enhancement and genetic enhancement, and social enhancement by education 
is routinely accepted and encouraged. I will return to this issue in 6.4.1, 
below. 
Gardner presents a more complex empirical slippery slope argument of 
his own, arguing that a ban on genetic enhancement will not be sufficient to 
prevent its occurrence. He argues that nations and parents will have strong 
incentives to defect from a ban on human genetic enhancement to give 
themselves a competitive advantage, which is likely to mobilise pressure that 
will undermine any ban on genetic enhancement. This argument concludes 
with the surprisingly uncontroversial conclusion that those 
who hope to prohibit enhancement must carefully consider what legal and 
political mechanisms, national and international, will be sufficient to enforce 
that prohibition. (1995, 80) 
The bottom of this argument's slope, the undermining of any ban on genetic 
enhancement, will clearly be considered morally unacceptable by those who 
wish to prohibit genetic enhancement. Given Gardner's limited conclusion, 
the failure to cite empirical evidence does not appear to be overly 
problematic. Nonetheless, it must first be established that genetic 
enhancement ought to be prohibited (see 6.4.1). 
The major issue with regard to all slippery slope arguments is 
establishing that the bottom of the slope is, indeed, morally impermissible. 
The strength of the empirical evidence necessary to establish a ltnk between 
allowing A and the occurrence of B will be proportional to the moral iniquity 
of B. After all, precautionary reasoning, requiring the risk of violating the 
PGC be minimised, could justify reliance on inconclusive (but persuasive) 
empirical evidence. Much of the remainder of this chapter will, therefore, 
concentrate on the alleged immoral outcomes potentially sittlng on the 
bottom of slippery slopes. Before this, however, we need to explore a more 
prevalent and persuasive empirical slippery slope argument. 
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6.2.2 The Dominant Empirical Slippery Slope Argument Against Trait 
Selection 
The most prevalent empirical slippery slope argument in this context claims 
that allowing prenatal influence of certain traits is likely to encourage or 
facilitate harm to those with the rejected traits, those without the chosen 
traits, or the families of such persons. This argument has been made with 
regard to selection for or against numerous traits. 
It has been made with regard to selection against traits associated with 
disabilities, 
[A]n increase in genetic testing and the availability of PGD might affect 
people's attitudes towards disabled people and their families by creating a 
climate where genetic disability is increasingly seen as preventable. (HFEA 
and ACGT 1999, para. 20) 
The Danish Council of Ethics used a similar argument with regard to allowing 
fetal diagnostics to be used to avoid the birth of children with physical disabilities, 
Fetal diagnostics may also be feared to fuel an unwillingness to provide care 
and display tolerance towards those who do not match increasingly narrow 
parameters of performance and ability to function. The fear is, then, that fetal 
diagnostics is contributing to the trend in social development towards what 
might be called "social brutalization", in which people are sorted into worthy 
and inferior, desirable and undesirable categories. (1999, 56) 
This form of slippery slope is often used to suggest that sex selection is 
likely to encourage or facilitate sexual discrimination and prejudice, and race 
selection is likely to encourage racism.g It has also been suggested that the 
general preference for heterosexual children is even stronger than preference 
for a child of a particular sex, and those who seek to influence the sexual 
orientation of their child before its birth are likely to contribute to 
homophobic attitudes. According to Stein, 
By strengthening the disease view of homosexuality and increasing pressure 
to keep one's homosexuality secret, the use of orientation-selection 
procedures would engender and perpetuate (1) attitudes that lesbians and gay 
men are undesirable and not valuable, (2) policies that discriminate against 
lesbians and gay men, (3) violence against lesbians and gay men, and (4) the 
very conditions that give rise to the preference for heterosexuals rather than 
non-heterosexuals. (1998, 16) 
This latter ground might be the reason why the Spanish legislation prohibits cloning 
only when it is aimed at race selection, see 5.3. 
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Further, Beyleveld (2000b) argues that the ability to select for or agamt 
traits that are irrelevant to the possession of intrinsic moral status might 
cause hhions  for particular traits to develop, so that these traits become 
regarded as conditions meriting medical intervention. He cites 
the example of the desire for p e r f i  shaped teeth that has swept the US, 
resulting in children whose parents are unable to afford the treatment that can 
c o w  'imperfections' that are now perceived as deformities, suffering deep 
traumas as a result. (ibid, 474) 
The bottoms of these slippery slopes all involve uncontroversial violations of 
the PGC. Since agency-irrelevant disabilities (such as impaired motor 
capacity, sight, or hearing), sex, race, and sexual orientation are all 
examples of traits that are irrelevant to the possession of intrinsic moral 
status, prejudice against agents who either have certain variants of these 
traits or are related to those who have, will involve violation of the PGC. 
Empirical support for the predictions on which these arguments rest can 
be found in past examples of trait selection. For example, there is evidence 
that in Sardinia, where there is routine PND for thalassaernia, women who 
fail to abort a fetus diagnosed as having the condition are stigmatised by the 
local community (see Black 1998, 45). The empirical evidence does indeed 
suggest that gradually increasing social pressure is a realistic consequence of 
widespread trait selection. This social pressure is also likely to be directed 
towards children with the undesired genes, rather than being restricted to the 
parents of such children. As one commentator has warned 
the very language used to discuss genetic disease leads us to the easy but 
wrong conclusion that the alBicted fetus or person is rather than has a 
disease. . . . [Wje easily slide from the language of possession to the 
language of identity, from "he has hemophilia" to "he is a hemophiliac," from 
"she has diabetes" to "she is diabetic," from "the fetus has Down's syndrome" 
to "the fetus is a Down's." This way of speaking encourages the belief that it 
is defective persons (or potential persons) that are being eliminated, rather 
than the disease. (Kass 1988,89) 
A culture of testmg might also have more widespread consequences with 
regard to the ability to get employment, insurance, or social standing of 
those with the rejected traits, especially if persons with such undesired genes 
become regarded as diseased. A notorious example of genetic testing lea@ 
to illegitimate discrimination occurred in the 1970s when the US Department 
of Defence camed out a policy of excluding individuals with the sickle cell 
trait-i.e., people who, having only one copy of the sickling allele, will not 
get sickle cell disease. This policy was pursued on the basis that this trait put 
them at risk of collapsing at high altitudes, whereas only sickle cell 
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disease1'--i.e., possession of two copies of the sickling allele-was known to 
have this effect (see Kitcher 1996, 130-1 32). Admittedly, since only native 
Africans and those of Afncan descent usually possess the sickling allele, 
there might have been other prejudices behind this policy. Nonetheless, once 
a trait or condition is perceived as a preventable disease, negative 
associations attributable to that trait or condition are likely to increase. 
It is also plausible that those prospective parents who seek to avoid the 
birth or conception of a child with a specific trait who, despite all their 
efforts, have a chlld with this undesired trait are likely to value this child less 
than they would have valued a child without that condition. Thus, trait 
selection could facilitate and increase parental resentment and pressure on 
those children who have undesired traits. This seems to be the most plausible 
interpretation of popular claims that selecting and designing hldren will 
reduce children to consumer products (see, e.g., BMA 1998, 59). If the 
characteristics of children are perceived as being subject to prior choice, 
those children not conforming to those choices could become regarded as 
defective in the same way that a consumer good would be regarded as 
defective if it failed to reach expectations. Thus, some trait selection can 
facilitate the development of a culture whereby all children become 
perceived as consumer goods with attendant expectations. 
Wielding relevant empirical evidence will not, however, be sufficient to 
establish the soundness of this type of argument. It also needs to be 
established that the moral benefits of permitting attempts to influence an 
undesired trait do not outweigh the harm caused by running the risk of such 
social pressure occurring. Where, for example, the occurrence of the trait is 
likely to impose onerous burdens on the prospective parents, running the risk 
of increased social prejudice might be defensible as an unavoidable side 
effect of avoiding harm to the prospective parents, perhaps, until supportive 
social mechanisms for alleviatmg parental burdens are in place. To take just 
one example, where prospective parents have already endured the emotional 
and financial hardship of raising a child with a condition such as Down's 
syndrome, or even a treatable condition such as PKU, the possibility that 
attempts to avoid the birth of second child with this condition might generate 
social pressure towards others is fhr from morally conclusive." In short, the 
moral issues are often so complicated that even a high likelihood of harm as 
a result of consequential social pressure will not by itself be enough to 
establish the impermissibility of permitting trait selection. 
Insofar as the argument under discussion has force, with appropriate 
modifications, it can also apply to techniques such as germ-line gene therapy 
and prenatal environmental manipulation (see Pattinson 2000). The only 
dfference between these techniques and PGDIPND is that successhl 
l0 Sickle cell disease is also known as sickle cell anaemia. 
l1 A parent might even possess the undesired trait his or herself 
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prenatal mdfication using gene therapy or environmental manipulation has 
the potential to benefit the subject, by removing or limiting harm caused by 
the possession of deleterious traits, whereas PGD and PND usually involve 
the destruction of rejected subjects. Thus, for this argument to apply to 
prenatal modification, rather than diagnosis and testing, the risk of sliding to 
the bottom of the slope must also be weighed against the potential benefits of 
the techniques to the subject (see 6.1). 
Where, however, prenatal modification is used to modify traits that 
would not harm the subject, the risk of turning a n o n - M 1  trait into a . 
trait that is perceived as harmful or undesirable has force. If this outcome 
occurs, then generic harm will be inflicted on those with the now M 1  
traits and probably the parents or families of those who choose not to use 
prenatal modification to avoid the occurrence of such traits. 
Ail these arguments need to establish that any consequential social 
pressure could not be confined by other means. After all, the true villain is 
illegitimate societal pressure, generating a desire to avoid certain traits and 
pressure towards those who do not conform. Such social pressure might be 
legitimately deflected from parents by, for example, principled eligibility 
requirements restricting access to the techniques of prenatal influen~e.'~ 
Nonetheless, plausible mechanisms for avoiding the predicted harm are not 
over abundant. 
Despite the reservations raised, there is at least a prima facie defensible 
argument that prenatal influence of the above mentioned traits is likely to 
encourage the violation of the generic rights of (ostensible) agents. Thus, the 
starting presumption should be in favour of regulatory mechanisms 
restricting prenatal influence of traits that are irrelevant to the possession of 
moral status-and, in the case of prenatal modification, do not harm the 
subject-as a means of avoiding or limiting violations of the PGC. Where 
the trait is one that is relevant to possession of intrinsic moral status, in the 
sense of limiting the moral status of the subject (as in the case of 
anencephaly and severe mental retardation), this presumption is much 
weaker or absent. 
6.2.3 Empirical Slippery Slopes and Sex Selection 
It is commonly assumed that sex selection to avoid the birth of a child with a 
severe X-linked condition (such as Lesch-Nyhan syndrome) is permissible, 
but to choose the sex of a child for, what are often termed, social reasons is 
not. This has led many regulatory bodies and instruments to allow sex 
'* It is argued in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b that the present eligibility requirements 
for access to assisted reproductive techniques are far from principled. 
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selection only where it is aimed at preventing the birth of a child with a 
serious X-linked condition (see 4.3.2 and 4.4.1). 
As emphasised throughout, the benefits of satis-g the preferences of 
prospective parents must be taken into account. Sex selection can prevent 
severe harm and distress for some couples facing a significant risk of having 
a child with a serious X-linked condition. However, predictable harm to 
prospective parents is not limited to fears of serious X-linked conditions. In 
some circumstances having a child of one particular sex might cause the 
parents to be stigmatised or ostracised by their community, or to suffer from 
the effects of an overwhelming desire to have a sex-balanced family. Thus, 
the rights and interests of prospective parents can undercut the distinction 
between sex selection to avoid disease and sex selection for social reasons." 
An example of a couple with an overwhelming desire for a sex-balanced 
family recently attracted the attention of the UK media. Alan and Louise 
Masterton sought medical help to ensure that their next child would be a girl 
after losing their daughter in a bonfire accident. They already had four sons 
and had tried for 15 years to have the daughter whose life was taken by the 
accident only three years later. The UK regulatory body, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, refused to make an exception to 
their policy of restricting sex selection to the avoidance of X-linked diseases 
(see 4.4.1). Predictably, many invoked the slippery slope metaphor (see, e.g., 
The Sunday Telegraph 2000). When used to convey what I have called the 
"empirical slippery slope," this metaphor can be used to present a number of 
arguments against sex selection (especially where it is performed for social 
reasons). 
One rests on the claim that sex selection will encourage the treatment of 
the rejected sex as a M 1  trait. This type of argument was supported 
above (6.2.2). Here, this argument is bolstered by the likelihood that sex 
selection could display and encourage gender-role expectations. According 
to this argument, selection for social reasons is likely to display and 
encourage sexual stereotyping-as even a desire to have a balanced family is 
likely to hide the assumption that a child of the missing sex would have 
behavioural traits attributable to members of that sex only and the 
satisfaction of such desires can aid their perpetuation. Insofir as gender 
expectations are likely to lead to disapproval and disregard for those whose 
behaviour does not conform to certain morally optional behavioural patterns, 
such sexual stereotyping is likely to impermissibly endanger the rights of 
l3 JustifYURg sex selection for any reason requires reliance on the potential generic harm 
that is likely to be suffered by the prospective parents. The prospective parents must 
be offered counselling. Otherwise they are likely to suffer even greater generic harm 
if, despite the use of selection techniques, their hopes and expectations are frustrated 
by the birth of a child of the undesired sex. After all, diagnosis of sex (especially 
before implantation) is not 100% accurate. 
P~natal  Influence of Traits: Legitimate Goal? 153 
agents. Although these claims require empirical support, they are clearly 
plausible. 
Thus, there are strong prima facie reasons why sex selection for social 
reasons might be morally illegitimate, suggestmg that a presumption against 
this practice ought to be adopted. These reasons will be bolstered if the 
additional claim concerning gender expectations is borne out by empirical 
research. Nonetheless, such a presumption must be subject to the 
contingencies of possible harm to the prospective parents. 
Another empirical argument capable of being invoked against sex 
selection claims that it can create an imbalance in the sex ratio to the 
detriment of society. Thls argument has some empirical support. For 
example, sex selection (currently using PND) 
has contributed to India's declining proportion of females to males; the ratio 
dropped from 935: 1000 in 198 1 to 927: 1000 in 199 1. In certain communities 
in the northern states of Bihar and Rajasthan the ratio has plummeted to 
600:1000, one of the lowest in the world. (Mudur 1999,401) 
However, the idea that sex selection will create an imbalance between the 
sexes to the detriment of society must be tempered by a number of 
considerations. First, it is likely that any short-term imbalance will be self- 
rectifymg, as social pressures are likely to create a demand for the minority 
sex. Second, the alleged consequential harm must be carefully specified, 
because there can be no right to have equal sex ratios, because of the costs 
inherent in a duty to bring this about.I4 Thirdly, it must not be assumed that 
the natural balance-which at birth is usually slightly weighted towards 
males-is automatically morally preferable. Therefore, this particular 
slippery slope argument is much weaker than is commonly assumed. 
6.3 Human Dignity 
6.3.1 Conceptions of Human Dignity 
Like the slippery slope argument the human dignity argument comes in many 
flavours. For a start, human dignity can be used in a way rendering it 
equivalent to intrinsic moral status, so that those possessing dignity are those 
who have moral worth entitling them to concern from others. I will call this 
the intrinsic worth conception. This intrinsic worth can be given a duty- 
based or a rights-based orientation. A duty-based orientation (as in Kantian 
moral theory) renders it possible for agents to compromise the dignity 
l4 Positive rights are subject to a number of limitations, see 2.7. 
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(understood here as intrinsic worth) of not only others but also themselves.15 
The idea being that an agent compromises its dignity by violating its duties 
to itself. Following the Gewirthian presuppositions of this book, this 
conception of human dignity is to be rejected in favour of a rights-based 
conception, as there can be no direct duty not to compromise one's own 
dignity under the PGC. This follows fiom the waivability of the benefits of 
the generic rights of agents, rendering it meaningless for an agent to have a 
right (imposing a correlative duty) against itself.16 Interpreted in this way, 
the concept of human dignity can be seen to underpin all the arguments on 
the application of the PGC in this book, rendering the term superfluous. The 
term "human dignity" used in this way will, of course, have to be interpreted 
as "agent-digmty . " 
Human dignity can also be given a narrower focus. Interpreted narrowly, 
a violation of human dignity involves denying a possessor of intrinsic moral 
value its status. Within a Gewirthlan context, to violate human dignity in 
this way is to deny the rights-bearing status of an agent. This interpretation 
is narrower as although all attempts to deny the status of a possible agent 
will violate the PGC, not all the generic rights are concerned with the 
subject's status as a rights bearer. 
Accordingly, claims that certain techniques of prenatal influence violate 
human digmty by treating the subject as a mere means rather than an end in 
itself, must be read as claims that either the subject's generic rights are 
violated by the technique or its status as a rights-bearer is denied. The idea 
that certain techniques (particularly cloning techniques) involve using 
individuals as a means to the ends (or purposes) of others-sometimes 
referred to as "instrumentdisation""-has widespread appeal.18 For 
" On duties to oneself in Kant, see Kant 1797 as translated in Gregor 1996, 209. See 
also Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998, especially 75-77. 
See Chapter One. There are, however, indirect/vicarious duties to one's self. 
Arguments to establish such duties have already been analysed with regard to the idea 
of indirect moral status in 2.6.2. See, also, Gewirth 1978, 333-338. 
OAen the principle appealed to is Kant's Formula of the End in Itself of his 
Categorical Imperative, 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time 
as an end. (Kant 1785 as translated in Paton 1948, 91) 
In Kantian (and Gewirthian) theory the only relevant persons are agents (i.e., setters 
of ends), not merely possessors of interests. However, many of those who appeal to 
this principle wish to extend it to encompass non-agents. 
l8 See HGAC and HFEA 1998b, para. 4.5 and CCNE 1997. The latter states, 
Reproductive cloning of human beings is therefore unacceptable not just because 
of its foreseeable effects on the human condition, but also because the very ends 
in the name of which certain people believe they can justifjl the scheme is 
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example, the preamble of the Council of Europe's Adhtional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Cloning states that, 
Considering however that the instrumentalisation of human beings through 
the deliberate creation of genetically identical human beings is contrary to 
human dignity and thus constitutes a misuse of biology and medicine. 
This raises issues already addressed. Since the mere act of cloning cannot be 
taken to violate the rights of the cloned individual, on the basis that the clone ' 
cannot be assumed to have suffered any generic harm (see 5.2. l), the clone's 
dignity cannot be violated by the mere use of cloning technology. 
The idea of human dignity also conveys the idea of dignljed conduct or 
character. I will call this the virtue conception. This conception can be 
given a strong or weak interpretation. The strong interpretation, underpinned 
by virtue theory, claims that to be dignified is to be a virtuous person. This 
interpretation rejects the moral assessment of conduct in favour of the moral 
assessment of persons, or more precisely, the character of persons. In 
contrast, the weak interpretation is compatible with conduct-assessing, 
action-based morality. According to the weak interpretation, hgnified 
conduct is conduct in compliance, or disposing towards compliance, with 
moral principles. This conception was defended as being supported by the 
PGC in 2.6.2 (see also Gewirth 1978, 332-333). In contrast, the strong 
conception, requiring the rejection of action-based morality, is incompatible 
with the PGC as an action-based morality. It must, therefore, be rejected if 
the argument to the PGC is taken to be sound, as it is in this book. 
As with slippery slope arguments, this classificatory framework is not 
conclusive. There is at least one other conception, the rhetorical conception, 
which does not purport to be an argument at all but a warning that 
something appears to transgress moral boundaries. It is, perhaps, this 
version that Harris had in mind when declaring that "[alppeals to human 
dignity, while universally attractive, are comprehensively vague" (Hanis 
1998a, 3 1). 
In sum, popular conceptions of human dignity reflect the tensions within 
moral theory. The concept is linguistically flexible enough to allow 
deontological, teleological, virtue theory, moral relativist, and rhetorical 
conceptions. Under the PGC, however, human dignity must be interpreted in 
its rights-based conception, which encompasses the dignlJied conduct virtue 
conception. 
tantamount to malung an end in itself of cloning as opposed to the clone. In this 
way, there would necessarily be an instrumentalisation of the person to be born. 
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6.3.2 Human Dignity as Invoked in Regulatory Frameworks 
Many international instruments give the now almost mandatory nod in the 
hrection of human dignity and human rights, reflecting the growing 
consensus that human endeavours should respect these concepts. With 
regard to the techniques of prenatal influence, human dignity is specifically 
mentioned by, for example, the preambles of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine19 and UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights. It is, however, a concept whose precise 
formulation is often left vague and undefined (see, e.g., Harris 1998a, Harris 
1999,66; 3 1; Beyleveld and Brownsword 1998, 7 1). 
Where human dignity has been given constitutional enactment, 
constitutional courts have given it a more precise formulation. For example, 
the German Basic Law-whch has formed the common constitution of the 
now unified East and West Germany since 1990-has a provision requiring 
the state to "protect the dignity of man,"20 which has been interpreted by the 
Federal Administrative Tribunal in terms of the duty-based conception of 
human dignity.21 A similar interpretation has been given by the French 
Conseil d'Etat, deriving the need to protect human dignity from the 
constitutional provision requiring protection of "ordre public" (see Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 1998,70). 
Of the techniques of prenatal influence, cloning and germ-line gene 
therapy are often presented as contravening human dignity. For example, in 
March 1997 the European parliament passed a resolution declaring that 
cloning "offends against human dignity."" UNESCO clearly support this 
view as Article 11 of its 1997 Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights, states that, 
Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning 
of human beings shall not be permitted. 
Also, Article 24 names germ-line inventions as an example of a technique 
that "could be contrary to human dignity" (my emphasis). 
l9 Also, Article 1 states that, 
Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human 
beings . . . with regard to the application of biology and medicine. 
20 Article l(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, as translated in Vitzhum and Klimmerer 
1999,308. 
" See the Peep-Show Decision, B v d E ,  247 (1981), as discussed in Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 1998,70. 
22 For this Resolution and the earlier Resolution of 28 October 1993 see Bulletin of 
Medical Ethics 1997. 
Prenatal Influence of Traits: Legitimate Goal? 157 
In this context, the Fourth Revision of the Portuguese Constitution of 
1997 introduced two provisions seeking to protect human dignity.23 First, 
Article 26.3 states that, 
The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and genetic identity of the 
human being, particularly in the creation, development and use of technology 
and in scientific experimentation. (My emphasis.) 
Second, Article 67.3(e) states that the State has a duty to protect the family, 
in particular by "regulating assisted procreation, in such terms as safeguard 
human dignity." Given the widespread belief that germ-line gene therapy and 
cloning violate human dignity, these provisions are likely to affect the 
legality of these techniques. Moreover, since Article 26.3 specifically states 
that human dignity is to be protected "in scientific experimentation" this 
might have knock on effects with regard to embryo research. As far as I am 
aware, the Portuguese constitutional court has yet to interpret these 
provisions. Nonetheless, it is likely that jurisprudence from other continental 
constitutional courts, such as those of France and Germany, could be 
influential. 
The flexibility of human dignity as a label also allows it to be used by 
those who argue for the greatest possible reproductive freedom. For 
example, Robertson argues that procreative liberty is of central importance 
to individual meaning, dignity, and identity" (Robertson 1994, 16, my 
emphasis). 
For our purposes, however, the mere assertion that cloning, germ-line 
gene therapy, and repressed reproductive autonomy, threaten to contravene 
human dignity is not enough. In fact, without more it is frankly question- 
begging. The next section will explore a concept that is often said to violate 
human dignity and rest at the bottom of slippery slope arguments, i.e., 
genetic enhancement. 
6.4 Prenatal Enhancement 
6.4.1 Is Prenatal Enhancement Morally Pernicious? 
We have seen that a distinction is often drawn between acceptable and 
unacceptable prenatal intervention. The purportedly acceptable is often 
labelled treatment, curing, or therapy, whereas the supposedly unacceptable 
23 I am relying on an English translation of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 
(Constitutional Law no. 1/97 of 20 September 1997), http://www.parlamento.pt/leis/ 
constituicao-ingledcrp-uk.htm. I am grateful to J d o  Carlos Loureiro for drawing my 
attention to these provisions in personal communication. 
158 Influencing Traits Before Birth 
is dismissed as non-therapeutic, enhancement, or eugenics. Sometimes this 
contrast is described as negative versus positive eugenics, disease versus 
nondisease, or serious versus non-serious disease. Sometimes these 
distinctions are claimed to be identical, sometimes they are claimed to be 
distinct, but they are all distinctions between the purportedly acceptable and 
unacceptable. Where a slippery slope argument is invoked the bottom of the 
slope is often claimed to represent this category of the impermissible, i.e., 
genetic or eugenic enhancement. 
It has, for example, been argued that only therapeutic uses of genetic 
and reproductive technologies fall within the boundaries of legitimate 
medical practice or health care need (see, e.g., Anderson 1989; Baird 1994). 
Various national and international bodies also appeal to this type of 
reasoning. For example, the Canada Tri-Council Policy Statement declares, 
The aim of genetic research should be to advance knowledge or to alleviate 
disease, not to "improve" or "enhance" a population by cosmetic 
manipulation. (Medical Research Council of Canada et al. 1998) 
We are asked to defer to a commonly held. intuition that prenatal genetic 
influence can only be legitimately used for a limited category of traits. It is 
commonly assumed that preventing a child being born with a severely 
disabling disease/condition (such as cystic fibrosis or Lesch-Nyhan 
syndrome) is morally permissible, or even morally required, whereas it is 
morally impermissible to attempt to avoid or ensure the birth of a child with 
a desired eye colour, sex, or artistic talent. Between these two intuitively 
appealing extremes rest the more controversial instances, such as attempts to 
influence the occurrence of Down's syndrome, achondroplasia (dwarfism), 
or homosexuality. There are a number of points to make about 
distinguishing between supposedly permissible treatment from supposedly 
impermissible enhancement in this way.14 
First, this category of impermissible enhancement appears to be equally 
applicable to postnatal social manipulation by education (see I-Iarris 1998% 
171-174). Against the equation of social and genetic engineering Kass 
argues that the techniques of 
so-called social engineering with man as their object, used by one generation 
to mold the next. . . are feeble and inefficient when compared to those 
[developing genetic and reproductive technologies] on the horizon. . . . The 
traditional influences operate by speech or by symbolic deeds. They pay 
24 The line that I defended in 6.2.2 is capable of being interpreted as supporting aspects 
of this claim. However, if interpreted in this way the terms "treatment" and 
"enhancement" are not appropriate labels for distinguisiung between the permissible 
and impermissible. 
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tribute to man as the animal who lives by speech and who understands the 
meanings of actions. Also, their effects are in general, reversible, or at least 
subject to attempts at reversal. Each person has greater or lesser power to 
accept or reject or abandon them. Biomedical engineering, on the other hand, 
circumvents the human context of speech and meaning, bypasses choice, and 
goes directly to work to mod@ human material itself, and the changes 
wrought may be irreversible. (1 998, 18-19) 
No empirical evidence is cited in support of the claim that social 
manipulation is more reversible and it appears to be an over generalisation. 
One only has to perceive the effects of societally and parentally instilled 
values and religions, which once internalised are just about impossible to 
dislodge without severe psychological harm and instability. Also, the 
realisation of technologies such as germ-line gene therapy is so distant that 
somatic gene therapy might then offer a degree of reversibility. Moreover, no 
manipulation performed on a child before it has the ability to voluntarily 
consent pays "tribute to man . . . who understands the meanings of actions" 
any more than prenatal genetic manipulation does. 
Another argument attempting to refute the claim that prenatal genetic 
enhancement is impermissible is presented by Hams, who states that, 
It seems to me to come to this: either such traits as hair colour, eye colour, 
l gender, and the like are important or they are not. If they are not important 
why not let people choose? And if they are important, can it be right to leave 
t such important matters to chance? (1998b, 29) 'h, 
Harris' is suggesting that it does not matter whether a trait such as hair 
colour is important-if such traits are important, they should not be left to 
chance and if they are not important, they do not deserve protection. 
However, it does matter whether or not a trait is important. A trait might be 
important because it indicates the degree of moral status possessed and the 
greater moral status possessed the more protection that being is entitled to. 
What is distinctive about the examples given by Harris is that they are 
unimportant with regard to the possession of moral status. However, despite 
being unimportant in this sense, such traits might be important in 
determining our moral obligations when the likely social consequences of 
permitting their manipulation are taken into account. It might be the case, for 
example, that some traits are more important to the values held by parents or 
society, so that allowing influence of those traits will be more likely to 
I encourage rights-violating fashions. 
There is a third reason to question or limit the intuition distinguishing 
prenatal genetic manipulation of disabling diseaseslconditions from 
manipulation of nondisabling or nondisease conditions. The idea that 
I classifying a trait or condition as a disability or disease is value neutral is i 
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misguided. When such classification determines the regulatory or attitudinal 
response to a trait or condition, it is inescapably moral (as opposed to non- 
moral). The distinction between a disease and non-disease requires a 
standard of normality, deviation from which is to be labelled disease. This 
standard can track any number of models, including the typical function of 
the majority of people, the desires of parents, and the ideal function of a 
person in a specific environment. However, the distinction between the 
permissible and impermissible cannot legitimately rest on these particular 
examples. What is important, under the PGC, is not the relationship between 
a specific variant of a trait and, say, the variant of this trait held by the 
general population. What is important is the effect that this trait has, or is 
likely to have, on the agency behaviour and generic capacities of the 
prospective child possessing the trait and other persons potentially effected 
by that child having that trait. 
In sum, any defensible dstinction between permissible treatment and 
impermissible enhancement, will usually apply to both prenatal and 
postnatal manipulation, cannot rest on purportedly value-neutral definitions 
of disease, and must not be blind to relevant variables in multivariable 
conflicts. 
6.4.2 Prenatal TreatmentlEnhancement and the Child's Right to an 
Open Future 
The oft-cited distinction between treatment and enhancement masks other 
claims. What is often really in issue is the potential conflict between the 
claims and desires of prospective parents, and the claims and potential 
desires of their prospective children. In another context, Feinberg (1980) 
discusses a further potential conflict between the parent's "right" to control 
their child's upbringing (the right to "bend the twig"), and the child's right to 
retain the capacity to pursue certain future purposes, what he calls the 
child's "right to an open future." According to Feinberg, children have a 
right to an open future, encompassing numerous "rights-in-trust" or 
"anticipatory autonomy rights" that seek to protect the interests that the 
child might come to have later in life. According to Feinberg these rights can 
be violated now if the ability of the child to exercise them, when it becomes 
an adult, is removed or hindered now. 
Unfortunately, Feinberg does not explicitly ground his right to an open 
future. It is possible to read hls argument as presenting the right as (i) a 
possible right that is capable of being possessed by children, (ii) a right 
derived from the assumption that the adult that the child will (or is intended 
to) become has autonomy rights, or (iii) a merely asserted, ungrounded 
claim. The PGC does, however, ground such a right. Under the PGC, the 
subject of prenatal influence is granted moral protection because of the 
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possible agent that it is, and because of the more probable agent that it will 
become (i.e., it will usually become, or be intended to become, an ostensible 
agent in the b r e ) .  These rights/protections seek to protect and develop, 
inter alia, the necessary conditions of their pursuing future purposes with 
general chances of success (additive rights).25 Thus, the only future purposes 
that can be legitimately closed off are those that would impose undue 
burdens on any potential duty holder, or involve the violation of the 
rights/protections of others.26 Moreover, since the PGC protects future rights 
over and above additive rights, it also follows that the PGC recognises a 
prima facie right to an open future that is wider than Feinberg's and is not 
dependent upon birth as a trigger. Since this right will impose obligations on 
others, including prospective parents, it follows that prospective parents 
primarily have obligations towards, rather than rights over, their children. 
Indeed, prospective parents have rights to restrict the range of future choices 
open to their children only insofar as necessary to protect those generic 
features of their own or others that are hierarchically more important. 
Therefore, the ambit of the right to an open future presents itself as a 
relevant factor in delineating permissible from impermissible prenatal 
influence as explored in 6.4.1. 
In some cases, where the PGC derived claims of prenatal subjects are 
unclear, there will be a range of decisions that may be left to constrained 
parental discretion. Nonetheless, parents are under a prima facie obligation 
to maximise the range of future purposes open to their child. That is not to 
say that prospective parents are under a duty to conceive and rear those 
prospective children with the greatest potential for future purpose fulfilment, 
rather they must seek to maximise the potential for future purpose fulfilment 
possessed by their existing offspring, including prenatal offspring. 
This means that prenatal influence of traits is not inherently problematic 
where the aim is to increase the potential for future purposivity of an 
existing subject, at least where this aim is likely to be achieved without 
creating a disproportionate risk of inadvertently putting the subject in a 
worse position than it would otherwise be in. This applies to techniques of 
prenatal influence ranging from prenatal administration of vitamins to 
prenatal gene therapy. 
In contrast, using prenatal influence to reduce the potential for purpose 
fulfilment is morally problematic. Thus, all things being equal, it is 
impermissible to attempt to modifl an embryo so that the child born will be 
25 For an explanation and defence of these claims, see Chapters One and Two, especially 
2.7. 
26 An ostensible agent can also close off a future purpose by choosing to waive the 
benefit of its right to pursue it. Obviously this does not apply to a prenatal subject 
who, even on the assumption that it is a locked-in agent, cannot display a choice to 
waive the benefit of a right. 
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congenitally deaf (perhaps, to render it more amenable to the deaf culture of 
its deaf parents), or have achondroplasia (perhaps, to enable it to fit into the 
spatially restricted living conditions of parents with such congenital 
dwarfism). Both traits are associated with limitations on the range of f h r e  
purposes open to the child. The deaf have less communicative and 
interactional potential than those with full hearing. Achondroplasia carries 
purpose-restricting effects, such as a below average life expectancy. 
Therefore, inflicting these conditions on a child who could have been born 
without them would harm the generic features of that child. 
It might be countered that Deafhess and A~hondroplasia~~ are to be 
viewed as cultural identities, rather than as di~abilities.~~ There are, however, 
at least two problems with such a counter argument. First, it is prima facie 
inconsistent with the right to an open h r e  to bring a child up within a 
culture that will limit the child's options to move outside that culture at some 
future point.2g Second, if those with full hearing (or without achondroplasia) 
are held to lack the potential to be integrated into the relevant culture, on 
the basis that a qualificatory requirement of this culture is deafness 
/achondroplasia, then this culture is excluding people because they do not 
possess a trait or property that is irrelevant. to the possession of intrinsic 
moral status. In other words, such cultural values involve treating those 
excluded agents as if they had less value, and exclusionary values of this 
sort are prima facie illegitimate. Deafhess or any other trait-based culture 
must not become the new racism. That is not to say, however, that defensible 
reasons for choosing a deaf or achondroplasic child over those without such 
conditions can never be offered. As always, it is a matter of avoiding 
violating the generic rights of agents. There are, for example, limits on the 
ability of any prospective parent to raise a child without instilling or 
perpetuating some form of prejudice. Such limits are often created by the 
existence of cultural and practical contingencies, which are relevant to (inter 
alia) the generic rights of the parents. 
The "right to an open future" is, therefore, a convenient label for a 
prima facie presumption derived from the PGC. This is a presumption in 
favour of permitting prenatal influence of those traits associated with future 
purposivity; at least where the technique used does not involve the 
destruction of rejected prenatal subjects and does not carry disproportionate 
risks for the subject. This presumption needs to be carefully specified. The 
h r e  purposivity in question is to be defined in terms of potentially 
27 Following Davis 1997b, I have used upper case for the first letter to emphasis the use 
of the term to denote cultural identity. 
On Deahess is a culture, see Ivers 1995. See also Davis 1997b, 567-575. 
29 A similar argument is made in relation to Deahess in Davis 1997b, 575. 
Unfortunately, Davis grounds the right to an open future in the contingent values of 
genetic counsellors, rather than a defended moral theory. 
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displayed generic features, rather than the contingent values of a specific 
society. In a world where sight is relevant to one's speclJic task 
competence-i.e., one's ability to pursue certain purposes without 
unintentionally putting oneself or others at risk of harm-and having green 
eyes is not, having green eyes will not be relevant to one's future 
purpo~ivity.~ This is because the purpose-restriction caused by the 
illegitimate prejudices of others (against those having green eyes) cannot be 
condoned. It follows that, in this example, the presumption would be in 
favour of prenatal influence realistically aimed at giving a prenatal entity 
sight, but against prenatal influence aimed at ensuring that the prospective 
child will have blue eyes. 
Moreover, this presumption-the right to an open future-does not 
apply to techniques of prenatal influence such as PGD and PND, as these 
involve the rejection or destruction of possible agents. Thus, more 
complexities are raised by a parental desire to use prenatal testing to ensure 
that the child that is implanted or carried to term has a trait or condition that 
is irrelevant to its moral status but will restrict its h r e  purposes. If they 
choose to implant or continue gestating a child with a gene or genes 
associated with congenital deafhess, achondroplasia, or blue eyes, rather 
than one without this gene or genes, the chosen child is not thereby harmed. 
However, others are potentially harmed by such a choice. I have already 
addressed the possibility that widespread trait selection for traits that are 
irrelevant to moral status could encourage or display prejudice towards 
others with the rejected traits or their families (in 6.2.2). Moreover, the 
subjects of prenatal testing that are rejected, by either non-implantation or 
abortion, are harmed. They are judged not worthy of implantation or 
gestation on the basis of traits they possess that are irrelevant to their moral 
worth. Nonetheless, the birth of a child with such a trait might impose 
considerable burdens on those 
(a) whose contingent desires and expectations are frustrated by that trait; 
(b) who live in a society that provides little support to those who would 
rather give such a child up for adoption than rear it themselves; and 
(c) whose society offers insufficient postnatal support. 
Thus, to take one example, parental attempts to avoid the birth of a child 
with PKU, whose symptoms are avoidable with a special diet, have less 
weight in countries providing financial support for parents of such children 
(such as the UK), than in countries that do not (such as the US)." 
M The concept of specific task competence, and the related concept of societal 
competence, were fmt explained and examined in Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998. 
3L The British Medical Association (BMA) states that "in the UK financial assistance is 
available for those requiring a special diet to avoid phenylketonuria" (1998, 1 15). 
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6.5 Resource Allocation 
Since it is highly unlikely that universal access to the techniques of prenatal 
influence will ever be feasible, the techniques raise access and resource 
allocation issues. There are a number of sub-issues here. First, there is the 
negative (non-interference) versus positive (assistance) rights issue. 
Although the PGC grants both negative and positive rights, the positive 
rights are much more limited (i.e., the comparable cost and own unaided 
effort provisos: 2.7). In practice, the demands on public-funded medical 
services mean that the techniques of prenatal influence will rarely be given 
priority for research allocation. There are exceptions to &is. For example, in 
the UK nearly all prenatal screening and diagnosis is undertaken within the 
National Health Service (see ACGT 2000, 18). Under the PGC, resource 
allocation should track generic needs and, so, many limitations on public 
funding will be defensible. Second, even for those who can afford to pay for 
access to the techniques there still remains an issue of whether access should 
be subject to further access criteria. Access to assisted reproduction is, for 
example, routinely subject to questionable eligibility criteria in many EU 
countries (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b,. 2 16-223). 
The resource allocation issues are particularly pertinent where the 
resource could alter the nature of society, as is the case here. The genetic 
and reproductive technologies that form the focus of prenatal influence are 
usually very expensive and not realistically available within most developing 
countries. It has been argued that the biggest killers are not usually the direct 
result of genetic disease: cancer and heart disease in developed countries, 
and infections in developing countries (see Greenwell 1997, 224). While thls 
claim has a point-the techniques of prenatal influence are often not a 
medical priority-it must be kept in mind that all of these conditions have a 
degree of contributory genetic imput. For example, some cancers and 
infections have been associated with specific contributory genes and might 
be reduced by prenatal manipulation by, for example, successful gene 
therapy. 
There is also an argument for restricting access to the techniques of 
prenatal Influence suggested by resource limitations. Often presented as an 
empirical slippery slope argument, it can be argued that since access to the 
techniques will only realistically be available to the rich and successful and 
the techniques offer the potential to increase the prospects of one's offspring, 
unrestricted access is likely to mirror, increase, and perpetuate societal 
inequalities. Some go much further and argue that the ultimate consequence 
is likely to be a division of what is now human society into sub-species due 
to genetic mdfication of one group so that they become unable and 
unwilling to reproduce with the genetically disadvantaged (see, e.g., Silver 
1998, 1-13; 281-286). 
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The plausibility of this claim raises wider issues. The potential for the 
financially and socially advantaged to use their position to increase the 
opportunities and abilities of their offspring is not something that is 
restricted to the techniques of prenatal influence. Wealthy parents can, for 
example, afford to pay for their children to have additional or privately 
funded education and medical care. Directly preventing parents from using 
their legitimately acquired economic resources for what are prima facie 
morally permissible purposes is not easy to reconcile with the PGC. The 
existence of social inequality per se does not violate the generic rights of 
others. Social inequality is only an immoral outcome where it is the result of 
immoral behaviour or institutions, i.e., those creating or maintaining 
violations of generic rights. Thus, if the disposable expenditure of the 
wealthy is limited to the extent permissible after appropriate satisfaction of 
the hierarchically more important claims of others, then the potential of any 
remaining inequality of resources to provide advantages for some children is 
not, generally, morally relevant. There are exceptions to this generalisation, 
as the hierarchically more important claims of others, including the 
prospective child, do mean that well off parents cannot do as they wish. For 
example, all things being equal, any traits that put biological barriers in the 
way of future reproductive options cannot be permitted, especially if this 
were likely to result in the separation of humans into sub-species. Given the 
history of conflicts between different populations of humans, any species 
differentiation between humans is very likely to lead to prejudice, unjustified 
discrimination, social segregation, and possibly war. Also, as argued above 
(6.2.2), the techniques of prenatal influence must not be used to perpetuate 
prejudice against traits that are irrelevant to the possession of intrinsic moral 
status. 
6.6 Conclusion 
One theme running throughout this and the last few chapters is that, 
irrespective of the specific goal, we must distinguish between prenatal 
influence by 
(i) manipulating subjects to ensure desired traits (using, e.g., prenatal gene 
therapy); and 
(ii) selecting subjects with desired traits (using, e.g., PGD). 
Action (i) is capable of harming the prenatal subject now or in the future 
(including its right to an open future). Any prenatal manipulation that puts 
the subject in a worse position vis-a-vis its possession of the generic features 
than it would have been in had it not been manipulated, has harmed it. Thus, 
the only remaining issue is whether this harm is justified. 
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In contrast, action (ii) cannot harm the chosen subject, because it cannot 
be assumed that the subject has been denied a better alternative existence 
(see 5.2.1). Where, however, action (ii) is contingently characterised by an 
attitude or intention that will be harmful to the selected subject in the h r e  
(i.e., an intention to act inconsistently with its rights as an agent-in-in- 
fbture), then the action can still be immoral. But, since selection per se 
cannot harm the selected subject, no matter how bad its traits or prospects, 
the selection as such cannot violate the subject's rights. This might seem an 
unduly fine distinction, but the point is that no generic harm is inflicted 
unless the alleged victim could have been in a state of less or non-harm vis- 
a-vis its possession of the generic features at the time of the alleged harm. 
This chapter has explored many more specific arguments. 
Slippery slope arguments are ofien invoked to decry the developing 
genetic and reproductive technologies, usually without adequate defence of 
the conditions that they must satisfl if such arguments are to be sound. I 
have suggested that these arguments must be better specified and defended 
than they usually are. For example, those presenting predictive claims 
require supportive empirical evidence. Also, it seems to be too commonly 
assumed that there is no need to prove that the allegedly unacceptable 
outcome--usually called genetic enhancement-is indeed morally 
unacceptable. This might well be the case but it should not be assumed, 
especially given the doubts about this conclusion raised in 6.4.1. 
I have held up one empirical slippery slope argument as having a great 
deal of force (see 6.2.2). It was argued that since influencing certain traits is 
(on empirical grounds) likely to lead to harm to those with the rejected traits, 
those without the chosen traits, or the families of such persons, it is prima 
facie impermissible to 
(a) select a prenatal entity for traits that are irrelevant to the possession of 
moral status; and 
(b) manipulate a prenatal entity for traits that are irrelevant to the 
possession of moral status and non-harmful to the subject (i.e., irrelevant 
to its h r e  purposivity). 
Thus, all things being equal, this argument justifies starting from the 
presumption that prenatal influence of such traits is to be restrictively 
regulated to limit encouragement and exercise of illegitimate prejudices. 
Furthermore, this presumption might be strengthened as a presumption 
against sex selection for social reasons by arguments presented in 6.2.3, on 
that basis that such actions are likely to engender and encourage illegitimate 
sexual stereotypes. 
I have also argued that, like the rhetorical slippery slope argument, the 
rhetorical human dignity argument is to be rejected as having no place in a 
rational debate. Determining whether the concept of human dignity 
consistent with the PGC has been contravened is, however, no simple task. It 
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involves all the complexities inherent in trying to apply the PGC to multi- 
variable conflicts. These complexities that have led me to rely on prima 
facie presumptions, rather than absolute conclusions on controversial 
applications of the PGC. 
The next chapter, as the final chapter, will draw together the 
presumptions defended in this book, and return to examine the regulatory 
mechanisms adopted in the UK and other EU countries, Canada, and the US. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The media periodically evokes the image of a brave new world of designer 
babies. In the broadsheets, recent headlines include: "'Designer Babies' raise 
the spectre of genetic manipulation;" "Deaf parents could choose to have 
deaf children"; and "Gay groups split over 'engineered babies'."' This book 
has taken an unavoidably theoretical approach to the issues behind these 
headlines. It has explored the implications of a specific moral theory for the 
techniques and goal of prenatal influence. That there are no morally neutral 
opt-outs hardly needs mentioning; the decision not to regulate is clearly as 
much a decision in need of justification as the decision to regulate. 
The techniques of prenatal influence have raised complex issues 
concerned with the selection and design of children, the desires and 
expectations of parents, and the rights of other potentially affected M y  or
society members. Most of the conclusions reached on these issues have taken 
the form of tentative and provisional presumptions, rather than definitive 
conclusions. In Chapters Two and Four in particular, I emphasised the 
complexity inherent in applying the PGC to multi-variable conflicts, and the 
need to rely on its indirect application through competent and good fhith 
attempts to apply the PGC by those legitimately appointed to do so. 
Procedural solutions are not, however, the 111 story, as there remains a 
range of legitimate discretion outside of which no competent official could in 
good faith attempt to step. 
The application of the PGC must take account of all relevant fitdors, 
including the nature of the social, scientific, and political reality. A first best 
scenario, an ideal world where supremely rational agents universally seek to 
uphold the PGC without problems of scarcity, will never be a realistic 
yardstick. A second best situation, a world governed by human ostensible 
agents predominantly attemptmg to apply the PGC constrained by a degree 
of scarcity, also appears to go fiu beyond reality. A third best scenario, a 
world where human ostensible agents often apply PGC-values in ignorance 
or denial of the PGC as the supreme principle of morality and M with 
scarcity of many resources, is much closer to the Western world. In the 
main, the Western world probably MS within or just below a third best 
scenario. At least that is what I have assumed when evaluatrng the 
I Ledward 2000, Connor 2000, and Laurence 2000, respectively. All of these headlines 
are from The Independent, which is not known for bemg melcdramatic. 
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regulatory responses of the 17 countries studied. This seems to be a 
plausible assumption given the almost universal incredulity at the idea that 
there could be a supreme principle of morality, the coincidental fact that 
many of the values of the dominant Judaeo-Christian moral framework are 
similar to those of the PGC, and the evident limits on available natural and 
economic resources. 
7.1 Summary of Pn'ma Facie Presumptions 
We are faced with the reality that many prospective parents are not happy to 
raise just any child. Many attach great importance to a child's traits or 
genetic origins. The techniques of prenatal influence, however, are more than 
just means of satisfymg parental desires and expectations. These techniques 
also affect the interests of the subject (i.e., the gamete, embryo, or fetus) and 
persons who are neither subjects nor prospective parents. Faced with the 
complexities introduced by these potentially conflicting moral interests, this 
book has sought to defend a number of prima facie presumptions. 
In Chapters Four and Five, presumptions were defended 
(a) in favour of early abortion where the pregnant woman does not at that 
time want to carry and give birth to any child and attempted to avoid 
getting pregnant (4.3); 
(b) against permitting any form of prenatal screening or testing (includmg 
PND or PGD) for incurable late onset disorders such as Huntington's 
disease (4.3.1);' 
(c) against using PGD to select an embryo for implantation that displays 
less evidence of agency than the other (non-implanted) embryos in the 
sample (4.4);3 
(d) in favour of using PGD over PND to achieve the same end (4.4); 
(e) in hvour of early in vitm embryo research4 where it is necessary to 
protect the basic generic features of ostensible agents (4.5.1); 
(f) against a blanket 14 days limitation on in vitm embryo research (4.5.2); 
(g) against (non-therapeutic) research on the fetus, unless the fetus will (for 
other reasons) be disregarded (4.5.1); 
(h) in favour of permitting cloning where it presents the only means for an 
involuntarily childless agent to have a child, a carrier of a mitochondrial 
disease to have a child without the disease, or a person to avoid other 
undesired traits, and the denial of such an opportunity will cause generic 
harm to an ostensible agent (5.3.1); and 
This presumption is even stronger where the parents do not wish to know whether 
they themselves have the Huntington's mutation (4.3.1). ' The morality of disregarding unimplanted embryos is also explored in 4.4. 
Embryo research was distinguished from eqminental treatment in 4.5. 
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(i) against prenatal gene therapy until it becomes more predictable and less 
risky for the subject, unless the aim is to remove traits associated with 
non-viability or extremely low moral status (5.6.1 and 5.6.2).' 
Many of these presumptions are conservative and of limited scope. We are 
not, after all, starting with a blank sheet nor is moral theory an-g like 
mixing instant gravy granules. The presumptions do, however, provide some 
basis for questioning the current regulatory positions. 
Despite their limited ambit, in some countries some of these 
presumptions would be very difficult to implement as regulatory policies. 
One only has to witness the slowness of legislative action to see the 
controversy that genetic and reproductive techniques can elicit. Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal have, for example, had a series of unsuccessful 
proposed laws, and France is unlikely to revise its 1994 bioethics legislation 
(which was due to be revised in 1999) before 2002. The public or political 
will for change or a different type of compromise is often absent. For 
example, in none of the 17 countries studied is there much political or public 
support for formally permitting the creation of a cloned child or explicitly 
granting a regulatory body permission to do so in the future. Democratic 
institutions are constrained by the views of political representatives and the 
tide of public opinion. Public opinion is, however, subject to change and is 
capable of being changed. Nonetheless, we have seen that, at present, the 
regulatory approaches adopted in the EU countries, Canada, and the US 
display d i f f e ~ g  levels of compliance with these pre~umptions.~ 
Presumption (a) is clearly rejected by the Irish law, which appears to 
grant too much protection to the embryo-fetus. The other countries examined 
(in 4.3.2 and Appendix 1) appear to be generally compatible with this 
presumption. However, the position in many of these countries (notably the 
UK) requires more justificatory support than is provided by this simple 
presumption (see 4.3.2). 
Presumption (b) is rarely explicitly upheld, as incurable late onset 
disorders are often not separated fiom other traits by formal regulatory 
responses. There are, however, many informal or non-statutory guidelines 
that do treat late onset disorders differently, and so the de facto position in 
some countries might uphold this presumption. 
Building on this presumption (in 4.3.2), I argued that the legislative 
position on abortion following PND in countries such as Britain was prima 
facie too permissive. It was argued that granting less protection to one 
category of embryo-fetus-such as the "seriously handicapped"-is only 
appropriate where that category is defined relative to the possession of 
5 Other presumptions defended in Chapters Four and Five are outlined below, ha* 
been given a more precise formulation in later chapters. 
The following discussion draws on 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 5.4, and 5.8,  IS well 
Appendices 1 to 5. 
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(lower) moral status or where there is a conflict between those in this 
category and the hierarchically more important needs of the pregnant 
woman. In contrast to countries such as Britain and Finland, it was argued 
that the Italian abortion legislation is consistent with this presumption. (See 
Appendix 1 for the other countries.) 
Presumption (c) requires little enforcement, as it is hard to imagine a 
situation where a prospective parent would choose to implant an embryo 
without the potential for ostensible agency over one with such potential. 
Nonetheless, this presumption appears to be implicitly supported by those 
countries that either prohibit PGD or limit its use to the avoidance of 
chromosomal and genetic abnormalities. Some of these regulatory responses 
are, of course, questionable for other reasons, including those underpinning 
the other presumptions defended in this book. 
Presumption (d) is supported by those countries that have less restrictive 
regulation of PGD than of abortion following PND (see Appendix l and 2).7 
Thus, the regulatory position in countries such as Austria and Germany is 
inconsistent with this presumption. 
Presumption (e) is only upheld by those countries permitting in vitro 
embryo research, namely, Belgium, Canada,. Denmark, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. It is not upheld 
by the legislation of Austria or Germany, and arguably the French legislation 
(even though it permits embryo research) effectively rejects the approach of 
this presumption. 
Presumption (f) is not upheld by any country permitting emb~yo 
research and, of course, it is not upheld by countries prohibiting embryo 
research. Socio-political factors might make the widespread policy of 
restricting embryo research to the first 14 days after fertilisation political 
unalterable. In the long term, however, regulatory policies should aim to 
attach the permissibility of embryo research to the goal of the research, the 
likelihood of the research attaining that goal, and the availability of 
alternatives. It is not clear that a blanket 14 day cut off point is justifiable in 
the face of these considerations. 
Presumption (g) appears to be upheld by all the countries examined. 
However, this question has not been given sufficient focus to determine 
whether this is in fact so. 
Presumption (h) is theoretically rejected by all the countries whose 
legislation prohibits cloning (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Sweden, and the UK), and is likely to be rejected by many more in the near 
' It would appear that if the proposed federal legislation is enacted in Canada, the use 
of PGD for sex-selection would be more stringently regulated that the use of PND for 
the same end (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
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future.8 However, the legislation of countries such as Sweden was drafted in 
such a way that it has to be interpreted fairly loosely if it is to encompass the 
creation of a human child using the Dolly technique. 
Presumption (i) does not appear to have been adopted in its entirety by 
any country. The majority of countries with legislation addressing germ-line 
gene therapy appear to unconditionally prohibit it. Some countries clearly 
come closer to adopting this presumption than others. For example, the 
Spanish and Finnish legislation at least permit some germ-line gene therapy 
in some circumstances where it might benefit the subject, albeit within 
restrictive limits. Thus, the Spanish and Finnish legislation appear capable 
of being interpreted or applied in accordance with this presumption. 
Chapter Six addressed the goal of prenatal influence itself. One 
particular empirical slippery slope argument was defended (see 6.3.2). This 
argument claims that allowing prenatal influence of certain traits is likely to 
encourage or facilitate illegitimate prejudice towards individuals, and 
relatives of individuals, with those traits. Taking account of specified 
factors, I relied on this prediction to defend a presumption against allowing 
prenatal influence of traits that are irrelevant to possession of moral status 
and, in the case of prenatal modification, non-harmful to the subject. Since 
none of the countries studied directly address the goal of prenatal influence, 
this presumption is not currently supported. In theory, there are at least two 
ways to support it. One is to introduce this limitation into regulation 
addressing the individual techniques. So, for example, a (rebuttable) 
presumption could restrict PND and PGD to those traits that are relevant to 
the possession of moral status. However, this carries a high risk of leaving 
regulatory lacunae. Another way to apply this presumption is to introduce it 
in the form of a more general regulatory response. 
Any such regulatory response must be rebuttable in specifiable 
circumstances. Throughout this book I have argued for an underlying 
presumption in favour of allowing the exercise of parental influence of traits 
where it seeks to avert basic generic harm to prospective  parent^.^ Where, 
for example, there is a high probability that any offspring produced by a 
couple will have a relentlessly p h i  life, severe psychological harm to the 
prospective parents is a very likely consequence. Thus, prenatal attempts to 
avoid the conception or birth of child with, say, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, 
Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa (EB),1° or spina bifida, might be sufficient 
It is also rejected by other formal regulatory means in many other countries, see 
Appendix 4. 
Especially where the trait in question limits the prenatal entity's moral status (such as 
anencephaly), see, e.g., 4.3.1. 
'O EB is a disease whereby any contact with the skin of a sufferer is likely to cause large 
blusters that will burst leaving raw open skin and scars, usually causing death within 
the first six months of life (see Glover 1998,56). 
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to rebut or escape the presumption outlined in the previous paragraph. The 
strongest cases are those where the prospective parents have already suffered 
the consequences of nursing a child with these conditions (or have the 
condition themselves), so that the birth of another such child is likely to 
result in self-blame, vicarious suffering, and irreparable psychological 
damage. In the end, it is a matter of weighmg the likelihood that a given 
action or inaction will violate the generic rights of agents. As emphasised 
throughout, this is not a failsafe mathematical process, but appropriate 
regulatory bodies must give priority to avoiding the infliction of basic 
generic harm on ostensible agents. 
In Chapter Six I also argued for a second presumption, conveniently 
summed up as the "right to an open future." This is a presumption in fhvour 
of permitting prenatal influence of those traits associated with future 
purposivity, where the technique used does not involve the destruction of 
rejected prenatal subjects and does not carry disproportionate risks for the 
subject." Prenatal influence in such circumstances would be aimed at 
fblfilling our duties towards the prenatal subject now and in the future, or at 
least advancing their interests. As such, this presumption is not restricted to 
future additive rights. 
7.2 Genetic and Reproductive Tourism 
Given the limited ambit of the presumptions defended in this book, those 
legitimately appointed to introduce regulatory mechanisms have a degree of 
morally acceptable regulatory discretion. However, in the modem world 
regulatory inconsistencies between countries can lead to genetic and 
reproductive tourism. This has three dimensions. 
First, those denied access to the developing genetic and reproductive 
technologies might simply go to a country where access will be permitted, 
either because there is greater availability or less restrictive regulation. 
Diane Blood, for example, was able to receive treatment in Belgium 
following the UK regulatory authority's refusal to allow her to undergo 
artificial insemination using her dead husband's sperm.I2 
" This presumption underpins arguments made elsewhere in this book. It underpins the 
claim that therapeutic embryo-fetal manipulation (as opposed to non-therapeutic 
embryo research) will be justifiable in certain circumstances (see 4.5). It also 
underpins the proviso of presumption (viii) above (defended in 5.6.1/2), i.e., the right 
to an open future might justify prenatal gene therapy if it were more predictable and 
less risky for the subject. 
" There was an added twist in the Diane Blood case, as her claim that the UK 
regulatory authority's refusal to authorise the export of her husband's sperm infringed 
(what were) Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty-granting EC citizens the right to 
receive m d i r ~ l  tre~tinent in nnnthm M e m k  Stnt-was ~mnheld hv the TJK Cni~rt of 
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Second, those prevented from offering existing procedures could seek 
out a country whose regulatory structure is more permissive. For example, a 
UK doctor is- reported to have set up a sex selection service, using PGD, in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, having been denied permission to do so in the UK. 
His intention was to carry out treatment initially in Naples, Italy where 
regulations are less strict (see Fletcher 1997). 
Third, if scientists and researchers are prevented from developing the 
technology in one country they could move to a country with less stringent 
regulations. Following the passing of a bill prohibiting cloning by the US 
House of Representatives, Advanced Cell declared that it would probably 
move to the UK to conduct research using embryonic stem cells (see 
Whitworth 200 1). 
These three dimensions can put economic pressure on countries to adopt 
a less stringent regulatory approach. There are, however, a number of 
responses and limitations to these concerns. 
First, mechanisms for reducing the likelihood of these outcomes are 
available. Popular mechanisms for avoiding or limiting genetic and 
reproductive tourism include international agreements and conventions, and 
other forms of internationally agreed minimal standards. With regard to the 
idea that multinational companies will relocate to less stringently regulated 
countries, the disincentive affect of public opinion and commercial pressures 
should not be ignored. With technologies that elicit widespread public 
disapproval, such as cloning and germ-line gene therapy, relocation is likely 
to cany commercial risks. Therefore, effective publicity and campaigning 
can, in some situations, prevent some forms of genetic and reproductive 
tourism. Witness, for example, the effects of public opinion on the 
advertising and policies of international companies such as Nike and Shell.I3 
Second, such tourism is only a realistic consequence of major regulatory 
decisions affecting the feasibility of access to, or research on, the techniques. 
Many, less important, regulatory decisions are not likely to result in travel to 
other countries. 
Third, for some regulatory decisions, such as whether to require minimal 
clinical standards for assisted reproduction clinics, the ability of persons to 
travel to other countries for access create pressure to increase the degree of 
regulatory stringency. 
Appeal: R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [l 9991 
Fam 151. The Court of Appeal went on to lay down circumstances where such 
infringement would be justifiable under the EC Treaty. Although the court's 
interpretation of European law has been heavily criticised (see, e.g., Morgan and Lee 
1997), it remains possible that future denials of access to genetic and reproductive 
technology will lead to actions being brought under European law. 
l3 E.g., in l99711998 public pressure caused Shell Oil to reverse its decision on the 
disposal of Brent Spar, an old oil platform. Shell was forced to dismantle the platform 
on land, rather than dump it was sea. 
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Fourth, there are sometimes alternative ways of addressing the negative 
consequences of such tourism. For example, new or existing economic 
institutions might be able to influence developments-although this has 
limited potential (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 2001). 
Fifth, there are moral reasons why reproductive and genetic tourism 
should be accepted as an unavoidable consequence of state sovereignty. If 
state sovereignty is defensible,14 the existence of inter-state regulatory 
differences is an unavoidable consequence that should not, in itself, lead to 
revision of one's own regulatory response. In other words, little moral 
weight should be attached to the fact that some states have more permissive 
regulation, where all the relevant regulatory dlflerences could plausibly be 
defended under the PGC. Economic and national pressure to be a leader in 
the developing genetic and reproductive technologies, should not dictate 
regulatory policy. 
Despite these limitations, where divergent regulatory responses towards 
the techniques of prenatal Influence are likely to create an economic or 
prestige advantage for the permissive countries, this will make a slide 
towards permissivity just about inevitable. At least, for those techniques not 
attracting widespread condemnation, such as-embryo research (see Beyleveld 
and Pattinson 2001). This tendency can be witnessed with regard to the 
regulation of research involving embryonic stem cells. Many countries, 
including France, are now considering passing legislation formally 
permitting such research. 
All this demonstrates the need for both international and national 
regulatory oversight. l5 
7.3 Additional Considerations 
The stringency of regulatory response is only one factor relevant to 
regulatory oversight of prenatal influence. Other factors, listed at the 
beginning of Chapter Four, include the form of regulatory response and its 
trigger. Formal legislation is not the only regulatory response available and, 
if legislation is to be effective, it must be supported by less formal 
mechanisms, such as cultural norms and professional support. 
14 This is a pretty major "if," as (unless carefully specified) state sovereignty has the 
potential to undermine the universalist nature of the PGC. Nonetheless, even if state 
sovereignty is not, all t h q s  considered, consistent with the PGC, it must be 
recognised that it is likely to remain in practice. 
l5 On the creation of an international regulatory agency to deal with human cloning, see 
Greene 2001, especially 357-360. Many of the considerations raised by Greene are 
also relevant to other techniques of prenatal influence. 
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Although legislative responses are neither necessary nor sufficient, 
authoritative regulatory action or oversight is required. Authoritative 
application (or at least consideration) of the regulatory presumptions 
defended above is not compatible with unconstrained scientific and market 
fieedom. In countries where the relevant technology is likely to be developed 
and applied to meet demand, non-regulation is not an option. Although 
regulatory oversight needs to attract public support to be effective, it must 
be the product of adequate consideration of all morally relevant interests and 
var~ables by those legitimately empowered to do so. In those countries where 
the government has failed to act-such as the US where there has been little 
federal regulatory interventiont6 and only piecemeal state responses to the 
techniques of prenatal influence-the techniques have been left to private 
arrangements regulated only by voluntary agreements and self-regulatory 
initiatives. Both have well documented weakness. Deferment to private law 
mechanisms, such as the law of contract, is hindered by inequality of 
bargaining positions, &lure to represent all morally relevant needs and 
interests, and the contingencies of enforcement. Similarly, self-regulation by 
researchers and clinicians cannot provide authoritative consideration of all 
morally relevant needs and interests. Effectiveness should not be confused 
with legitimacy; it is merely one condition of adequacy. 
Authoritative blanket rules are also not the answer. Since the application 
of some of the provisional conclusions of this book depends on contingencies 
that are capable of changmg faster than legislative responses, in many cases 
regulatory oversight is better left to legitimately appointed regulatory 
committees and bodies. All h n g s  being equal, if violations of the PGC are 
to be limited and avoided, many regulatory decisions must be made on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than subjected to blanket policies. In general, 
blanket prohibition or non-regulation of techniques such as cloning or 
prenatal gene therapy will not do. Nor is it acceptable to treat all attempts to 
achieve prenatal influence as equivalent. Thus, the presumption for 
regulatory oversight must be in favour of legitimately appointed regulatory 
bodies and sub-bodies, rather than formal blanket approaches. I, therefore, 
consider the UK's recent legislative ban on cloning (see 5.4) to be ill- 
conceived and driven by short-term political e w e n c y .  If the HFEA is not 
16 Of the techniques of prenatal influence, cloning and gene therapy have attracted the 
greatest federal regulatory response. Both the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and National Institutes of Health 0 claim some jurisdictional competence. 
However, the FDA's jurisdictional competence is limited to ensuring the safety and 
efficacy of biologies and medical devices, and the NIH only has jurisdiction over NTH- 
funded proposals and proposals talung placed within NIH-funded institutions. See 
Appendices 4 and 5. 
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competent to make case-by-case decisions of this sort, then this is an 
argument for reforming the Authority. l7 
The membership and appointment procedures of committees, such as the 
HFEA, need to be transparent and balance the need for competence with the 
need for accountability. As stated earlier, whatever else a good faith attempt 
to apply the PGC requires, it requires officials to display a high degree of 
competence. The most effective way of ensuring the competence of 
committee members is to have stringent qualificatory criteria. In this regard, 
the UK legislation, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, is far 
from ideal. 
Under UK legislation, the members of the regulatory Authority are 
appointed by the Secretary of State18 for no more than three years at a time. l9 
The Secretary must take into account the desirability of ensuring that the 
Authority's decisions "are informed by the views of both men and women.'-O 
Further, "at least one-third but fewer than half of the other members of the 
Authority," must fall into one of three specified categories of people who 
have had first-hand experience of using or keeping gametes or embryos 
outside the body.21 However, persons from these three categories cannot be 
appointed as chairperson or deputy ~hairperson.'~ Thus, a government 
Minister, who is, in theory,23 accountable to the electorate, decides the 
membership of the Authority without being required to ensure their 
competence in moral theory. The result is a regulatory body whose members 
might comprise persons who do not have competence in moral theory and 
have no direct democratic support for their role in makmg ethical decisions. 
This is far from satisfhctory. 
Additionally, if all PGC-relevant issues are to be addressed, regulatory 
oversight should not only be triggered by the use of specific techniques, but 
also by attempts to achieve the goal of prenatal influence by other means. A 
related point, following fiom the arguments of this book, is that the 
regulation of the genetic and reproductive techniques, and the purposes for 
which they can be used, cannot take place in a regulatory vacuum. In many 
cases the illegitimate purposes and values being displayed by some potential 
uses and users of these techniques are better addressed at their source, which 
often has little to do with the techniques or goal of prenatal influence. Just as 
racism manifested in the employment context is often more effectively 
17 Granting greater regulatory functions to the HFEA would also address other problems 
left maddressed by the legislative ban on cloning, see 5.4. 
l8 5(2)(b) and Sch. 1 ,  para. 4(1), Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
l9 Sch. l ,  p. 5(2). 
20 Sch. l ,  para. 4(2). 
21 Sch. l ,  para. 4(4). These persons are specified in para. 4(3). 
22 Sch. 1, para. 4(3). 
23 Whether the current parliamentary system is a legitimate attempt at representative 
democracy is beyond the scope of our present concerns. 
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addressed by means other than, or in addition to, employment legislation, 
PGC-violating behaviour is often better addressed at a social level by 
mechanisms such as education. 
In conclusion, the techniques and goal of prenatal influence present yet 
another battleground for conflict between the rights and protections granted 
to different possible agents. Many of the issues raised by these techniques 
are not exclusively confined to these techniques. As I have emphasised 
throughout, resolving multi-variable conflicts should be the prime concern 
and many of the ethical and regulatory problems can be raised in the absence 
of the possibilities presented by the developing genetic and reproductive 
technologies. Although this book does not provide a comprehensive 
regulatory policy, it has tried to provide some ethical guidance. One clear 
piece of guidance is that neither law nor moral theory can provide neat 
substantive solutions to all the moral questions raised by attempts to 
influence traits before birth. 
Appendix 1 
The Legality of Prenatal Diagnosis 
(PND) and Abortion1 
Countty Legislation Legality ofAbortion 
Austria Ss. 96,97 k 98 Permitted 
of the Penal code2 (a) within 12 weeks after conception; 
(b) to avert a serious danger to the mother's life or 
(physical or mental) health; 
(c) where there is a "serious danger" that the child 
will be afflicted with a "serious" (mental or 
physical) defe~t;~ or 
(d) if the mother was underage at the time of 
conception (S. 97). 
Belgium Law of 3 April Permitted 
1990 (amending (a) before 12 weeks, after counselling, where a 
the Penal doctor is convinced of the pregnant woman's 
distress and determination; and 
(b) up to bnth, if the pregnancy would "gravely 
endanger" the health of the pregnant woman, or 
if, were the child born, it would have a serious 
and incurable disease. (Penal Code, S. 350.) 
No time limit is provided for abortions after 12 weeks 
performed on the grounds specified in (b) above. 
However, during the parliamentary discussion the 
majority stressed that abortion is the ending of 
pregnancy where the fetus is non-viable. If the fetus is 
An early version of this table originally appeared in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. It 
has been moddid, expanded, and corrected. 
An English translation of these sections of the Penal Code can be found at 
http://cyber.law.Harvard.edu/population/abortionlAustria.abo.htm. 
Mandry 1998, 34 translates this as where "'the child will probably be severely 
handicapped." 
For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1990. 
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viable, its destruction was regarded as infanti~ide.~ At 
present, there is no jurisprudence on late term 
abortions where the fetus is viable. 
For all abortions, the physician is required to inform 
the woman of the risks of the termination, draw her 
attention to the possibilities for taking care of the 
child if it were born, and be convinced of her 
determination to terminate (S. 350(2)). 
Canada Charter of Rights A majority of the Supreme Court struck down 
62 Freedoms S. 251 of the Federal Criminal Code, which 
vested control of abortion in hospital abortion 
committees, holding that it violated the security 
and liberty of the pregnant woman as protected by 
Art. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
~reedom.~ 
The Supreme Court has so far managed to avoid 
determining whether the fetus is given protection 
underArt. 7.' 
Proposed There have been a number of failed bills: including 
legislation exists: Bill C47  which (in S. 4(1Xi) prohibited the use of 
Assisted Human any diagnostic procedure for the purpose of 
ReproductionAct ascertaining the sex of a zygote, embryo, or fetus, 
except for reasons related to its health. 
In May 2001, the federal government released a 
Proposal for Legislation Governing Assisted Human 
.Information provided by Hennan Nys. 
R v Morgentaler [l9881 1 SCR 30. Health law is not of federal jurisdiction. 
In Borowski v Canada (Attorney-Geneml) [l9891 1 SCR 342, holding that the 
plaintiff lacked standing, and in Tremblay v Daigle [l9891 2 SCR 530, holding that 
the Charter was intended to limit government action and did not apply to disputes 
between private individuals. 
Bill C-47 "Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act" 1996 and a private 
members bill, Bill C-247 "An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Genetic 
Manipulation)" 1997. These took different approaches to the issue of federal 
jurisdiction by involung different constitutional mechanisms. Bill C-47 uses the 
Peace, Order, and Good Government "POG" provision, which is almost a 
miscellaneous jurisdictional category, whereas the private members bill uses the 
federal government's criminal jurisdiction. It has been argued that the "criminal law 
is probably the most secure" from constitutional challenge (Caulfield et al. 1997,4). 
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~ e ~ r o d u c t i o n . ~  This proposal has been distributed in 
draft for discussion with the intention that the final 
version will be presented in 2002. 
Although the proposed legislation does prohibit some 
forms of sex-selection for social reasons, it is only 
concerned with acts designed to ensure or in- the 
probability that an embryo will be a w c u l a r  sex 
(S. 3(1Xh)). 
An embryo is def~ned as "a human organism during 
the first 56 days of its development following 
fertilisation or creation, excludmg any time in which 
its development has been suspended" (S. 2). 
Thus, the proposed legislation does not appear to 
address diagnosis of an embryo or fetus over 56 days 
after its fertilisation or creation. 
Denmark Law No. 350 of Permitted 
13 June 1973" (a) on demand (and for f ie )  within the first 12 
weeks; 
(b) after 12 weeks, where there are serious social 
reasons, the case was rape or incest, or where 
the child is in danger of hereditary problems or 
sickness during the embryonic stage; and 
Research on PND: (c) up to birth, if necessary to avert a risk to the 
Law No. 499 of woman's life or a serious deterioration of her 
12 June 19%" (mental or physical) health (Chapter 1).12 
Clinical use: PND is permitted for women over 35 years and 
Regulated by women with a risk of hereditary diseases." 
administrative 
guidelines14 
See Health Canada 2001a. For discussion of this proposed legislation, see Health 
Canada 2001b and Caulfield 2001. 
'O An English translation can be found at http://cyber.law.~ard.eddpopulati~n~ 
abortionlDenmark.abo.htm. 
l'  Information provided by Nina Schultz-mtzen and ibid. 
lZ See MacKellar 1997,s; Nielsen 1997,132; and Moulin 19%, 27. 
l 3  See RendtorfT 1998, especially 83. 
l4 Information provided by Nina Schulk-Lorenken. 
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Finland Law No. 239 Permitted 
of 24 March 1970, (a) up to 16 weeks (S. 5). 
as amended1' to avoid notable strain on the pregnant woman 
in relation to her living conditions and those of 
her family and other circumstances (S. l(2)); 
if the pregnancy was caused by rape or other 
specified crime (S. l(3)); 
if there is a reason to assume that the child 
would be "mentally retarded," or would have 
or develop a "severe disease or physical 
defect" (ss. l(5) & 6(3)); or 
if the parents are severely limited in their 
ability to care for the child (S. l(6)); 
(b) between 16 and 20 weeks, subject to the 
permission of the National Board of Health 
(S. 5); and 
(c) up to birth, where the woman's life or health is 
endangered (S. l(1) & 5). 
France Law 75-17 of 
17 January 1975 
Law 79-1204 of 
31 Dec. 197917 
Law 93-121 of 
27 Jan. 1993 
Law 94-654 of 
29 July 199418 
Permitted 
(a) before the 12th week16 where the pregnancy 
places the pregnant woman in a situation of 
distress; and 
up to birth, if two physicians conclude that the 
pregnancy endangers the life of the woman, or 
there is a high probability that the child will 
suffer h m  a serious incurable disorder 
recognised as such at the time of diagnosis 
(Art. L. 162-1 & 162-12, Public Health Code). 
PND procedureeefmed to include medical 
(Formingpart of practices the aims of which are to diagnose very 
the Public Health serious disease of the embryo or fetus in utem-must 
Code,Art. L. 162- be preceded by medical "genetic" counselling, 
Amended by Law No. 18 of 1971, No. 564 of 1978, No. 572 of 1985, and No. l085 of 
1995. Act translated by Urho Kekkonen (Minister for Social Affairs and Health, 
Finland). See also http:///cyber.law.Harvard.edu/popdatiodabortion/Finland.abo.htm. 
l6 Until recently it was the 10th week: see CCNE 2000 and BBC 2001. 
An English translation of 75-17 and 79-1204 can be found at http:/l/cyber.law. 
Harvard.edu/popdatiodabortion/France.abo.htm. Additional information p&vided by 
Pierre Langeron. 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1994. 
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1 to 22)19 fulfilling certain stated aims (Art. L. 162-16). 
With regard to PND, the National Consultative Ethics 
Committee (CCNE) has recommended that the word 
"genetic" be replaced with the word "specialised," 
since doctors in addition to geneticists may be 
called upon to conduct the session.20 
Germany S.218 of the Termination of pregnancy by a physician is not illegal 
Penal code2' (a) up to the first 12 weeks, where the woman has 
had counselling not later than 3 days before 
the termination (S. 218a(l)); or 
(b) up to birth, where it is necessary to prevent a 
threat to the woman's life or a threat of 
"serious injury to her physical or mental 
health," which could not reasonably be averted 
by any other means (S. 218a(2)). In practice, 
the risk of mental injury to the woman is 
interpreted to encompass abortion following 
PND, the emphasis being placed on the 
pregnant woman rather than the fetus.22 
The pregnant woman is not punishable under S. 218 if 
an abortion is performed by a physician under 22 
weeks, where the woman has received counselling 
prior to the abortion (S. 218a(4)). Also, under this 
provision the court can refrain from convicting a 
pregnant woman who was experiencing a "state of 
particular distress" at the time of the abortion. 
S l9 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. There are also other decrees addressing PND 
and other laws also mention abortion, e.g., Law of December 31 1982 allows the i repayment of abortion expenses by the French national health service. 
20 See CCNE 1998. 
21 For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1992. 
22 Under the previous law, abortion was permitted for medical indications including 
hereditary disease. This provision was removed because it was thought to have 
"eugenic" implications. (Information obtained from Eser 2001, para. 37, 1761-1762; 
I and Sabine Michalowski.) 
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Greece Law 160911 986 Permitted where 
on ~ b o r t i o n ~ ~  (a) the embryo is less than 12 weeks old; 
Ministerial (b) there are indications, based on PND, that the 
decision A3BIoik child will suffer fiom a serious abnormality 
2799125.2.87 and the pregnancy has not passed the 24th 
week of gestation; 
Law 103611980~~ (c) the life of the pregnant woman is endangered 
or there is a danger of serious damage to her 
physical or mental health; or 
(d) the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.2s 
The abortion must be performed with the consent of 
the woman by an obstetrician with the parhipation of 
an anaesthesiologist in an organised medical unit. If 
the woman is underage, the consent of one of the 
parents or her guardian is required.26 
PND must take place in a state, university, or armed 
forces hospital.27 . 
Ireland Offences Against S. 58 of the offences Against the Person Act renders it 
the PersonAct an offence for a pregnant woman to 'Mawfdly" 
1861, ss. 58 62 attempt to "procure her own miscarriage" and for 
59, and the anyone else to attempt to do so. S. 59 renders it an 
Eighth offence to supply or procure anythmg known to be 
Amendment to intended for such a puxpose. 
the Constitution 
(Art. 40.3.3) The Eighth Amendment states, 
"The State acknowledges the right to life of the 
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life 
of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate that right." 
The Supreme Court has in-ted this provision as 
23 See Dalla-Vorgia 1988,4; and European Commission 1995. 
24 Decision No. 2 of the 23* plenary meeting of the Central Council of Health in 1985 
defines the personnel of the Units that can conduct PND. See Dalla-Vorgia 1988,3. 
25 See European Commission 1995; and MacKellar 1997, 15. An English translation of 
the legislation is also available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/papuiation/abortion/ 
Greece.ab0.hb.n. 
Information provided by Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia. 
27 See Dalla-Vorgia 1988,4. 
L 
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prohibiting abortion, unless "there is a real and 
substantial threat to the life, as distinct from the 
health, of the mother."28 This was held to include the 
risk of suicide, so that, on the facts, a 14-year-old girl 
was permitted to travel to England for an abortion. 
An amendment to The proposed amendment prohibits abortion, defmed 
the constitution is as "the intentional destruction by any means of an 
under unborn human life after implantation in the womb of a 
considerationz9 woman" (S. l(1) of the Bill). However, it does not 
include the ending of a human life, by a medical 
practitioner using a procedure that she believes to be 
''necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of 
loss of the woman's life other than by self- 
destruction" (S. l(2)). Thus, it is stricter than the 
present law, because it will prohibit termination 
arising fiom the threat of suicide. 
The proposed amendment permits women to travel 
abroad for abortion services that are legally available 
in other jurisdictions, even where they are not legally 
available in Ireland (S. 4). 
This proposed amendment will be put to the people in 
a referendum.jO 
Italy Law No. 194 of Abortion on demand is available within the first 12 
22 May 1 97831 weeks and six days of pregnancy, after which abortion 
can only be requested where 
(a) the continuation of the pregnancy or delivery 
could pose a serious threat to the woman's life; 
(b) the fetus has malformations so serious that the 
woman's psychological or physical well-being 
is endangered, or if her well-being is 
endangered by other pathological processes; or 
" Attorney Geneml v X [l 9921 1 R l ,  53-54, per Finlay CJ. 
29 Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in m c y )  
Bill 2001. See the Irish Department of Health Website: http://www.doh.ie/pdfdocs/ 
proporot.pdf. 
30 Explanatory memorandum (http:lhvww.doh.ie/pdfdocs/proporot.pdf). 
3' Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. An English translation can be found at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/a~on/Italy .abo.htm. 
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(c) the pregnancy is the result of rape3' 
Luxembourg Law of 1978 Permitted 
(a) before 12 weeks, if the pregnancy would 
threaten the woman's physical and mental 
health, is the result of rape, or if there is a 
substantial risk that the child, if it were born, 
would be very sick or be physically or mentally 
seriously handicapped; and 
(b) after 12 weeks, only if two medical doctors 
ascertain that birth of the child presents a 
serious risk to the health of the pregnant 
woman or the child to be born.% 
Netherlands Law of l May Permitted up to fetal viability, if the woman is in a 
1981M state of distress and has a genuine desire to terminate 
(ss. 5 & 20). In practice, this means that abortion is 
available on demand up to 24 weeks gestation. 
Except in cases of imminent danger to the woman's 
life or health, the pregnancy cannot be terminated 
earlier than the sixth day after consulting the 
physician (ss. 3 & 16(2)). 
The abortion must be performed by a physician in a 
licensed hospital or clinic (S. 2). 
Where the fetus is viable, abortion is not generally 
permitted. Art. 82a of the Penal Code states that "take 
someone's life" includes "takjng the life of a foetus 
that in reason can be expected to have the ability to 
keep alive outside its mother's body." The general 
defences to homicide apply. The legal position on 
termination for fetal abnormality is, therefore, 
restqctive but uncertain. Nonetheless, in practice, late 
32 See ibid.; MacKellar 1997, 18, and Clerici et al. 1997,45. 
33 See MacKellar 1997, 19. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997,50; and van Thiel 1996, 103. An English 
translation can be found at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/aM~ether. 
abo.htm. 
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termination for severe fetal abnormalities is sometimes 
performed, albeit very infrequently.35 
Portugal Chapter I1 of the Permitted 
Penal (a) within 12 weeks, if it is necessary to remove 
the danger of death or serious and irreversible 
damage to the women's physical or mental 
health; 
(b) up to 16 weeks, if the pregnancy is the result 
of crime against "sexual freedom and self- 
determination;" 
(c) up to 24 weeks, if there are strong medical 
reasons indicating that the unborn child has a 
serious incurable disease or congenital defect; 
(d) up to birth if the fetus is unviable; and 
(e) up to birth, if it is "the only means of 
removing [the] risk of death or serious and 
irreversible damage" to the pregnant woman's 
body or physical or mental health (Art. 142, 
no. 1 of the Penal Code). 
Also, 
(a) the physician who approves the abortion 
cannot perform it (Art. 142, no .2); and 
(b) with a few specified exceptions, the written 
consent of the woman is required three days 
prior to the intervention (Art. 142, no. 3, a)). 
~onsti tution~~ Sex selection is not expressly prohibited. However, 
some constitutional protection is granted to embryos 
and fetuses under Art. 24 (the right to life),38 and Art. 
26, no. 3 states, 
"The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and 
genetic identity of the human being, particularly in the 
creation, development and the use of technology and 
in scientific experimentation." 
35 All information derived from Braake 2000, especially 391 and 388, where the issue of 
abortion for fetal abnormality under the Dutch law is fully discussed. 
36 For an English translation see http://www.lexmedicinae.orglpor/direitol.html. I am 
grateful to Andre Pereira and J o b  Loureiro for their guidance on these provisions. 
37 I am relying on an English translation of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 
http://www.parlamento.p~eidconstituicaoingledcuk.htm. See Pereira 2001,497. 
38 See Pereira 2001,495. 
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More specfically, Art. 13 prohibits any form of 
disaimhation against anyone by reason of their sex. 
Also, the general abortion provisions apply. Thus, 
abortion for the purpose of choosing the sex of the 
baby (except to avoid a serious X-linked condition) is 
unlawful. 
Order 541 1197~' Prenatal diagnosis is defined as "a  set of procedures 
that are carried out to determine whether an embryo 
or foetus has or does not have a congenital 
abnormality" (Art. 1). There must be a "large 
probability" that a serious genetic disease will be 
detected, and the test should only be performed after 
genetic counselling (Art. 3). What counts as a serious 
genetic disease is not specified.40 
Spain Art. 417bis of Permitted 
Law 9 of 5 July (a) during the first 12 weeks, if the pregnancy is 
1985 (part of the the result of a previously declared rape; 
Penal (b) during the first 22 weeks, if two specialists 
who are not p e r f i  the abortion diagnose 
a serious physical or mental/han&cap; and 
(c) up to birth, to avoid a serious threat to the life 
or (physical or mental) health of the woman, if 
stated in a report submitted by a medical 
specialist who cannot be the physician 
performing or supervising the abortion." 
If an abortion is performed where these conditions are 
not satisfied, the woman will not be prosecuted, but 
the person conductmg the abortion may be (Art. 145 
of the Penal code)." 
Sweden Abortion Act of Permitted 
1974, as amended (a) up to 18 weeks (unless, due to the woman's 
by the Law No. 66 illness, abortion would seriously endanger her 
39 DR , II,6-8-1997, see Pereira 2001,496-497. " See Pereira 2001,496. 
41 See G a W n  and Ramos 1997,68. 
" See G a W n  and Ramos 1997,68. 
" See Gabarr6n and Ramos 1997,68. 
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of 18 May 1995" life or health) (S. 1 ); 
(b) after 18 weeks?5 if permission is granted by 
the National Board of Health and Welfare 
where there are special reasons for the 
abortion (S. 3). Permission will not be granted 
"if there is a reason to suppose that the embryo 
is viable" (S. 4). 
There is no time limit if there is a serious danger to 
the woman's life or health. This is subject to the 
permission of the National Board of Health and 
Welfare where it can be obtained without danger to 
the woman (S. 6). This is not, however, a ground for 
abortion as such, because it might be possible to save 
the life of the fetus, and the fetus is normally viewed 
as a patient to be treated and saved." 
UK Abortion Act Permitted 
(excluding 1967 (S. 1(1)), as (a) up to 24 weeks, where the continuation of the 
Northern inserted by S. 37 pregnancy will involve risk, greater than if the 
Ireland)47 of the Human pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the 
Fertilisation and (physical or mental health of) woman or her 
Embryology Act family, and 
1 9904 (b) up to birth, to save the life of the woman, to 
avoid permanent injury to her physical or 
mental health, or to avoid the birth of a 
severely handicapped child. 
" Translated in Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1995, Appendix 1. For another 
English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1996. 
45 Note that, 
It is established practice with the National Board of Health and Welfare for no 
abortions to be allowed after the expiry of the 22nd week, the one exception to 
this rule being if the foetus being so badly damaged as not to be viable, or if 
[there is a danger to the pregnant woman's life or health]. (Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs 1995,4). 
46 Information provided by Elisabeth Rynning. 
47 The UK legislation does not extend to Northern Ireland: S. 48 HFEA 1990 and S. 7(3) 
Abortion Act 1967. In Northern Ireland it is illegal to carry out abortion other than to 
save the life of the mother or to prevent serious damage to her physical or mental 
health: R v Boume [l9391 1 KB 687. " The Abortion Act (as amended) provides statutory immunity with regard to the 
offences otherwise committed under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. 
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US Federal In Roe v wade4' the Supreme Court held that 
Constitution women have a constitutional right to abortion derived 
from the constitutional rights of liberty and privacy. It 
was held that the State could not restrict abortions 
during the first trimester. During the second trimester 
the State could, however, intervene to protect the 
health of the mother, and at the point of viability the 
State's interest in the fetus can justify restriction. 
Later Supreme Court decisions have upheld 
restrictions on public fundug for abort i~ns,~ and 
struck down, then re-atlimed the part of the Roe 
ruling that held that the state's interest in human life 
only exists at viability. " 
Individual state Abortion (even late abortion) for fetal abnormalities is 
laws legal in about half the states, although many doctors 
refuse to perform it." 
49 410US113(1973). 
See Petersen 1996,93-94. 
Webster v Reproductive Health Services 492 US 490 (1989); and Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L. ed. 2nd 674 (1992). 
" See Malinowski 1994, 14 81. 
Appendix 2 
The Legality of Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD)l 
Counby Legislation Legality of PGD (in addition to the rules governing 
embryo research) 
Austria Act No. 275 of 1 Implicitly forbidden, because under S. 9(1), gametes 
July 1992 and unimplanted embryos2 are only permitted to be 
medically examined and treated to the extent 
necessary to establish a pregnancy.3 
Belgium None4 Permitted by default. 
A licence is required to establish a centre for 
genetics. 
Canada None Permitted by default. 
A voluntary moratorium on sex selection for non- 
medical purposes has existed since July 1995.~ 
Proposed There have been a number of bills that failed or 
legislation exists: were dropped. 
Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act In May 2001, the federal government released a 
Proposal for Legislation Governing Assisted Human 
~e~roduction.' This proposal has been distributed in 
A version of this table originally appeared in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. 
The legislation does not define "embryo" (see EGE 1998, para. 1.17). 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
There is, however, a Higher Council on Human Genetics established under the Crown 
Order of 7 November 1973. Information provided by Paul Schotsmans. 
Information provided by Paul Schotsnans. 
See Government of Canada 1996, 7. However, the government's request for a 
voluntary moratorium has proven to be ineffective (see Caulfield et al. 1997,8). 
See Health Canada 200 1 a. See also Health Canada 200 1 b and Caulfield 200 1. 
194 Influencing Traits Before Birth 
draft for discussion with the intention that the final 
version will be presented in 2002. 
This proposed legislation prohibits a person Erom 
knowmgly acting to ensure or increase the 
probability that an embryo will be of a particular 
sex, except for reasons related to the health of the 
resulting human king (S. 3(1Xh)). 
An embryo is defined as "a human organism during 
the first 56 days of its development following 
fertilisation or creation, excluding any time in which 
its development has been suspended (S. 2). 
Thus, the proposed legislation clearly covers the use 
of "sperm-sorting techniques'& and sex-selection of 
an embryo below 56 days old. 
Denmark Law No. 460 of Permitted. . 
1 9979 
Under S. 7(1) "The genetic examination of a 
fertilized oocyte may only be carried out in cases 
where there is a known and considerable risk that 
the child will be affected by a serious hereditary 
disease." 
Also, under 7(2) "A genetic examination may in 
addition be carried out in connection with artificial 
fertilization outside the woman's body on the 
grounds of infertility, where such an examination 
may establish or rule out the presence of an 
important chromosome abnormality." 
Spenn or fertilised eggs can only be selected for sex 
before implantation to avoid "a serious sex-linked 
hered~tary disease" (S. 8). 
No new therapeutic and diagnostic methods can be 
introduced in connection with artificial fertilisation 
before they have been approved fiom ethical and 
See also Health Canada 2001b, 6. 
For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1997. 
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technical health standpoints by the Minister of 
Health (S. 21(1)). 
Finland None. Permitted by default." 
P r o p 0 ~  A working group report, given to the Ministry of 
legislation Justice in 1997, recommended that assisted 
exists" reproduction should not be allowed for the purpose 
of choosing a child's sex or characteristics, except to 
avoid serious hereditary sex-related disease.I2 
France Law 94-654 of 29 
July 1994, Art. 14 
(Public Health 
Code, Art. L. 162- 
1 7)13 
Decree 97-578 of 
28 May 1997 
(Art. R. 162-17 to 
3 1 in the C&)'* 
Diagnosis canied out on cells taken fiom an in vim 
embryo is permitted, exceptionally, where 
(a) it is undertaken in a centre licensed by the 
National Committee for Medicine and Biology 
of Reproduction and Antenatal Diagnosis; 
(b) the couple in question provides written consent 
and has a high probability of producing a child 
with a particularly serious and incurable genetic 
disease; and 
(c) the abnormality leading to such disease has 
been precisely identified in one of the parents. 
(Public Health Code, Art. L. 162-1 7.)16 
Decree 98-216 of The practitioner authorised to perform the diagnosis 
24 March 1998 must explain to the couple the medical and technical 
(Art. R. 162-32 to constraints affecting the diagnosis. The practitioner 
43 in the code)" must also inform the couple of the different stages of 
genetic diagnosis and the degree of reliability of the 
analyses. (Art. R 162-33) 
Germany Embryo It is an offence to fertilise a human egg for any 
Protection Act purpose other than to start a pregnancy in the woman 
1990" who produced the egg (S. l(lX2)). Also, it is an 
offence to produce or remove an embryo for a 
Information provided by Salla L6tjdnen. 
See Schenker 1997,178. 
Information provided by Annamari Hynninen. 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1994. 
Information provided by Pierre Langeron. 
For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1998. 
These provisions were implemented by " k e t s  d'application" some years after the 
majority of the legislation came into force. Information provided by Pierre Lugeron. 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990. 
Greece 
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purpose not serving its preservation (S. 2(2)), and an 
embryo is defined to include any totipotent cell 
removed fiom an embryo that is assumed to be able 
to divide and develop into an individual (S. 8(1)). 
Thus, PGD is implicitly prohibited. 
It is an offence to fertilise a human egg with a sperm 
that has been selected for the sex chromosome 
contained in it, unless this has been done to avoid 
Duchenne-muscular dystrophy or a similarly severe 
sex-linked genetic illness. The illness threatenq 
the child must be recognised as being of appropriate 
severity in the applicable state (Lhder) law (S. 3). 
In February 2000, the Medical Assembly issued 
guidelines on PGD proposing that it should be 
allowed, but restricted to cases where there is a 
known predisposition for severe genetic disease." 
Permitted by default." 
A National Bioethics Committee has been 
established to investigate the issues raised by the 
application of biological sciences and to investigate 
their moral, legal, and social dimensions and 
consequences.2' 
Ireland Eighth Any diagnosis of the pre-implantation embryo is 
Amendment to implicitly prohibited, as the Eighth Amendment 
the Constitution states, 
(Art. 40.3.3). "The State acknowledges the right to life of the 
unborn an4 with due regard to the equal right to life 
No specific of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
legislation as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate that right." 
An amendment to The proposed amendment prohibits abortion, defined 
the constitution is as "the intentional destruction by any means of an 
See Sentker 2000. 
Information provided by Tina Garanis-Papadatos and Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia. 
20 Information provided by Tina Garanis-Papadatos and Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia. 
21 Information provided by Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia 
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under unborn human life after implantation in the womb of 
considerationz2 a woman" with a specified exception (s.1 of the 
Bill). Thus, the embryo will not receive legal 
protection until implantation. 
This will be put to the people in a ~eferendum.~ 
None Permitted by default. 
The Ethical Code of Practice 1998 restricts genetic 
tests to diseases and requires certain Information to 
be offered to the parents.24 It is an open question 
whether this code is legally binding.25 
Luxembourg No Information No information. 
Netherlands None Permitted by default.26 
Proposed In late 2000, the Dutch government proposed 
legislation exists legislation prohibiting sex deknnh~ation.~~ 
Portugal None Permitted by default.29 
Some provisions Art. 67.2(e) places a duty on the State to protect the 
of the constitution family by "regulating assisted procreation, in such 
might be terms as safeguard human dignity." 
relevadB 
Art. 26.3 states that, 
Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) 
Bill 2001. See the Irish Department of Health Website: http:l/www.doh.ie.~pdfdws/ 
proporot.pdf. 
Explanatory memorandum (http:lhvww.doh.ie/pdfdOcs/proporot. pdf). 
Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
A recent judicial sentence (Tribunale di Roma, 14 February 2000) recognised the 
right of a wuple to have access to a surrogate mother, notwithstanding a contrary 
provision of the Ethical Code of Practice. (Information provided by Roberto 
Mordacci.) 
See Schenker 1997,178. 
See the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport website: http:/lwww.minvws.nl. 
For an E d s h  translation of Constitutional Law no. 1/97 of 20 September 1997 see 
http:llwww.parlamento.ptfleidw~~tituicao~ingledcrp~uk.htm. I a  grateful to J d o  
Loweiro for drawing my attention to these provisions. 
Information provided by Andrk Pereira. 
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"The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and 
genetic identity of the human being, particularly in 
the creation, development and use of technology and 
in scientific experimentation." 
Sex selection is not expressly prohibited. However, 
some constitutional protection is granted to embryos 
and fetuses under Art. 24 (the right to life),M and 
Art. 26, no. 3 states, 
"The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and 
genetic identity of the human being, part~cularly in 
the creation, development and the use of technology 
and in scientific experimentation." 
More specifically, Art. 13 prohibits any form of 
discrimination against anyone by reason of their sex. 
However, "there is no criminal protection for 
situations in which the sex is chosen for an in v i m  
embry~."~' 
Spain Law 35 of Assisted reproduction is expressly allowed for the 
November 1 9 8 8 ~ ~  prevention and treatment of illnesses of a genetic or 
hereditary origin (S. 12(1)). However, genetic 
selection for "non-pathological" characteristics is 
prohibited (S. 13). 
Sweden None PGD is not directly covered by 1991: 11 5 (which is 
restricted to experiments on, and storage of, 
embryos) or 1991 : 1 14 (which is restricted to certain 
types of medical screening).33 
A research project involving PGD would, like 
embryo research, fall under the 1991: 115. Act 1991: 
114 only applies to a "general health ~urvey.''~~ 
SeePereira2001,495. 
31 Pereira 2001,497. 
32 An English version of this Act appears in Oflcial Bulletin o f  the Smte, No. 282, 
Thursday 24 November 1988. 
33 For w s h  translations of these Acts, see Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1991 
Appendices 1 and 2. " Suggested by Elisabeth Rynning as a more precise translation of the Act's provisions 
than the phrase "medical screenhg" used in ibid. 
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Thus, only a general screening or research project 
using PGD would fall within the legislative rules. 
Parliament has declared (without adopting any 
legislation on the matter) that PGD should be 
permitted only for the diagnosis of serious, 
progressive, hereditary disease that leads to 
premature death and for which there is no cure or 
t~eatment.~' 
In 1999, the National Board on Health and Welfare 
published guidelines in the area of "gene ethics and 
gene technology in health care." These guidelines 
reiterate the Parliamentary statement and stress that 
PGD cannot be considered part of routine health 
care, and recommend that some kind of ethical 
review or ethics consultation should take place.36 
UK Human Permitted under licence h m  the Human 
Fertilisation 62 Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 
Embryology Act 
1990 Research licences can also be granted for any 
activity that is "necessary or desirable" for the 
purpose of "developing methods for detecting the 
presence of gene or chromosome abnormalities in 
embryos before implantation" (Sch. 2, para. 3(2)(e)). 
The licensing authority's Code of Pmctice declares 
that, "Centres should not select the sex of their 
embryos for social reasons."37 
US No federal Permitted subject to any relevant state legislation. 
legislation 
1 
l 
35 Information provided by Elisabeth Rynning. '' Idonnation provided by Elisabeth Ryrlrung. I 37 HFEA2001, p. 9.9. 
Appendix 3 
The Legality of In Vitro 
Embryo Research1 
Counw Legislation Legality of in vitro embtyo research 
Austria Act No. 275 of Embryo research is prohibited, though examination 
1 July 1992~ and treatment may be allowed if it is necessary to 
achieve a pregnancy (S. 10).~ 
There is a fine for ~iolation.~ 
Belgium None Embryo research is permitted by default5 
In practice, only two of the Free Universities 
undertake embryo research.6 
The Committee of Medical Ethics of the National 
Scientific Research Fund recommends that research 
should seek to enhance the chance of implantation 
in the uterus and not be performed &er 14 days. 
Proposed Two proposals for legislation are currently under 
legislation exists consideration by the Belgium senate. The draft laws 
propnse a ban on the creation of embryos for 
research. The use of surplus embryos for which 
there is no prospect of implantation will, however, 
be permitted, subject to conditions. One of which is 
' A version of this table appeared in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. In this book, the 
term "embryo research'' is defined to exclude experimental treatment that is for the 
direct benefit of the embryo (see 4.5, above). 
2 See KriariCatrauis 1997,58; and Gunning and Enghsh 1993,147 and 171. 
3 See Kriari-Catranis 1997,58; and Gunning and English 1993,148 and 171. 
See Bernat 1993, 50 1. 
See Gunning and English 1993,148 and 172. 
See Schenker 1997,18 1. For a wider discussion, see Gunning and E d s h  1993,148. 
202 Influencing Traits Before Birth 
that the embryos are less than 15 days old and are 
destmyed on completion of the research.' 
Canada None The Discussion Group on Embryo Research, 
reporting in 1995, recommended that research be 
permitted on embryos up to 14 days after 
fertilisation, and that a national body be created to 
licence such research.' It did, however, recommend 
the prohibition of creating embryos solely for 
research, thereby deparbg h m  the view of the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
~echnolo~ies.~ 
proposed There have been a number of bills that failed or 
legislationexists: were dropped. Under bill C-47 (which was 
Assisted Human dropped in 1997 as a result of the federal election) 
Reproduction Act embryo research was prohibited later than 14 days 
after conception. This is done by prohibiting the 
maintenance of an embryo outside the body 
(S. 4(1)(~)), and defining an embryo as "a human 
organism during the period of its development 
beginning on the fifteenth day and ending on the 
fifty-sixth day following fertilisation." 
In May 2001, the federal government released a 
Proposal for Legislation Governing Assisted 
Human ~e~roduction.'~ This proposal has been 
distributed in draft for discussion with the intention 
that the final version will be presented in 2002. 
If enacted contravention of its provision would be a 
criminal offence punishable by a heavy fine or 
imprisonment (ss. 34 & 35). 
The proposed legislation prohibits the creation of 
an "in v i m  embryo solely for the purposes of 
research" (S. 3(1)(d)). 
' See European Parliament 2001 b, 4. 
See Discussion Group on Embryo Research 1995,2, and 14. 
See Discussion Group on Embryo Research. 1995,6, 18-19. 
' O  See Health Canada 2001a. For discussion of this proposed legislation, see Health 
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A licence would be required to 'make use of any in 
v i m  embryo or part of one for the purpose of 
research or the prevention, diagnosis or treatment 
of a disease, injury or disability" (S. 8(2)). 
Regulations would be developed setting out the 
conditions for embryo research (ss. 12 & 40(1)(d)). 
It would, however, be a crimind offence to 
maintain an embryo outside of the body for longer 
than 14 days after creation (S. 3(l)(c)). Thus, 
embryo research on surplus embryos would be 
permitted, subject to conditions, up to 14 days after 
its creation. 
Denmark Law No. 460 Embryo research is permitted under certain 
of 199711 conditions. Under S. 25(1) experiments on fertilised 
eggs, and gametes intended for use in fertilisation, 
may only be canied out 
"1. for the purpose of improving in v i m  
fertilization or similar techniques intended to bnng 
about pregnancy, and 
2. in order to improve techniques for the genetic 
testing of a fertilized oocyte with a view to 
establishing the possible presence of a serious 
hereditary disease or an important chromosome 
abnormality @reimplantation diagnosis)." 
Fertilised eggs can only be kept in v i m  for up to 
14 days (excluding periods of cryo-preservation) 
(S. 26). 
Embryos that have been genetically modified or 
which might have been damaged by research 
activities may not be re-implanted (S. 27(1)). 
All research projects must be approved by an ethics 
committee (S. 27(2)) 
European The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Convention has been ratified without making any reservation to 
Article 18(2), which prohibits the creation of 
embryos for research. 
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Finland Medical Research Embryo research is permitted under licence up to 
Act No. 488 of 14 days after fertilisation (excluding periods of 
199912 cryo-preservation) (S. 11). Written consent has to be 
obtained from the gamete donors (S. 12). 
Creation of embryos for research is prohibited. 
Fertilised eggs that have been subject to research 
cannot be transferred to the womb, and they are not 
to be kept alive for more than 14 days after 
fertilisation. The maximum time limit for c~yo- 
preservation of embryos to be used for research is 
15 years after which the embryos are to be disposed 
of (S. 13). 
Violation of S. 11 or S. 13 is sanctioned by up to 
one year imprisonment or a fine (S. 25). wolation 
of S. 12 is sanctioned by a fine (S. 27). 
France Law 94653 of 29 
July 1994, Art. 9 
(which forms part 
of the Penal 
Code,Art. 511- 
1811 9) 
Law 94-654 of 29 
July 1994,Art. 8, 
Art. L. 152-8)13 
The creation of human embryos in v i m  for study, 
research, or experiments is prohibited (Art. L. 152- 
8, Public Health Code). 
Any experiment on an embryo is forbidden. 
"Exceptionally", the couple may permit studies to 
be carried out on the embryo, provided they give 
written consent, and the studies have a medical 
purpose, do not impair the embryo, and have the 
approval of the National Committee for Medicine 
and Biology of Reproduction and Antenatal 
~iagnosis '~  (Art. 152-8). 
DecreeNo. 97- Experimentation is only allowed where there is a 
613 of 27 May direct advantage for the embryo itself (especially to 
1997,Art. R. 152- help a successful implant), or it will contribute to 
8-1 to 12)lS the improvement of medically assisted reproduction 
techniques (Art. R. 152-8-1 to 12). Thus, only non- 
destructive experimentation is allowed. 
l2 For an Enghsh translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 2000. 
l3 For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1994. 
l4  CLC~mmi~~ion Natio ale de mkdicine et de biologie de la reproduction et du diagnostic 
prenatal," English translation derived h m  CCNE 1998,9. 
l5 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. See European Parliament 200 1 a, 16. 
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No embryo age limit is provided.16 
A human embryo may not be conceived or used for 
commercial or industrial purposes (Art. 152-7). 
Any violation of the law is severely sanctioned (7 
years imprisonment and FF 700 000 penalty)." 
Research on in utem embryos is permitted with the 
approval of the National Committee for Medicine 
and Biology of Reproduction and Antenatal 
Diagnosis.'8 
The National Consultative Ethics Commission 
(CCNE) recommended, 
(a) the word "research" replace the 'word 
"experiments" in the text of the Art. 152-8; 
(a) all embryo research projects be examined on a 
case-by-case basis by the National Committee for 
Medicine and Biology of Reproduction and 
Antenatal Diagnosis; 
(b) the law should distinguish between research 
on the embryo for the purpose of intra-uterine 
transfer, and research that does not aim to do so; 
and 
(c) the maintenance of the ban on the deliberate 
creation of embryos for research purposes.'9 
Similar re-commendations were made in January 
2001. The CCNE was of the opinion that the 
proposed legislation should include a firm reminder 
that the creation of embryos for research is 
prohtbited, and recommended allowing controlled 
use of spare IVF embryos for research purposes (in 
particular research on embryonic stem  cell^).^ 
l6 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. Cf. MacKellar 1997, 9 and European 
Parliament 2001b, 5 who state that a seven day period is imposed. Similarly, 
European Parliament 2001a, 16 declares that Decree No. 97 lays down a seven day 
time limit. 
17 Infinmation provided by the EGE (European Group on Ethics) Secretariat in 1998. 
Information provided by Pierre Langeron. 
l9 See CCNE 1998,9. 
i 20 SeeCCNE2001. 
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G-Y Embryo It is an offence to 
Protection Act (a) fertilise a human egg for any purpose other 
1990" than to start a pregnancy in the woman who 
produced the egg (S. l(1 X2)); and 
(b) use an embryo for any purpose not serving its 
preservation (S. 2(1)), where an embryo is 
defined to include any totipotent cell removed 
from an embryo that is assumed to be able to 
divide and develop into an individual (S. 8(1)). 
Thus, embryo research is prohibited. 
If neither treatment (as above) nor implantation is 
possible, the physician can only avoid punishment 
by allowing any surplus embryos to die." 
Violation of the law is severely sanctioned (up to 
three years imprisonment or a fine: S. 2). 
Greece None Embryo research is permitted by default.= 
The Greek Central Council for Health 
recommended that research on emb~yos should be 
permitted only during the first 14 days from 
fertilisation. 
A National Bioethics Committee has been 
established to investigate the issues raised by the 
application of biological sciences and to investigate 
their moral, legal, and social dimensions and 
comeq~ences.~~ 
Eufo~ean The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Convention has been ratifled without making any reservation to 
Article 18(2), which prohibits the creation of 
embryos for research. 
Ireland The Constitution Implicitly prohibited under the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, which states, 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990. 
22 See Vitzhum and Khmerer 1999,316. 
See Gunning and Eughsh 1993,172; and Schenker 1997,180. Additional i n f i t i o n  
provided by Tina Garanis-Papadatos and Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia. 
24 Tnfmmntinn nrnvidd hv Pnnnointn lh l ln -Vnrka  
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"The State acknowledges the right to life of the 
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to 
life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, 
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate that 
No specific The Medical Council's ethical guidelines state that, 
legislation. "Any fertilised ovum must be used for normal 
implantation and must not be deliberately 
destroyed" (para. 26.4). 
Also, it would be professional misconduct to create 
embryos for experimental purposes (para. 26.2).26 
Thus, embryo research is practically impossible for 
registered medical practitioners (the guidelines do 
not apply to other persons). 
The Government set up a Commission on Assisted 
Reproduction in 2000 to report on, inter alia, 
embryo research. 
Italy None Embryo research is permitted by default. 
l=r0posed A "Disengno di legge" on medically assisted 
legislation exists reproduction was passed by the Lower Chamber of 
Parliament on May 26 1999. This peaitted 
embryo research only for therapeutic and diagnostic 
reasons for the protection of the health and 
development of the embryo. It prohibited the 
production of embryos for research.27 It was not, 
however, passed by the Upper chamber." 
A proposed law on the protection of embryos has 
been under consideration since 21 June 2 0 0 0 . ~ ~  
Luxembourg None No embryo research is bemg performed. 
Proposed The proposed legislation, Law No. 4567, prohibits 
legislation exists the a t i o n  of embryos for research (Art. 8). In 
25 See also Attorney Geneml v X [l 9921 l.  1.R l. 
26 Infinmation provided by Deirdre Madden. 
27 Infonnation provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
SeePacitti2000, 19. 
29 See European Parliament 2001 b, 5. 
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exceptional circumstances, with the approval of the 
National Committee of Reproductive Medicine and 
Biology, medical research may be undertaken under 
the conditions specified by the Grad Ducal 
regulation (9 January 1997).~ Thus, experiments 
may be permitted on surplus embryos up to 14 days 
after fertilisation, where they have a medical aim 
and do not endanger the embry~.~' 
Under Art. 15 non-profit making establishments 
can collect, treat, and preserve gametes. Art. 28 
makes it a criminal offence to obtain embryos by 
payment.32 
Netherlands None Embryo research is permitted by default." 
The Health Council has recommended that an 
embryo should not be grown in v i m  beyond 14 
days following.fertili~ation.~~ It also recommended 
that legislation be passed which should 
(a) permit in v i m  embryo research after 
obtaining the approval of the Central 
Committee; 
(b) contain no ban on the creation of embryos for 
research; and 
(c) should prohibit transferring embryos used for 
research to the womb.35 
Proposed In late 2000, the government put forward 
legislation exists: legislation seem to prohibit the creation of 
The Embryo Bill embryos solely for research. This proposed 
legislation provides for a future Royal Decree 
lifting the general ban subject to conditions. It is 
envisaged that this decree will be passed between 
three and five years after the legislation comes into 
force. With the aim of ratifying the Convention on 
Biomedicine and Human rights, the Bill also 
See European Parliament 2001a, 17. 
See European Parliament 2001b, 4 and 8. 
32 See European Parliament 200 1 a, 1 7. 
33 See, e.g., Gunning and English 1993, 172. " See Health Council of the Netherlands 1998,6 1. 
35 See Health Council of the Netherlands 1998,13-14,61. 
i. 
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provides for a reservation to its ban on the creation 
of embryos for research (so that it can give effect to 
the Royal Decree in the future).= 
The proposed legislation allows scientific research 
on surplus embryos where it is "aimed at providmg 
new insights in the field of medical science." 
Portugal  one^^ Embryo research is permitted by default.38 The 
National Council of Ethics for the Life 
Sciences has declared that the production of 
embryos for research is "ethically unacceptable."39 
~onstitution'"' Some Constitutional provisions might be relevant. 
Art. 26 states that, 
"The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and 
genetic identity of the human being, particularly in 
the creation, development and use of technology 
and in scientific experimentation." 
Also, Art. 67.2(e) places a duty on the State to 
protect the family by "regulating assisted 
procreation, in such terms as safeguard human 
dignity." 
European The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Convention has been ratified without making any reservation to 
Article 18(2), which prohibits the creation of 
embryos for research. 
Proposed In 1998, Parliament accepted legislation on 
legislation exists medically assisted procreation. It has, however, 
remained unpublished because the President of the 
Republic applied hjs right to veto.41 This legislation 
would have prohibited the creation or use of 
embryos for research, but would have allowed 
36 See the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport website: http://www.rninvws.nl. 
37 See Oliveira 1996,68. 
B Accofdmg to the EGE 2000, l l :  'ho embryo research seems to be perfmed." 
See National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1995, especially 10. 
'"' For an English translation see httpY~.parlamento.ptfleid~tuicaoO~ngleslcrpcrp 
uk.htm. J d o  Carlos Loureiro kindly drew my attention to these provisions. 
4' Information provided by J& Carlos Loureiro. See also European Parliament 2001b, 
6. 
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experimental treatment performed to benefit the 
Spain Law 35 of Research on embryos is permitted up to 14 days 
November 1988" a fk r  fertilisation, provided the parties concerned 
give their written consent (SS. 15(l y(3) & 20). 
Research can only be conducted on viable embryos 
if it is applied research of a diagnostic character or 
if it has a therapeutic or prophylactic purpose, and 
the ''non-pathological genetic patrimony is not 
modified" (S. 15(2)). 
Research on non-viable embryos must not be 
capable of being carried out on an animal model, 
and must be authorised by the competent scientific 
and health authorities or, by delegation, by the 
Multi-disciplmuy National Committee (S. 1 S(3)). 
Research must have a purpose laid down in S. 16, 
such as the improvement of the techniques of 
assisted reproduction; or increasing knowledge 
about infertility, gene and chromosome structure, 
contraception, or the origin of genetic and 
herdtary diseases. 
Other purposes can be authorised by regulation or 
by the Multidisciphary National Committee 
(S. 16(1Xk)). 
The creation of embryos for research is prohibited 
(S. 3). 
Sweden Law No. 11 5 of Measures (incl* experiments for research or 
14 March 1991" treatment) involving fertilised ova require the 
" See Pereira 2001,507-508. 
43 An E@sh version is in OBcial Bulletin of the State, No. 282, Thursday 24 
November 1988. 
For a long time this Act remained unimplemented due to being challenged as 
unconstitutional. However, in July 1999 the Supreme Court ruled that it wss 
constitutional, and it has since been implemented. 
44 An English translation of this Act appears in Ministry of Health and Social Afbirs 
1991, Appendix 2. 
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consent of the donors of the gametes (S. 1). 
Embryos that have been subjected to experiments 
must be destroyed at the end of the 14th day (S. 2). 
A fertilised ovum may be stored in a frozen state 
for up to five years or for a longer period 
determined by the National Board of Health and 
Welfare under S. 5. (S. 3, as amended in 1998).* 
No gametes or embryos that have been the subject 
of research can be transferred to the woman's body 
(S. 4). 
Breaches of ss. 2,3, or 4 are sanctioned by a fine or 
up to one year imprisonment. Liability is imposed 
for a minor offence under S. 3. Any prosecution for 
offences under this Act can only be instigated with 
the consent of the National Board of Health and 
Welfare (S. 6). 
In practice, embryo research will often be approved 
by an ethics 
UK Human Research on embryos is permitted under licence up 
Fertilisation & to the appearance of the primitive streak or up to 
Embryology Act 14 days after fertilisation, whichever is the earliest 
1990 (SS. 3(3Xa) & 3(4)). 
An embryo is defined as a live egg that has been 
fertilised or is in the process of fertilisation 
(SS. 1(1 Xa) & 
Embryos that have been the subject of research may 
not be returned to the womb (S. 15(4)). 
The creation of embryos specifically for research is 
permitted under licence (Sch. 2, para. 3(1)). 
Any research must be "necessary or desirable" for 
45 Information on the amendment, whereby the storage period was increased h m  one to 
five years, provided by Elisabeth Rynning. 
46 Information provided by Elisabeth Rynning. 
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promoting advances in the treatment of infertility; 
knowledge about congenital disease, miscarriage, or 
contraception; or detection of gene or chromosome 
abnormalities (Sch. 2, para. 3(2)). There are now 
two additional purposes, see below. 
The Secretary of State may pass regulations 
extending the purposes for which embryo research 
is permitted (Sch. 2, para. 3(2)). However, the 
purposes that may be added are restricted to 
research that would increase knowledge about the 
creation and development of embryos, or about 
disease, or enable such knowledge to be applied 
(Sch. 2, para. 3(3)). 
Human The purposes for which research can be performed 
, Fertilisation & now include increasing knowledge about the 
Embryology development of embryos and about serious disease, 
(Research and enabling such knowledge to be applied in 
PU~POS~S) developing treatments for serious disease (Reg. 2). 
Regulations 2001 
US Legislation on 
Congressional 
appropriations for 
DHHS 
(Department of 
Health & Human 
Services) 
activities47 
None of the funds appropriated for the activities of 
the DHHS may be used for 
(a) creating human embryos for research; or 
(b) "research in which a human embryo or 
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or 
knowingly subjected to risk of injury greater 
than that allowed for research on fetuses in 
utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and section 
498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 
USC 289g(b)."48 
"Human embryo" is defined as "any organism. . . 
derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or 
any other means from one or more human gametes 
or human diploid cells."49 
In 1994, the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel 
supported federal funding for research on existing 
" The relevant provisions have been "included in Congressional appropriations for 
DHHS activities since 1996, without alteration" (Flannery and Javitt 2000, D-6). 
48 Flannery and Javitt 2000, D-6. 
49 Ibid. 
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unused embryos up to 14 days after fertilisation, 
and the creation of embryos for research in 
exceptional cases.M The Panel did, however, 
consider the implantation of research embryos and 
sex selection (except to avoid X-linked disease) to 
be unacceptable." 
Also, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC) has argued in favour of federal hdq for ' 
certain research on surplus embryos.52 
Private and university based research has been 
performed in the context of infertility treatment.53 
Also, embryos have been created for research.54 
The DHHS has ruled that human embryonic stem 
cells fall outside the ban on federal h d m g  of 
embryo research.55 More recently, President Bush 
announced that federal fimding will be available 
for stem cell research on existmg cell cultures, but 
would not be available for research on stem cells 
that had not been derived fiom embryos already 
existmg at the time of the ann~uncement.~ 
Individual state At least ten states have law regulating research on 
laws." in vim embryos, nine of which ban such research 
altogether.5a 
See NBAC 1999, Chapter 5. 
See Eisenberg and Schenker 1997,16. 
See NBAC 1997. 
See Eisenberg and Schenker 1997,16. 
See Josefson 200 1. 
See Meyer 2000,166; Flannexy and Javitt 2000, D-3. 
See Fletcher 2001. 
See Andrews 2000, especially Appendix A. 
See Andrews 2000, especially A4 .  
Appendix 4 
The Legality of Cloning1 
Counhy Legislation Legislative provisions concerning cloning 
additional to those addmssing embryo msearch 
Austria Act No. 275 of Cloning is indirectly prohibited.2 
1 July 1992~ 
Belgium None None. 
Legislation is 
being considered4 
Canada None A voluntary moratorium on the cloning of human 
embryos has existed since July 1995.' 
Proposed There have been a number of bills that failed or 
legislation exists: were dropped. Bill C-47 (which was dropped in 
Assisted Human 1997) prohibited the manipulation or implantation 
ReproductionAct of an ovum, zygote, or embryo for the purpose of 
producing a zygote or embryo that contains the 
same genetic information as a living or deceased 
human being or a zygote, embryo, or fetus: 
S. 4(1Xa). 
A Tri-Council Policy Statement recommends a 
legislative prohibition of cloning6 
In May 2001, the federal government released a 
Proposal for Legislation Governing Assisted 
A version of this table ori@ly appeared in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
See HGAC and HFEA 1998b, Annex E. ' See Government of Canada 1996, 7. However, the government did little more than 
request a voluntary moratorium, which has proved to be ineffective (see Caulfield et 
al. 1997, 8). 
See Medical Research Council of Canada et al. 1998, Articles 9.5. and 9.3. 
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Human ~e~roduction.' This proposal has been 
distributed in draft for discussion with the intention 
that the final version will be presented in 2002. 
The proposed legislation makes it a criminal 
offence for a person to knowmgly "create or 
participate in the creation of a human clone or 
transplant or participate in the transplantation of a 
human clone into a human being" (S. 3(1 Xa)). 
A "human clone" is defined as "an embryo that as a 
result of the manipulation of human reproductive 
material contains the same nuclear 
deoxyribonucleic acid sequence as is found in the 
cell of a living or deceased human being, foetus or 
embryo" (S. 2). 
It would also be a crimind offence to "create or 
participate in the creation of an embryo kom a cell 
or part of a cell taken kom an embryo or foetus, or 
transplant or pqticipate in the transplantation of 
such an embryo into a human being" (S. 3(1 Xe)). 
Thus, cloning (both reproductive and therapeutic) 
would be prohibited. 
Denmark Law No. 460 Research on, and assisted reproductive treatment 
of 1 9978 with the aim of, producing genetically identical 
individuals is prohibited, as is nuclear substitution. 
Assisted fertilisation may only take place if its 
objective is the uniting of a genetically unmodified 
egg with a genetically unmodified sperm cell (S. 2). 
The implantation ("either simultaneously or 
successively") of identical fertilised or unfkrtil~sed 
eggs into one or several women is prohibited (S. 4). 
"Experiments intended to enable production of 
genetically identical human individuals" are not 
allowed (S. 28).' 
7 See Health Canada 2001a. For discussion of this proposed legislation, see Health 
Canada 200 1 b and Caulfield 200 1. 
For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1997. 
As translated in Danish Council of Ethics 2001. 
! The Legality of Cloning 2 17 
l 
// Finland Medical Research Conducting medical research for the purpose of 
Act No. 488 of facilitating the cloning of human beings is a 
L 19991° criminal offence and sanctioned by up to two years 
imprisonment or a fine (S. 26). 
France Laws 94-653 and The embryo research that would be necessary to 
94-654 of 29 July clone a human being is prohibited. Thus, human 
1994" cloning is implicitly prohibited. This is conclusion supported 
by the Parliamentary preliminary 
works,12 and re-affirmed by opinion No. 54 of the 
National Consultative Commission of Ethics 
(ccNE).13 
The CCNE, in its Opinion No. 54 of 22 April 1997, 
opposed the production of identical human beings. 
It was divided on whether more explicit wording 
should be added when the legislation is revised. A 
later opinion, No. 60 of June 25 1998, 
recommended (by majority) making the prohibition 
more explicit, and proposed inviting a resolution by 
the General Assembly of the UN to proscribe 
human reproductive cloning. In its Opinion No. 67 
of 18 January 2001, the CCNE again recommended 
explicit prohibition of reproductive cloning-this 
time unanimously. l4 
Gennany Embryo It is an offence to create an embryo that is 
Protection Act genetically identical to another embryo, fetus, or 
1990" any living or dead person (S. 6). 
The Act does not define the key phrase; translated 
by Winter as "genetically identical,"16 and the 
Bulletin of Medical Ethics as "with same genetic 
information."17 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 2000. 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1994 
Information provided by Pierre Langeron. 
See CCNE 1997. 
See CCNE 1997, 1998, and 2001, respectively. 
For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990. 
See Winter 1991, 191. 
Winter 1991, 191 and Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990, 10, respectively. Also, 
translated as "having the same genetic information" in European Parliament 2001b, 3. 
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Violation of the law is severely sanctioned (up to 
five years imprisonment or a fine): S. 6. 
Greece None None. 
European Greece has signed and ratified the European 
Convention Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and 
its additional protocol prohibiting cloning. 
The Greek Central Council for Health has 
recommended that assisted reproduction should not 
be used for the creation of genetically identical 
human beings.'' 
A National Bioethics Committee has been 
established to investigate the issues raised by the 
application of biological sciences and to investigate 
their moral, legal, and social dimensions and 
C O ~ W I C ~ S .  19. 
Ireland None The legal position is uncertain. One commentator 
states that use of the Dolly technique might be 
affected by the Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987 
and the Control of Clinid Trials and Drugs Act 
1990, if they are not "tm vague in their nature to 
include the procedure."20 
The Medical Council does, however, have 
guidelines.'l Para. 26.1 of the Medical Guidelines 
1998 state, 
"The creation of new forms of life for experimental 
purposes or the deliberate and intentional 
destruction of human life already f m e d  is 
professional misconduct." 
Para. 26.2 limits the manipulation of sperm or eggs 
to the "improvement of health." It adds, 
"However, if the intention is not so directed or is 
the creation of embryos for experimental purposes, 
it would be professional misconduct." 
l' See Dalla-Vorgia 1996,281. 
19 Information provided by Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia. 
20 Sheikh 1997,95. 
21 See Ahlstrom 2001. 
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Doctors who practice medicine outside these 
ethical limits are open to sanction by the council, 
includmg removal of their licence to practice in 
Ireland. However, the guidelines "only apply to 
registered medical practitioners and would be 
ineffective in the case of any service operated by 
other 
The Government set up a Commission on Assisted 
Human Reproduction in 2001, which will report 
on, inter alia, cloning.23 
Italy The Minister of The decree prohibits all forms of experimentation 
Health issued a and intervention aimed at (even indirectly) cloning 
decree on 5 a human or 
March 1997'~ 
The National Bioethics Committee (CNB) has 
expressed the view that cloning should be 
prohibited. 26 
Proposed A series of laws have been proposed, includmg law 
legislation exists S.2433 on the protection of embryos, which has 
been under consideration since 21 June 2000.'~ 
Under the proposed law, human cloning is banned, 
and transgressors will be punished with 10-20 year 
sentences.28 
Luxembourg None None. 
Netherlands None None. 
European The Netherlands has signed the Convention on 
Convention Human Rights and Biomedicine and its Additional 
See Irish Department of Health website: http:llwww.doh.ie, "Assisted Repduction 
Commission set up" dated 25 February 2000. 
Ibid. 
See UNESCO 1998,lO. 
See UNESCO 1998, 10. Such decrees have legal force for only 90 days unless 
converted by a vote of the Parliament. This did not initially happen. However, it has 
since been renewed. Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
See UNESCO 1998,lO. 
See European Parliament 2001 b, 5. 
See Simini 1999, 1950. 
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Protocol. It has, however, added the following 
declaration, 
"In relation to Article 1 of the Protocol, the 
Government of the m d o m  of the Netherlands 
declares that it interprets the term 'human beqs '  
as referring exclusively to a human individual, i.e., 
a human beq who has been born." 
,proposed In 1998 the government proposed to pass 
legislation legislation prohibiting the cloning of human beings, 
existsz9 but permitting the use of cloning techniques in 
embryo research (before 14 days after 
c~nception).~ 
However, in late 2000, the government proposed 
legislation prohibitmg the creation of embryos for 
research and prohibiting human 
Portugal  one^^ The National Council of Ethics for the Life 
Sciences has expressed the view that the cloning of 
human beings is "ethically unacceptable" and must 
be 
Some provisions Art. 26 states that, 
of the 
Constitution The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and 
might be genetic identity of the human being, particularly in 
relevant34 the creation, development and use of technology 
and in scientific experimentation." 
Also, Art. 67.2(e) places a duty on the State to 
protect the family by "regulating assisted 
procreation, in such terms as safeguard human 
dignity." 
--- 
'g Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. ' See the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport website: http://www.minvws.nl. 
32 By implication, see National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1997,2. 
33 See National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1997,2. 
34 For an English translation see http://www.parlamento.ptfleiddtUicaoO~ngledcrpcrp 
uk.htm. JOao Carlos Loureiro kindly drew my attention to these provisioos. 
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Proposed The law on assisted procreation, passed by the 
legislation Assembleia de Rephblica but vetoed by the 
exists President, made cloning a rriminal offence.% 
European Portugal has signed and ratified the European 
Convention. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and 
its additional protocol prohibiting cloning. 
Spain Law 35 of It is a criminal offence to create identical human 
November 1988 beqs ,  by cloning or other procedures aimed at 
(S. 2 0 ) , ~  and Title race selection (S. 2q2XBa)). 
V of the Penal 
Code It is also an offence to create human b e q s  by 
(S. 161(2))~~ cloning "in any of the variants or any other 
procedure capable of originating several identical 
human beings" (S. 2 0 ( 2 ~ ~ ~ 1 ) ) . %  
European Spain has signed and ratified the European 
Convention Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and 
its additional protocol prohibiting cloning. 
Sweden Law No. 1 15 of A fertilised ovum or gamete befort? fertilisation that 
14 March 1991" has been the subject of experimentation for 
purposes of research or treatment must not be 
implanted into a woman's body (S. 4). Also, 
experiments may not be performed on fertilised ova 
that have the purpose of developing methods for 
achieving potentially hereditary genetic effects 
(S. 2). Thus, cloning is implicitly prohibited if 
cloning can be said to involve "fertili~ation.'~ 
Since experiments on fertilised ova are permitted 
up to 14 days if the purpose is not to develop 
methods of achieving potentially hereditary genetic 
effects (S. 2), cloning by embryo splitting is 
35 See Pereira 200 1,5 10. 
An English version is in the Oflcial Bulletin of the State, No. 282, Thursday 24 
November 1988. 
" Title V of the Penal Code is translated in Lacadena 1996. 
As translated in the Offcial Bulletin of the State. 
39 For an English translation see Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1991, 
2. 
See UNESCO 1998,ll; and HGAC and HFEA 1998b, Annex E, for statements to the 
effect that embryo and oocyte cloning is implicitly prohibited with cnininal sanctions. 
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allowed as an experiment on a f&sed ovum up 
to 14 days. 
The National Council on Medical Ethics and the 
National Board of Gene Technology highlight the 
possibility that cloning using the Dolly technique 
might not be wvered41 
UK Human The nuclear substitution of an embryo is prohibited 
Fertilisation & (S. 3(3Xd)). 
Embryology Act 
1990 Licences are required for the creation of an embryo 
outside of the body (ss. 3(1Xa) & 1(2)), where an 
embryo is defined as a fertilised egg or an egg in 
the process of fertilisation (ss. l(1Xa) k (b)). 
The 1990 Act was recently held not to wver the 
Dolly technique." 
Human It is an offence to place in a woman a human 
Reproductive embryo that has been created otherwise than by 
Cloning Act 2001 fertilisation (S. l(1)). 
US No federal None. 
legislation of 
direct relevance43 The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(Nl3AC) recommended the introduction of a 
legislative prohibition on the use of cloning to 
create a child. This was to contain a sunset clause 
to ensure that Congress reviewed this prohibition 
after a specified period (three to five years)." 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) claims 
jurisdiction on the basis of its authority to regulate 
medical products for safety and efficacy, 
"The use of cloning technology to clone a human 
being would be subject to both the biologies 
provisions of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act 
41 Information provided by Elisabeth Rynning. 
42 R (on application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWHC 918, 
[2001] 4 All 1013. 
" See NBAC 1997,88. " See NBAC 1997, especially iii-iv. 
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and the drug and device provisions of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. . . . Because of the 
unresolved safety questions pertaining to the use of 
cloning technology to clone a human being, FDA 
would not permit any such investigation to proceed 
at this time.'*' 
The FDA's claim to regulatory jurisdiction has, 
however, been questioned by some  commentator^.^ . 
Proposed federal The Human Cloning Prohibition Bill was passed by 
legislation exists the US House of Representatives in August 2001. It 
has yet to be considered by the Senate. The bill 
prohibits the cloning of human begins for any 
purpose, making it a criminal offence punishable by 
up to 10 years in prison and fines of at least $1 
million. It also prohibits the importation of 
treatments derived from cloned embryos. 
If enacted, federal legislation banning cloning could 
be challenged on at least three constitutional 
grounds: (1) not being within the scope of the 
commerce clause; (2) violating scientists' First 
Amendment freedom of inquiry; and (3) violating a 
couple's or individual's constitutional right to 
privacy or liberty to make reproductive  decision^.^' 
The last two are also potential grounds for 
challenging state legislation. 
There is also state State legislation: e.g., California has enacted a five 
legislation year ban on the cloning of human beings using the 
Dolly technique.48 At least 21 states have 
considered similar bills. Indeed, many states ban 
cloning an individual, regardless of the funding 
source, however, the Alabama legislation "bans the 
use of government funds for any research using 
cloned cells or tissue," and Missouri legislation 
bans 'the use of government funds for cloning an 
entire indi~idual."~~ 
4' FDA 200 1 a. 
46 See, e.g., Rokosz 2000. 
47 See Andrews 1997, F-5-F-7. 
Californian Health and Safety Code, S. 24185: see Harvard Law Review 1998,2353. 
49 NBAC 1997, 104. 
i 
The Legality of Germ-line Gene Therapy1 
Country Legislative pmisions concerning genn-line gene themm in addition to 
those addressing embtyo research 
Austria Act on Procreative Medicine 27511992 prohibits germ-line gene therapy 
(S. 9(2)).2 
Belgium None. 
Canada A voluntary moratorium on gm-line modification has existed since July 
1995.' 
Art. 8.5 of the recent Tri-Council Policy Statement declares, 
' M e  alteration (including 'gene therapy') that involves human germline 
cells or human embryos is not ethically acceptable. Gene alteration for 
therapeutic purposes and involving human somatic cells may be considered 
for appr~val. '~ 
This statement represents the view of the three main research funding 
councils of ~anada.' 
In May 2001, the federal government released a Proposal for Legislation 
Governing Assisted Human ~ e ~ d u c t i o n . ~  This proposal has been 
distributed in draft for discussion with the intention that the final version 
will be presented in 2002. 
The proposed legislation makes it a rriminal offence to knowingly "alter 
1 A version of this table origrnally appeared in Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000b. 
See Kriari-Catranis 1998, 53. 
See Government of Canada 19%, 7. However, the government did little more than 
request a voluntary moratorium, which has proved to be ineffective (see Caulfeld et 
al. 1997,8). 
See Medical Research Council of Canada et al. 1998. 
For a discussion of the Tri-Council Policy Statement, see Molinari 1998. 
See Health Canada 2001a. For discussion of this proposed legislation, see Health 
Canada 2001 b and Caulfield 2001. 
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the genome of a cell of a human being or in vim embryo such that the 
alteration is capable of being transmitted to its descendants" (S. 3(1)(b)). 
Denmark Under Law No. 460 of 1997: artificial fertilisation may only take place if 
its objective is the uniting of a genetically unmodified egg with genetically 
unmodified sperm (S. 2). 
Fertilised eggs that have been used in biomedical research may not be 
implanted if they have been genetically m&ed (S. 27(1)). 
Finland Medical Research Act No. 488 of 1999' prohibits research on embryos or 
gametes for the purpose of developing methods to alter hereditary 
characteristics, unless it aims to find a cure or to prevent a severe 
hereditary disease (S. 15). Violation is sanctioned by up to one year 
imprisonment or a fine (S. 25). 
The working group (set up by the Ministry of Justice) reporting on the use 
of gametes and embryos in assisted fertilisation had proposed that no 
gametes or embryos be used in assisted fertilisation where the genetic 
heritage has been modified.g 
France Law 94-653 of 29 July 1994" (forming Art. 16-4 of the Civil Code) 
provides, 
"No one is permitted to violate the integrity of human species;" and 
"Any eugenic practice with a view to organising a selection of persons is 
prohibited. Without prejudice to research for the prevention and treatment 
of genetic diseases, no modification can be made to genetic traits with the 
purpose of modifying the descendants of a person."" 
Thus, germ-line gene therapy is prohibited. 
Germany Embryo Protection Act 1990 explicitly prohibits germ-line gene therapy 
(S. 5(1)/(2)).12 
Violation is sanctioned with up to five years imprisonment or a fine 
(S. 5(lY(2)). 
For an English translation see International Digest of Health Legislation 1997. ' For an English translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 2000. 
Information provided by Salla L(ltj1)nen. 
l0 Information provided by Pierre Langeron. 
" CCNE 1997. 
l2 For an Engl~sh translation see Bulletin of Medical Ethics 1990. 
The Legality of Germ-line Gene Therapy 227 
Greece None. 
A National Bioethics Committee has been established to investigate the 
issues raised by the application of biological sciences and to investigate their 
moral, legal, and social dimensions and  consequence^.'^ 
Ireland None. 
Italy None. 
The National Bioethics Committee (CNB) has published a document 
accepting somatic gene therapy while condemning germ-line gene therapy.14 
Luxembourg No information. 
Netherlands None. 
The Health Council has recommended a moratorium on human germ-line 
gene therapy. 
Portugal None. 
However, some provisions of the Fourth Revision of the Constitution might 
be relevant. Art. 26 states that, 
"The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and genetic identity of the 
human being, particularly in the creation, development and use of 
technology and in scientific experimentation." 
Also, Art. 67.2(e) places a duty on the State to protect the family by 
"regulating assisted procreation, in such terms as safeguard human dignity." 
Spain Under S. 15(2)(b) of Law 35 of November 1988, research on viable embryos 
can only be conducted where "the non-pathological genetic patrimony is not 
modified."15 
l 3  Information provided by Panagiota Dalla-Vorgia 
l4 Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. There have been a series of proposed laws, 
many of which did not directly address germ-line gene therapy. 
l5 An English version of this Act appears in OfJicial Bulletin of the State, NO. 282, 
1 Thursday 24 November 1988. 
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Sweden Under Law 115 of 1991,16 experiments on fertilised ova for the purposes of 
research or treatment "may not have the purpose of developing methods for 
achieving potentially hereditary genetic effects" (S. 2). 
UK Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, a treatment 
licence cannot "authorise altering the genetic structure of any cell while it 
forms part of an embryo" (Sch. 2, para 1(4)), and the same is true of a 
research licence, "except in such circumstances (if any) as may be specified 
in or determined in pursuance of regulations" (Sch. 2, para. 3(4)).17 
US No federal legislation explicitly addressing gene therapy. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has claimed the jurisdiction to 
regulate gene therapy since 1993. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
and its advisory committee, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee 
(RAC), are also involved in the regulation of gene therapy clinical 
research." However, the FDA's jurisdiction is confined to ensuring the 
safety and efficacy of products and the NIH only has jurisdiction over 
proposals that it funds or take place in NW-funded institutions.19 
l6 An English translation is in Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1991, Appendix 2. 
l7 For further information on the regulation of prenatal gene therapy in the UK see 5.8, 
above. 
See FDA 2000. 
l9 See Marden and Nelkin 2000,473. 
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